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Abstract
The start of this project coincided with the birth of my first child, Evelyn. Becoming 
a parent revealed the connectivity in and among the relationships that were being 
made in, and often extended beyond, our home. This connectivity is analysed here in 
terms of relationality, or a focus on the complex aspects of engagement among self 
and other. In this research project, I reflect upon my own experience using the lens of
relational environmental scholarship. I propose that parenting could be a praxis 
informed by such scholarship. 
Dualism is a central antagonist of relational environmental scholarship. This mode of
relating is typified by the physical, emotional, cultural, and/or instrumental 
domination of one group of people, beings, or entities over another, usually to the 
long-term detriment of both. The Australian environmental and relational 
philosophers Val Plumwood, Freya Mathews, and Debora Bird Rose critique 
dualistic and dominating modes of relating to others, while conceptualising 
connective and dialogical alternatives. The philosophies and insights of these three 
authors become a scaffold for nurturing my own understanding of relationality. 
My methodology draws upon the practices and philosophies of autoethnography, 
phenomenology, and hermeneutics. I narrate several revealing parenting experiences 
(as they pertain to particular relational themes), and textually and reflexively analyse 
the messy nuances of such encounters to build upon the scholarly work of 
Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose. 
To begin my analysis, I examine Plumwood’s five qualities of dualism and 
demonstrate the presence of dualistic logic in the parenting practice of sleep training 
infants (Chapter 5). In the proceeding chapters, I build an understanding of the fine 
line between domination and leadership in caregiving by reflecting upon 
undemocratic parenting decisions (Chapter 6), unveil the ontological and 
epistemological grounding of relational dynamics by analysing forms of judgement 
in parenting (Chapter 7), and examine panpsychism in response to my daughter’s 
friendship with a jar of lentils to question whom we value as relational kin and why 
(Chapter 8).  In the final chapter, the synthesis, I utilise understandings gained in the 
previous analysis chapters to bridge the gap between theories and practices of 
relationality. I conclude that deep and felt engagement, motivated by love and 
anxiety, plays a key role in connecting concepts of relationality with relational 
praxis. Praxis, in this case, is not about achieving ideal outcomes with ideal concepts,
or about rejecting dualism in favour of its opposite, but rather, to embrace the 
complexity and imperfection of relationality and to fight for connectivity, awareness,
engagement, dialogue, and reflexivity through the dynamics of relational life.   
Parenting, a rich and intense part of many people’s lives, offers an accessible means 
of embodying relational ontologies and epistemologies for both parents and children.
Equally, the philosophies of Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose can extend the depth of 
parenting philosophy (which is predominately practice focused) through their deeper 
analysis of the politics, metaphysics, history, ethical frameworks, and power 
relations which colour relationships of care.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1 - Newborn Evelyn and her new parents. Photo credit: Kaseen Cook
Don’t give up! I believe in you all!
A person’s a person, no matter how small!
And you very small persons will not have to die
If you make yourselves heard! So come on, now, and TRY!
(Seuss, 1954, p.47)
1.1 Question, Significance, and Intention
Muir et al (2010) proposed that how people care for each other is mirrored in how 
people care for the non-human world. How people care for their infants and children 
may likewise reflect how we care for non-human others. Parenting practices and 
environmental philosophies (specifically that of relationality, which is examined in 
this thesis), are both most often concerned with how humans situate themselves and 
their kin in the world. From this common focus emerge questions of how we 
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perceive self and others and their interconnection, how we form values that guide 
encounters of care, and how those values manifest in practice. 
Relational thinkers can be found in disciplinary traditions such as ecophilosophy, 
humanistic psychology, ecopsychology, transpersonal psychology, ecofeminism, and
deep ecology, as well as scholarly research on sustainability, Buddhism, and 
parenting practice to name a few. Here I focus on relationality, as it is described by 
Plumwood (1991), as a rejection of environmental instrumentalism and a focus on 
the connective and communicative aspects of self and others. Relationality is 
primarily ontological, in that it describes a view of the world as composed of a 
continuously dynamic, connective, and infinitely dimensional messy tangling of 
relationships among, within and thus constitutive of phenomena. Within the scope of 
this thesis, relationality also describes a focus on the synergy of intellectual concepts 
and physical practices of relating. This acknowledges that social relationships are 
central to the physical, mental, and metaphysical dynamics of the universe. 
Therefore, to address issues such as environmental crisis and social injustices, 
requires that we examine the relevant fundamental roots of these relationships that 
constitute them, including their materials, connectivity, dialogues, symbols, 
meanings, contexts, understandings, socio-cultural histories, and ethical frameworks. 
As Mathews (2017) describes of relationality:
If dualism was a paradigm that defined entities and attributes by hyper-separation, 
then relationality was the key to a new, emerging paradigm that would define entities 
and attributes in terms of their constitutive relations with one another, retaining 
difference and distinctness but construing these not in terms of exclusion, hierarchy, 
instrumentalism, backgrounding, incorporation, or homogenization, but rather in terms
of continuity (Mathews, 2017, p. 60). 
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The primary research question of this thesis is: 
In what ways can an analysis of parenting relationships provide a praxis for 
relational environmental scholarship? 
This research is significant because it creates a dialogue between parenting practice 
and concepts of relationality that manifest in two ways:
1. Analysing (my) the experience of parenting through the lens of
environmental ethics provides a means of developing a greater understanding
of relationality, as well as insight into and critique of relational theories.
Parenting presents a significant opportunity to analyse and understand the
power dynamics, culture, ethics, and experiences that frame intense
interdependent relationships within a particular context, providing new
relational understandings based in lived experience.
2. It follows then, that parenting practice presents the opportunity to develop a
praxis for environmental/relational scholarship, that helps to address the issue
raised by Mathews (2017) that theoretical disciplines such a ecofeminism are,
themselves, dualist when only defined by theories. Mathews (2017) writes:
As long as ecofeminism continues to define itself in theoretical terms, as 
philosophical discourse, the consciousness of ecofeminists will arguably remain
dualist, however opposed to dualism their theoretical stance might be 
(Mathews, 2017, p. 54).
Parenting presents a profound opportunity to develop a praxis for relational 
theories that questions how we are, and how we can, foster the relational 
qualities of new people, and how they, in-turn relate to others. Such a praxis 
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may contribute to addressing environmental crisis, social injustice, and other 
challenges.
If that is the case, then exploring and critiquing theories of ecofeminists and other 
environmental philosophers through the relational practice and experience of 
parenting may go some way to addressing this dilemma. In this project, I will 
reflexively analyse my own parenting experiences in dialogue with the relational 
environmental scholarship of Deborah Bird Rose, Freya Mathews, and Val 
Plumwood to produce new insights about concepts of relationality, and to propose 
ways in which parenting may provide a praxis for these relational philosophies and 
vice versa.
In my analysis, I consider a variety of my own parenting experiences, practices, and 
circumstances, ranging from those that may embody dualistic logic, through to those 
that may support the relationality promoted by Mathews, Rose, and Plumwood. This 
analysis consists of four chapters: Chapter 5: The Dualistic Logic of Sleep Training, 
Chapter 6: Negotiating Caregiver Power, Chapter 7: Judgement, and Chapter 8: 
Panpsychism and Parenting. 
I choose this range of themes in order to cover the breadth of relational concepts 
addressed by Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose. This range of themes includes 
identifying the culturally engrained issue of dualism (Ch. 5), unpicking the dynamics
of power relations (particularly in care situations) (Ch. 6), unveiling the ethical 
frameworks of dualism and relationality (Ch. 7), reasoning to whom ethical 
frameworks apply and how they are applied (Ch. 8), and synthesising and concluding
the thesis by reflecting upon the central role of engagement and its motivations (Ch. 
9). 
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Many choices about the direction of the analysis were organic and inductive, in that, 
the content I planned to cover at the onset of this research, and its 
organisation/presentation, continually changed with my growing understandings and 
the knowledge available. This included many intuitive and interpretive decisions 
about how to progress the thesis and what themes to explore deeper. Equally, the 
themes I chose to address needed to provide enough depth - in both parenting and 
philosophical discourse - to constitute a substantial body of work without being too 
large in scope to fit within the limits of this PhD project. There were endless 
parenting stories that could have illustrated these themes in different ways, so I 
choose stories based on how well I felt they suited the direction of each analysis. 
There were many stories and other theme areas that I wish I could have included 
(such as a chapter on relational intimacy), but due to time and scope limits, I had to 
be selective. 
The experiences presented in this thesis are not intended to provide a comprehensive 
account of parenting or to define a universal ‘parent’. The point of this analysis is to 
demonstrate the importance of parenting as praxis for relational scholarship, and as a 
means of understanding complex relationships of care. The value of my narrative lies
in the meanings that flow from participation in relational congress. These meanings, 
reflectively analysed in concert with other (scholarly and lay) literature, form 
understandings of parenting, relational scholarship and their common connection. 
My understandings evolve as I progress different themes, and so my insights in the 
first analysis chapter will have changed by the time I reach my last chapter. A 
synthesis chapter therefore follows the analysis to pull out and further refine key 
insights.
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1.2 Ontological and Epistemological Grounding
My child, Evelyn, was born on May 28th 2013, and without our amazingly rich 
relationship and my subsequent experiences of parenting, I would have never 
considered parenting as a significant focus for exploring relationality and its 
application. Motherhood has challenged the way I relate to others, and the way I 
view cultural practices and values. It has even changed the way I view my own 
childhood, assumptions about life and interdependency, and my resulting life course. 
My PhD journey officially began in December 2012. I wanted to dig more deeply 
into the relational ideas within environmental discourses, but how? From the 
inspiration of Rose’s ethnographic work (Rose, 2005), I initially considered 
investigating lived relational environmental philosophies with an Australian 
Aboriginal case study. Once I began my PhD, I realised that researching, 
experiencing, and understanding an Aboriginal case study was beyond my capability.
I became a little unstuck looking for the right way to further an understanding of 
relationality. By this stage, I was coming to the end of my pregnancy and I went on 
maternity leave for eight months feeling a bit lost and hoping for some inspiration 
over my break. 
Pregnancy, birth, and parenting launched me into a new culture and a very intense 
relationship of care. It was not until I contemplated returning to study, and possibly 
being separated from Evelyn, that I realised the significance of our relationship 
within the philosophical and practical reaches of relationality. I was becoming 
disillusioned with mainstream attitudes towards children and deeply involved in 
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streams of gentle parenting. Many of the principles of these new (to me) parenting 
philosophies resonated with the qualities of relational scholarship, such as concepts 
of respect, power, dialogue, and like-mindedness. I wondered if parenting, a very 
profound care-giving relationship, may provide opportunities for greater relational 
understanding, as well as a practical means of applying relational scholarship 
through parenting practice. 
In order to approach such a complex and context specific relationship, I adopted an 
interpretive and relational ontological position. As someone trained in science, this 
was a challenge, but a very liberating and opening process of questioning my 
scientific compulsions. To begin this process, I first became aware of ‘knowing’. 
How do we know? Why do we know? This is what I reasoned: We know the world 
through the senses of our body. That knowing is then processed through routes of 
consciousness – logical, innate, creative or other; we interpret and value knowing to 
further personal and interpersonal intentions. Knowing enables survival, and much of
what we know to survive is not objective. It’s relational, it’s complicated, and it’s 
experienced and interpreted. Even authors like Keller (1983) have described how the 
genetic scientist McClintock created a meaningful friendship with corn cells in order 
to further her understanding of them. In the following passage, McClintock describes
her relationship to Keller:
When I was really working with them I wasn't outside, I was down there. I was part of
the system. I was right down there with them, and everything got big. I even was able 
to see the internal parts of the chromosomes – actually everything was there. It 
surprised me because I actually felt as if I were right down there and these were my 
friends. (Keller, 1983, p.117)
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Knowledge occurs within the context of the meaning people ascribe to it. If a 
computer performs a statistical analysis and the scientist does not interpret it, does it 
mean anything? In this understanding, existence and knowing requires 
consciousness. Throughout my scientific upbringing I never questioned why 
researchers were superficially distanced from the knowing generated by their work. 
How can that distance be truly objective when the value of science depends upon 
how it’s interpreted? Numbers do not constitute knowing on their own, and thus even
science must be, in part, an interpretive system created for the purposes of furthering 
and understanding various manifestations of reality. Science is just one of many 
routes for generating information that requires a certain degree of belief and 
acceptance in a particular epistemological (in this case, scientific) process – a 
religion of sorts, with a particular set of values and practices (Mathews, 2011). With 
this line of thought, scientific and objective ways of ‘knowing’ blurred into the 
background with other forms of knowledge. Science is just another way of knowing 
the world, no more or less important than any other way. Therefore, relational 
understandings are valuable in their own right. 
This interpretive position acknowledges the subjective and context-specific nature of 
knowledge, as well as the multiplicity of understandings that it generates (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005; Flood, 2010). Furthermore, given that I am drawing upon 
personal experience to develop my understandings, a constructivist epistemology is 
consistent with my aims. This view of knowledge generation allows for many 
different ways of ‘knowing’ experience. Evidence of experience is a social construct,
therefore this research does not produce single ‘truths’ or answers (Ellis et al, 2011; 
Ferrarello, 2012). This research presents understandings - my understandings - about 
my experiences of parenting within the context of furthering understandings and 
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praxis of relationality. These understandings are intended to add to the great 
discourse devoted to understanding who we are - they aren’t right or wrong - they 
just are. At its base, this project is a synergy of the relational ontology and 
epistemology of both parenting and relational scholarship.   
Additionally, in this thesis I will utilise the terms ‘environment’ and ‘nature’ as they 
are utilised by Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose throughout their literature. I recognise
that these terms are contradictory to an ontological position that views the world as 
seamlessly connective. It can be necessary to use these terms to describe 
intellectualised parts of the whole (or existing specialised areas of thought, such as 
environmental philosophy) or to refer to cultural ideas which may segregate 
‘environments’ and ‘nature’ as a category of others. The use of the term 
‘environment’ also helps to locate this thesis within schools of thought such as 
ecofeminism, environmental humanities, and environmental philosophy, rather than 
just free-floating amongst vast relational discourses.    
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Forms of oppression from both the present and the past have left their traces in
western culture as a network of dualisms, and the logical structure of dualism
forms a major basis for the connection between forms of oppression.
(Plumwood, 1993, p. 2)
2.1 Introduction
The theories of relationality which ground this thesis assume and accept that all 
matter is connective and seamless, including those theories which I evidence here in 
my narratives of parenting practice. While relational thinking is applicable to many 
different social, environmental, and economic fields, I will focus my analysis in 
reference to the Australian philosophers Deborah Bird Rose, Freya Mathews, and 
Val Plumwood who also assume the continuous connectivity of matter. These three 
authors have inspired the themes that I aim to develop and explore in my analysis, 
such as ecofeminism, the metaphysics of connectivity, subjectivity, oppression and 
leadership, relational politics, values, and ethics within Australian contexts. All three 
scholars offer different perspectives and interests within the realm of environmental 
concerns, but their philosophies are highly interrelated through their common 
relational ontological positions, critiques of dominant world-views, and recognition 
of dualisms of oppression within relationships. Rigby (2006) and Swain and Smart 
(2014) describe Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose as significant voices in the 
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development of relational philosophy and environmental scholarship. In this chapter, 
I provide an introduction to the works of Plumwood, Rose, and Mathews, and so 
identify the philosophical niche in which this thesis is situated.          
2.2 Val Plumwood
Australian Val Plumwood was an ecofeminist whose work heavily influences this 
research process and thesis. Many ecofeminists sought to move beyond the eco-
centric and/or androcentric views of schools of thought such as deep ecology and 
environmental ethics, and cultivate a more inclusive, mutual, and caring way of 
resituating people (physically, socially, and mentally) into ecology (Plumwood, 
1991; 1993; Warren, 1990; 1993). In 1975, Rosemary Radford Ruether wrote in the 
book New Woman/New Earth (Ruether, 1975), that both feminism and 
environmentalism are troubled by societies of domination, and so share a common 
cause (Ruether, 1975; Warren, 1993). Ecofeminsists, while individual and diverse in 
their particular philosophies, share the perspective that there are important 
connections between the oppression and domination of women and the oppression 
and domination of the environment. This connection highlights the underlying social 
origins of these crises that require deeper and more serious consideration 
(Plumwood, 1986; 1991; Warren, 1990). 
Different ecofeminists evidence the domination of women and its links to 
environmental degradation in different ways. For instance, some use historical 
accounts of patriarchal cultures such as colonialism or the ascent of science, while 
others evidence value dualisms with male biases such as male-orientated hierarchies. 
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Some ecofeminists utilise empirical evidence to demonstrate that environmental 
destruction causes an unequal burden of suffering for women, children, poor, and 
minority races, while other scholars evidence the symbolic devaluation of women in 
cultural expression such as art, religion, politics, and literature (Plumwood, 1986; 
1991; 1993; Warren, 1990; 1993). Some streams of ecofeminism view all that 
encompasses being female (the female body, childbirth, mothering, and care taking, 
for example) as intimately and literally, rather than just culturally, linked to nature, 
and in turn see all that encompasses masculinity as being linked to artifice, 
intellectual reasoning, and domination (Plumwood, 1986; 1991; 1993; Warren, 1990;
1993). 
Some ecofeminists believe that women have a strong and privileged role to play in 
reconnecting people with non-humans (Archambault, 1993; Warren, 1990). As 
Plumwood (1993) reflects, sometimes the links between ‘nature’ and the feminine 
are flattering (such as a vision of a glorified ‘earth mother’), and sometimes they are 
derogatory (such as women being viewed as primitive and incapable of intellectual 
thought). Sometimes even the masculine is likened to nature (as in a wild, powerful, 
and rugged man) and logic to woman (as in the organised, multi-tasking, 
homemaker). Regardless of whether connections with nature are framed positively or
negatively (or even as male or female), Plumwood (1993) asserts that most of these 
distinctions attribute power and mastery to the masculine and being power-less and 
subservient to the feminine. As Plumwood (1993, p. 7) describes:
For usually this state is seen as a beleaguered one, surviving against the hostile intent 
of men, who control a world of power and inequality, of military and technological 
might and screaming poverty, where power is the game and power means domination 
of both nature and people. Feminist vision often draws the contrasts starkly – it is life 
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versus death, Gaia versus Mars, mysterious forest versus technological desert, women 
versus men. (Plumwood, 1993, p. 7)
Privileging women to reconnect people with ecology is strongly criticised as being 
essentialist because it asserts that male and female are fixed concepts, that the 
presumed association between women and ‘nature’ is innate, and that man’s 
disconnect from ‘nature’ is also fixed (Carlassare, 1994). Such a philosophy about 
the connections between gender and ‘nature’ lack openness about the potential for 
people – regardless of gender – to resituate themselves with non-humans. It also 
serves to reinforce dualistic and oppositional divisions based on the distinctions of 
male/female, reason/emotion, and human/nature which many ecofeminists, such as 
Plumwood, were trying to move beyond.
Plumwood (1991, 1993) discusses the role of rationalism in the enablement 
of dualistic practices and cultural paradigms. Reasoning, in the most basic 
sense, describes the ability of a being to plan and make decisions based on 
the available knowledge (Hawkins, 2009; Mathews, 2017). Rationalism is 
reasoning and theories immersed in agendas of mastery, which rides on the 
back of the rise of scientific authority (Mathews, 2017; Plumwood 1991, 
1993). Rationalism endears a mindset which is steeped in patriarchal 
history, and champions the powerful side of dualisms such as mind over 
matter, reason over emotion, human over nature, masculine over feminine, 
and so on. Rationalism universalises and simplifies relationships, and 
asserts the moral righteousness of the master (Plumwood, 1991, 1993). As 
Plumwood (1991) suggests, rationalism is the key to linking environmental 
ethics with other ethical discourses (such as feminism, or in the case of this 
thesis, parenting practice), because rationalism is evident in broader issues 
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of instrumentalism, the human self, and ethnocentric concepts of morality. 
Plumwood criticises traditional environmental ethics as just another form of
rationalism, because it dictates to whom ethical treatment should be 
generously granted. Rather, Plumwood (1991) suggests ethics should take a
dialogical and open form which is not grounded in rational and dualistic 
justifications for engagement with non-humans.
While Plumwood echoes the criticisms of postmodernists who deconstruct the power
relations of dualisms – sifting out and defining the oppressive and dominating 
aspects of dualistic thinking and conceptual binaries – she argues that these thinkers 
do not go far enough (Plumwood, 1993). They reflect rationalist perspectives that the
'problem' can simply be identified and removed (Plumwood, 1993; also see 
Mathews, 2017). Such postmodernists focused on rejecting, breaking down, and 
resisting the power structures of dualism and their conceptual frameworks, but they 
did not fully recognise the need to heal the divisions left in the wake of dualism 
(Mathews, 2017; Plumwood, 1993). Notably, there is the risk that attempting to 
reconstruct and integrate marginalised groups and worldviews would just exchange 
one kind of power relation and theoretical position for another that may be just as 
oppressive, exclusionary, and essentialist, such as by rejecting patriarchy and 
privileging females and femininity to reconnect people with 'nature' (Mathews, 2017;
Plumwood, 1993).    
To counter the social and environmental degradation caused by engrained attitudes of
domination and mastery, and achieve the reconciliation which the deconstructive 
postmodernists averted, Plumwood suggested that modern science and philosophy 
should focus on re-situating the human with continuity - in ecological and relational 
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terms through scholarship in communication and ethics (Plumwood, 1991, 1993). 
Bannon (2009) summarises Plumwood’s three philosophical properties for 
facilitating concepts of relationality as: attributing mind-like qualities to nature, 
viewing nature as self-governing, and becoming sensitive to place. Plumwood argues
that a mind-like approach to ecological relationships will help people to see the 
qualities of themselves within social and material others, dissolving dualistic 
thinking and illuminating opportunities for communicative and mutually beneficial 
relationships (Bannon, 2009; Plumwood, 1991, 1993). Bannon (2009) supports 
Plumwood’s relational concepts, but also suggests that the deliberate conception of 
humans unified with nature (one with a planned ending) is an unlikely solution to 
environmental crisis, and suggests a more fluid and evolving relational ontology.
Plumwood’s most significant and detailed theoretical works include Feminism and 
the Mastery of Nature (1993) and Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason (2002). In the former, Plumwood (1993) provides an overview and critique 
of ecofeminism, acknowledging the ontological connection between different arenas 
of domination, but maintains that women should not be privileged as ecological 
saviours as this would pose yet another oppositional dualism. A significant 
contribution is her detailed conceptualisation and deconstruction of dualism. This 
includes its cultural and ecological significance and its five characteristics – denial 
(to deny interdependence with the oppressed), hyperseperation (to ensure physical 
and psychological disconnection between the oppressed and oppressor), 
instrumentalism (to view the oppressed as a tool to achieve the ends of the 
oppressor), backgrounding (also called relational definition, describes the contrasting
qualities of the oppressed as flaws), and homogenisation (to promote all members of 
the oppressed as the same, usually in a derogatory or stereotypical way) (see Chapter 
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5.4, page 100, for a detailed description and analysis of these five characteristics). 
She argues that dualisms of opposition and oppression such as mind/body, 
male/female, and human/nature facilitate the dominance of one body over the other, 
to the material benefit of the dominator and to the severe expense and oppression of 
the other (Plumwood, 1991, 1993, 2008). Dualistic power systems mask and/or 
distance the connections between players, and so the long-term outcome of a 
dualistic power struggle is usually a problem for all players. 
In her final analysis, Plumwood (1993) offers a critique of deep ecology, an 
ecological movement pioneered by Arne Naess.  In 1973, Arne Naess published the 
article The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement (Naess, 1973), in 
which he first describes the fundamentals of deep ecological thinking. He proposed 
that ecological issues were far deeper than merely those of pollution and resource 
maintenance to sustain the privileged few (the ‘shallow movement’). Deep ecology 
also resonates with many of the principles of Buddhism, such as asserting that 
material attachment is a source of suffering for self and others (and should thus be 
transcended), as well as sharing a holistic ontological position (Gregory and Sabra, 
2008; Khisty, 2006). Other significant scholars in deep ecology include George 
Sessions, Bill Devall and Warwick Fox (Drengson et al, 2011; Humphrey, 2000; 
Khisty, 2006). 
This school of thought is criticised by Plumwood (1993) as being wilderness-centred,
privileging the position of non-humans, and unintentionally reinforcing the duality 
that separates human from nature. Plumwood (1993) contends that deep ecology 
reacts to relational separation and disconnect with equally dualistic and idealised 
concepts of interconnectedness, sameness, and holism which deny the differences of 
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individuals. Failure to acknowledge the diverse subjectivity of relationality and the 
diverse perspectives and values of others (humans and non-humans alike) hinders the
potential for deep ecology to embrace people as an integral part of ecology (and 
ecology as an integral part of people) in a way that could be mutually nourishing.  
Likewise, Plumwood (1991) also asserts that the deep ecological concepts of self, 
such as indistinguishability, expansion of self, and transcendence, are essentialist and
dualistic. These concepts not only discount the diversity of different relating 
subjectivities, but negate the self-interested boundaries that support reciprocal 
relationships, and remove the agency and engagement of people in relationships with
non-human others.  
Plumwood’s second book, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis 
of Reason (2002) extends the themes of her first book, including her 
critique of dominant cultures. Its most important contribution to this 
research is the suggestion that material spirituality offers an epistemology 
and ontology that is interconnected within place, rather than seeking to 
transcend it: 
We have the option to ask for little in the way of a separate individual 
essence that persists after death, but be satisfied with a materialist 
spirituality which recognises that spirit is not a hyper-separated extra 
ingredient but a certain mode of organisation of a material body 
(Plumwood, 2002, p. 223). 
Plumwood asserts that this spiritual concept of being allows for the agency 
of people in the world, which in turn awakens people to the mindfulness of 
others whom we can engage in dialogical relationships. From such dialogue
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and engagement grows, what Plumwood calls, an interspecies 
communicative ethic. This complex phenomenon is not an abstract concept,
but a practice still persisting in certain cultures (such as in American and 
Australian indigenous examples). This ethic extends to include an 
understanding of political solidarity with non-human others: 
[A]n appropriate ethic of environmental activism is not that of identity or 
unity (or its reversal indifference) but that of solidarity – standing with the 
other in a supportive relationship in the political sense (Plumwood, 2002, p. 
202). 
My thesis mirrors the core argument of ecofeminists such as Plumwood – 
how we treat our fellow humans, especially the ontological and 
epistemological grounding of those relationships, is seen in how we are 
situated with ecological others. Relationships in the home are important to 
environmental discourses because they play a significant role in ‘making 
people’, including shaping this ontological and epistemological grounding.  
Ecofeminism – particularly Plumwood - is important to my work because it 
helps me to understand dualism and its embedded qualities, with which I 
can reflexively search for dualisms within my own assumptions and 
experiences of parenting. Indeed, if dualism permeates an individual’s 
world in a multitude of ways we have yet to fully comprehend, then 
dualism would be likely to surface in many different relationships, 
including parenting. As such, Plumwood can also help me to decipher the 
significance and meaning of dualism in parenting, and provide some 
direction to understanding a parent’s role as a leader rather than a master. 
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Davison (2001) highlights that although Plumwood provides a deep 
understanding of relationality; she does not provide any practical or 
tangible means of how such concepts may be practised. Parenting could 
offer a means of not only road-testing concepts of relationality through 
messy everyday parenting experiences, but of embodying such relational 
philosophies from infancy.    
2.3 Freya Mathews
While Plumwood considered relationality from an ethical and political angle, Freya 
Mathews’ body of work approaches the philosophies and practices of relationships 
from a metaphysical perspective. Both strive to understand a world of complex, 
dialogical, and subjective relating. In particular, they both value the meanings, 
discourses, manifestations, and unity of concepts of self and other. 
Mathews’ work is situated within the environmental humanities, which is a 
contemporary branch of ecological thinking that aims to resituate people within a 
diverse world and incorporates many different sub-disciplines. Her work also 
compliments aspects of ecofeminism, such as critiques of dualism and culture, and 
touches upon aspects of spiritual discourse. As Rose et al (2012) describes:
[…] the environmental humanities can be understood to be a wide ranging response to 
the environmental challenges of our time. Drawing on humanities and social science 
disciplines that have brought qualitative analysis to bear on environmental issues, the 
environmental humanities engages with fundamental questions of meaning, value, 
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responsibility and purpose in a time of rapid, and escalating, change (Rose et al, 2012, 
p.1).
Mathews, in her first book publication The Ecological Self (1991), launches her 
analysis of contemporary visions of interconnectedness and self. This text begins to 
unpack the metaphysical aspects of environmental crisis, and moves beyond the 
material discourses of contemporary environmental scholarship. 
Mathews (2003), For Love of Matter: A Contemporary Panpsychism extends the 
argument that the world is far more than inert material to be measured by science, 
but is a communicative hive of dialogue (Mathews, 2003; Rigby, 2006). Mathew’s 
employs a reflexive narrative of her experiences of metaphysical phenomena such a 
love (of a childhood place), and how they demonstrate the interlaced and non-
material dimensions of self and other. She uses the term panpsychism to describe the 
“inner psychic” (Mathews, 2003, p. 27) property of all matter. For Mathews, 
panpsychism is an ontological position; a specific means of viewing the world 
relationally, which is both based in, and has ramifications for, encounters with 
others. Within this realm of thought, the universe becomes saturated in infinite 
centres of subjectivity – each one unique, external to all others (for example, I’ll 
never know what it is like to be you or any other centre of subjectivity), yet 
connective and communicative. The value of panpsychism is not as a scientific fact 
or material reality, but as a metaphysical and subjective experience which has 
ramifications for the ethics of relationality (how we justify the value we ascribe to 
others), linking the metaphysical work of Mathews and the ethical work of 
Plumwood. 
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Reinhabiting Reality: Towards a Recovery of Culture (Mathews, 2005) is the sequel 
to For Love of Matter (Mathews, 2003) and considers a modern praxis for 
panpsychism. She argues that culture represents the way in which humans engage 
with the world, and is thus important to the practice and value of panpsychism. She 
argues that traditional environmental management views others as in need of 
management and improvement, but rather people should just ‘let things be’ (also see 
Mathews (2004)). To ‘let things be’ implies that people allow relationships to unfold 
along their own timeline and in their own fashion (without necessarily removing 
themselves from the relationship), which includes not imposing conceptually 
imagined and disconnected ends on others.  As Mathews describes:
This is the distinction between what happens when things are allowed to unfold in 
their own way, or run their own course, and what happens when, under the direction 
of abstract thought, agents intentionally intervene to change that course of events for 
the sake of abstractly conceived ends of their own. […] From the point of view of this 
distinction then, nature might be understood as whatever happens when we, or other 
agents under the direction of abstractive thought, let things be, while artifice is what 
happens when such agents redirect events towards their own ends. The radical 
environmental injunction to live with rather than against the grain of nature then 
translates into an injunction to let things be (Mathews, 2004, n.p. online content). 
She further builds on her understandings of culture through several different 
narratives describing the process of inhabiting places. Mathews (2010) expands upon
these themes of panpsychism with a particular interest in resolving the metaphysical 
controversy between science and religion by demonstrating that spirit is intrinsic to 
all matter.  
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In later work, Mathews (2006) uses the term ‘synergy’ to describe a post-materialist 
situation where both people and others are adaptively transformed by human 
encounters. These transformations do not detract from the consistent connective 
patterns of the players, and Mathews (2006) describes three types of human 
modality: pre-material - religious people guided by mystical beings, material - 
instrumental people driven by mastery and benefit, and post-material - spiritual 
people who creatively connect and shape their existence with other beings without 
pre-determined ends (e.g. synergise). Mathews contends that post-material cultures 
have yet to exist in practice, because people have yet to look beyond science and the 
supernatural to embrace the inner subjectivity of matter in a way that translates to 
modalities of culture and ways of being in the world.  
Mathews (2008) extends the concept of synergy to discuss how people may relate 
synergistically on larger epistemological scales. She draws upon the Daoist arts of 
China to cultivate her thesis. Creativity and creation is presented as a means of 
engagement with the inner subjectivity of ‘nature’ and of expanding the world: 
If people could be exposed in childhood to the kind of experiences that would result in
their becoming imprinted with the inner organisational dynamics of nature, then there 
would produce a society of creative individuals whose activities in every field of 
praxis would be consistent with, and tributary to, the unfolding of nature. There would
be no need for ‘environmentalism’ in such a society, because there would be no 
‘environment’ distinct from humankind – no ‘nature’ ‘out there’ – but a pattern of 
Creation animating human agency as reliably as it animates nonhuman agency. We 
would be co-creating it in everything we did (Mathews, 2008, p. 57).
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As Mathews’ points out, the embodiment of the ‘inner organisational dynamics of 
nature’ in childhood has practical reaches for environmental scholarship, which 
synchronises with the focus of my research. 
2.4 Deborah Bird Rose
Deborah Bird Rose, like Mathews, is situated mainly in the environmental 
humanities discourse. Aligning with many of the critiques of modernity and 
domination made by Plumwood and Mathews, Rose has furthered the aspiration of 
the environmental humanities to resituate non-humans within our cultural and ethical
processes (and vice versa) through anthropological approaches and experiences. 
Rose’s work is valuable to my research as it brings unique insights to relationality 
from her ethnographic experiences living and working with groups of Australian 
Aboriginals. 
In her book, Dingo Makes us Human (Rose, 1992), she explores life, lessons, and 
culture with the Yarralin people in the Victoria River Valley region of the Northern 
Territory. She provides deep insight into the practical and cultural significance of 
panpsychist paradigms to survival and wellbeing in place, thus linking Rose’s work 
to that of Mathews. 
Rose (2005) draws from her time with the Yarralin people, and offers a lived 
example of ecological relationships described as providing ‘recursive tangled 
benefits’. These benefits, such as the provision of food and goods, were exchanged 
among the Aboriginal people of the Victoria River Valley and the non-human beings 
in their local environment (Rose, 2005). The Indigenous ‘philosophical ecology’ 
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born from this observed phenomenon is simply described as: “[…] the life of most 
living things is for others as well as for itself.” (Rose, 2005, p.296). The Yarralin 
people’s survival was hinged on how they conceptualised the significance of social 
and material relating and passed these philosophies on to the next generation – fluid 
and evolving intergenerational philosophical ecologies. Perhaps the Yarralin people 
are aware of a dynamic social and ecological consciousness, yet can also 
conceptualise the boundaries of people and others for the purposes of communicating
philosophical ecologies to other people (Rose, 2005; 2008). 
Rose (2002; 2008) also contributes to an understanding of how people may 
dialogically engage with non-human others. She expands upon the work of Mathews 
(1991) – that the self is embedded in the cosmos – to also describe the self as 
‘permeable’ and ‘dialogical’, or that the matter of place permeates the body (such as 
food) and that the matter of the body permeates place (such as wastes of the body) 
(Rose, 2002). Such an understanding has implications for how we contextualise and 
perceive our dialogues with the multitude of seen and unseen places which traverse 
our bodies. Rose (2008) describes the ways in which her Yarralin teacher Jessie fits 
into tangled webs of relation in country, providing a narrated account of how a 
person, within the bounds of culture, may synergise with the non-human in a way 
that supports the thriving of many beings. 
Rose’s scholarship on place-based relationality reminds me that we know of the 
complexity of our philosophical ecologies when we experience them in real time. 
Second hand, communicated knowledge, can’t replace experience, and it can’t 
replicate its time/space uniqueness and complexity. This is why it is essential to 
consider people-in-the-world by reflecting on the experienced nuances of our own 
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lives. You may need to be fully present in mind, body, and spirit within the 
‘recursive tangled benefits’ in order to begin to grasp relationships messy nuances, 
real-time ebb and flows, and how complex lives will progress into the future. Rose’s 
work demonstrates that philosophies of relating have a practical purpose, and that 
they come in two parts; the simple part that one can conceptualise and communicate, 
and the lived part, which requires mindful presence. 
2.5 Conclusion
This thesis is situated within the political and moral focuses of Plumwood, the 
metaphysical and material philosophies of Mathews, and the experiential and 
anthropological insights of Rose. In the opening chapter of my analysis, I will draw 
upon Plumwood’s (1993) descriptions of dualism to give me a foundation for 
understanding the characteristics of embedded themes of dualism in parenting 
practice. Plumwood’s (1991; 1993) critiques of deep ecology will help me to further 
understand the synergy of self and other, while Plumwood (2002) will provide 
relational knowledge about solidarity with non-humans, and give me a greater 
understanding of how to provide leadership amongst unequal participants. 
As my analysis progresses, Mathews (2003) will illuminate the historical importance 
of the Christian story of Original Sin (including moral, social, and cultural 
implications) in fostering cultures of domination. I will utilise both Mathews’ (2003; 
2011) and Boyce’s (2014) analysis of the implications of the story of Original Sin in 
order to understand the role of judgement, morality, and ethical frameworks in 
parenting and relationality. Rose (1991, 2005) supports these arguments, and 
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provides me with an example of morality in the Yarralin group of Australian 
Aboriginal people, which will then facilitate my understanding of the functionality of
open-ended ethics. 
In my concluding analysis chapter, the work of all three scholars will help me to 
understand who we deem worthy of ethical consideration and why. Mathews (2003; 
2005; 2010) provides an understanding of consciousness and culture through the 
concept of panpsychism, which is utilised by Plumwood (1991; 2003) as a 
justification for an inclusive ethic (a concept I will critique). Additionally, Rose 
(1992; 2002; 2005; 2008) provides supportive examples of how people practice, live,
and communicate concepts of panpsychism, and as such, reveal the value of 
panpsychism to a culture of being-in-the-world. Her examples of functional 
panpsychism from the Yarralin culture highlight the importance of storytelling and 
engagement in the continuing value of such theories, and inspire praxis through 
parenting practice.    
At the end of my thesis, it is Mathews (2003) who encourages and promotes the 
value of encounter over knowledge in order to bridge the gap between theories of 
relationality and relational practices. Encounter, and its visceral experiences, will 
synthesise the themes of this thesis and provide routes of praxis through parenting. 
While ecofeminism and its themes of domination synergise with aspects of parenting
culture and practice, and it features heavily in some areas of my analysis, this 
analysis also broadens to include more recent discourse in the environmental 
humanities and relational ontologies more generally. Relationality, while 
championed by Rose, Plumwood, and Mathews, has elsewhere been rather neglected.
Theories of relationality dangle in the background of different analyses of social and 
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environmental relationships, but are not often questioned, defined, or analysed 
neither directly nor practically – especially as it relates to the significance of messy, 
everyday living. This thesis adds a much needed practical approach to the academic 
work of the ecological humanities, environmental philosophy, and ecofeminist 
disciplines, while expanding the reach of existing scholarship.
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Chapter 3 Main Streams in Western Parenting 
Discourse
It’s not our job to toughen our children up to face a cruel and heartless world. It’s
our job to raise children who will make the world a little less cruel and heartless.
(Knost, 2013, no page number)
3.1 Introduction
As previously introduced, Mathews (2008) suggests that if children were exposed to 
the inner dynamics of world (or ‘nature’ as she also describes it), then such people 
might be more capable of co-creating the world synergistically with others. The 
conception of a new person marks the physical entrance of a new subjectivity, and so
begins the life-long and challenging process of growing as a social, material, and 
perhaps spiritual being. Caregivers orchestrate and modulate the mental, physical, 
sensory, communicative, and responsive landscape of their infants – they teach, 
impose, guide, and model how to be ‘people in the world’. While every caregiver and
child will have a unique relational experience, many of the concepts, values, and 
practices which infiltrate their relationship will be informed by social and cultural 
sources. Dominant cultural norms are particularly influential in shaping parental 
relationships, especially if they played a significant role in the caregivers own 
upbringing (Campbell and Gilmore, 2007; Simons et al, 1991; Thornberry et al, 
2003). 
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In this chapter, I will explore concepts of childhood, including a range of parenting 
styles and practices relevant to the parenting period that my experiences and this 
thesis are situated. I will focus on parenting traditions that are relevant to western 
cultures (such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States), 
because this is the cultural landscape that my autoethnography is set within. 
Similarly, western cultures are targeted by Rose, Mathews, and Plumwood as centres
of dualistic logic, so it would seem reasonable to focus on parenting phenomena in 
these regions. 
3.2 Childhood
Durkheim (2005) describes childhood has a period of time between birth and 
approximately seven to twelve years old (depending on context), defined by the rapid
growth of the individual person in mind and body. Childhood, though, is much more 
than a mere biological condition, but a social construct bedded in culture, time 
period, social relationships, gender, social class, and ethnicity among many other 
variables (Cunningham, 1995; Hendrick, 1997; James and Prout, 1990; Jared et al, 
1998). 
The ideas adults have about childhood may vary greatly from the ideas children have
about themselves, which will also differ from a person’s lived experience of 
childhood (Cunningham, 1995). Cunningham (1995) writes that the evidence that 
remains of the concepts and experiences of childhood over the past 500 years lacks 
descriptions of how children experienced childhood in their own words, as well as 
lacks any insight into the intimacy shared between children and their parents. 
Furthermore, similar cultural definitions and traditions of childhood can have 
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different expressions in different contexts (Cunningham, 1995). Childhood, then, is a
complex mix of the unique qualities, ideas, and experiences of the individual in early
life, shaped by the cultural and environmental landscape with which they live. Thus, 
childhood could constitute an infinite variety of forms, and is not universal 
(Hendrick, 1997).   
How childhood is conceptualised can reflect the deeper attitudes that societies have 
towards others, such as women, other races, animals, landscapes, and the like. For 
example, in addition to describing childhood as an age of growth, Durkheim’s (2005)
definition further argues that childhood is: 
[…] the period in which the individual, in both the physical and moral sense, 
does not yet exist, the period in which he is made, develops and is formed 
(Durkheim, 2005, p.25-26).
Such definitions of childhood, common in western contexts, suggest that children are
unworthy of ‘existence’, and reveal underlying threads of rationalism and duality. In 
these mindsets, people are regarded as incomplete until they reach a predetermined 
age, implying that the adult is completed, unchanging, and ideal. Viewing children as
less-than-adult-others, as becoming rather than being, particularly in a moral sense, 
creates a situation where adults can validate instrumental actions against children in 
order to ‘complete’ them. In so doing, those with power can justify a different set of 
moral obligations toward children, paving the way to normalised childhood 
oppression (Rose (L.), 1991). Even the term ‘childish’, meaning silly and immature, 
is used with negative connotations. An adult may be defined as a person who has cast
away the undesirable weakness and perceived short-comings of one’s early life, in 
exchange for rational and logical qualities, as well as greater strength and power. 
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Cunningham (1995) observes that the development of key ideas about childhood 
(glimmered in the definition above) in the Western paradigm, coincided with the 
escalation of Western imperialism and domination of other ethnicities, beings, and 
landscapes in the 18th century. The introduction of child labour laws and compulsory 
schooling for young children in 1870’s Britain redefined childhood as a time when 
children are innocent, asexual, vulnerable, and considered in terms their sentimental 
and emotional value (Hendrick, 1997). The domain of children shifted from farms 
and factories to homes, schools, and places of play. Rose (1991) writes that the child 
labour reforms in 1870’s Britain gave the appearance of protecting children by 
curbing the horrors of child labour in factories, and instead shifted them to 
educational intuitions. Compulsory schooling merely swapped one type of 
oppression for another, as school children were forced into the new emerging identity
of childhood, often with physical abuse, to make them more controllable, obedient, 
and productive (Rose, 1991).    
With this new emerging identity of childhood, came a greater recognition of children
as the future of nations, and thus created pressure to give children a ‘proper’ 
childhood – even if individual children needed to be pushed into those moulds 
through school programs, social groups, welfare initiatives, and the justice system 
(Hendrick, 1997). This increased focus on the value of children and childhood also 
became a focus of the growing scientific paradigm, which examined and attempted to
simplify, order, and ‘fix’ aspects of childhood to suit new ideals and visions for the 
future (Hendrick, 1997).  
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3.3 The Rise of Scientific Parenting
In the 20th and now 21st centuries, scientific understandings of parenting played a 
significant role in informing mainstream parenting practices and styles (Apple, 1995;
Faircloth, 2010). As Apple (1995) describes, the science of parenting gained 
momentum between 1890 and 1950 in regions like North America, Europe, and 
Australia, where parents were increasingly obliged to seek and follow expert medical
and scientific advice to raise healthy children. Apple (1995) observed that parents 
were solely responsible for their children’s upbringing, yet their instincts were 
devalued and replaced with medical and scientific directives. Some classical 
examples of this transition include the increase in physician advised formula feeding,
and the treatment of birth as a medical condition requiring hospitalisation and routine
intervention. The shift towards trust in science and medicine also brought profits for 
those selling scientifically formulated products and services (Apple, 1995). Scientific
parenting was disseminated through forums such as advertisements in magazines, 
physicians, baby care manuals, and government pamphlets. Science also provided all
sorts of accessible devices and products (like washing machines, televisions, 
supermarkets, and cars) that changed the context of parenting, and reduced the labour
associated with some aspects of parenting. 
In the past 20 years, science has also been used to help internalise parenting choices 
and justify a particular parenting identity. For example, Faircloth (2010) writes that 
mothers who breastfed into early childhood (contrary to cultural norms) called upon 
the authoritative knowledge of breastfeeding scholarship to justify their choice as the
‘healthiest’ and exempt it from debate and controversy. Rather than science dictating 
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parenting, science, in this instance, has helped to reinforce broader identities, 
philosophies, and values as ‘right, best, and true’. 
Similarly, Montesi and Bomstein (2017) identify that entrance into contemporary 
motherhood and its predicaments motivates information seeking and identity 
formation. Incoming information is valued by its’ perceived scientific rigour as it 
relates to personal experience, and weighted based on its’ alignment with emotional 
reactions and preconceptions. Often, scientific work is steeped in assumptions of 
what is normal and right for a particular culture, without scholars realising the 
influence of their own forestructures and values. Thus, the conclusions derived from 
some scientific work only serves those assumptions (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). For
example, researchers may find that leaving infants to cry alone is effective at 
‘training’ them to go to sleep and hence is justifiable, but they fail to recognise why 
such treatments are considered acceptable or why they may be necessary in the first 
place (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). Scientific parenting does not exist in a bubble, but
is just one tangled symptom of the ebb, flow, and changing manifestations of 
reasoning and rationalism (Hawkins, 2009).  
Parenting typologies have played a significant role in parenting science during the 
past century. Parenting typologies describe both parenting styles and parenting 
practices. Parenting styles constitute a parent’s beliefs and values, while parenting 
practices describe the parent’s physical actions. Brenner and Fox (1999) found that 
the physical and communicative qualities of parenting practices are more directly 
linked to childhood outcomes than are parenting styles.  
Baumrind (1966) described the most commonly used and enduring academic 
typology for parenting practice (Baumrind, 1966, 1996; Brenner and Fox, 1999; 
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Darling and Steinberg, 1993). She initially identified three types of parenting: 
authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive. As Baumrind (1966, 1996) and others 
(Brenner and Fox, 1999; Darling and Steinberg, 1993) describe, authoritarian 
parenting is typified by high parental demands and low warmth or support to meet 
those demands. It is an oppressive form of parenting in which the parent’s agenda or 
reality is instigated with force or manipulation, and does not account for the position 
of the child. Authoritative parenting is typified by high parental demands and high 
levels of warmth and support to meet those demands. It is a type of parenting that 
exemplifies strong core leadership based on firm reasoned boundaries, validation of 
the child’s position, and open communication. Permissive parenting is typified by 
low levels of demand and high levels of warmth or support. In this situation, the 
child holds directive power and the adults do not set effective boundaries. Maccoby 
and Martin (1983) extended these parenting classifications to also include an 
alternative measure of parental demand, and thus provided an additional category (as 
well as a more revealing way of assessing the previous three), neglect or 
ambivalence to a child’s needs or position. 
Darling and Steinberg (1993) point out that the work of Baumrind has not yet 
addressed the disparity of outcomes for children among different contexts and 
cultures. Indeed, work is also needed to understand why particular groups value 
certain outcomes over others, and how such underlying assumptions of ‘good and 
bad’ guide both parenting and parenting research. For example, academic 
achievement is often used as a means of measuring the outcomes of the different 
parenting types in western settings. This often assumes that the greater a child’s 
academic achievement, the more desirable a certain method of parenting is. Such 
assumptions require further dismantling and exploration. 
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In the following three sections I will look more closely at three contemporary 
parenting styles which are most relevant to the context of my parenting experiences, 
and therefore my autoethnographic analysis. These styles may not directly feature in 
parenting scholarship and science, but rather reflect cultural, historical, and social 
phenomena of the past century which may have influenced my autoethnographic 
parenting experiences. While there are as many parenting styles as there are parents, 
I will present three examples of parenting styles which represent three broad 
discourses, and ontologically and epistemologically link these parenting styles to the 
progression of social and environmental scholarship. The examples are presented as 
they emerged historically, although the actual progression of these ideas would have 
been much more complicated and tangled throughout time. The following sections 
progress from the authoritarian parenting of the first half of the 20th century, to 
interest in hunter-gatherer and attachment parenting during the counterculture era of 
the 60’s and 70’s, and lastly begins to refine into streams of gentle parenting of the 
80’s, 90’s and beyond. Of course, these styles represent periods of discourse, 
publication, and heightened interest in particular parenting styles/practices which 
have contributed to my autoethnographic understanding of parenting - they don’t 
describe how all (or even most, depending on the style) children were parented 
during different eras. 
3.4 Detachment, Authority, and Moral Conformity
Parenting gurus, physicians, publications, and advertisements of the early 20th 
century and post-war period (in Europe, North America, and Australia) advocated a 
range of detachment parenting practices aimed at preventing ‘spoiling’, dependency, 
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and instilling morality (Apple, 1995; Baumrind, 1996). Many of these authoritarian 
practices and attitudes linger today, particularly when parenting practices and 
attitudes are passed down through people’s own experiences of being parented 
(Campbell and Gilmore, 2007; Simons et al, 1991; Thornberry et al, 2003). 
According to Solomon et al (1993) parents believed that spoiling is the act of 
damaging an infant’s character by responding to their cries, holding them, or 
providing other forms of perceived pampering. This pampering was thought to lead 
to children who were self-centred, inconsiderate of others, immature, and lazy. These
values were reinforced by popular baby care manuals of the period, such as Truby 
King’s Mothercraft in 1913 (King, 1913; Rowold, 2013). The values around spoiling
also mingled well with other parental values and beliefs, such as independent 
sleeping (originating from evangelical values about beds, sexuality, and 
compartmentalising the home), that infants are inherently manipulative, and that 
children should be ‘seen and not heard’ (Blunden et al, 2011; Keller, 2013; Sears and
Sears, 2001). 
It has been suggested by Boyce (2014), that much of the contemporary treatment of 
infants and children is steeped in the underlying belief that children are ‘born bad’, as
exemplified by the Christian story of Original Sin. For example, common childhood 
behaviours such as crying, whining, hitting, biting, tantrums, perceived rudeness, and
the like are assumed to be evidence of children’s fundamental ‘badness’, which then 
requires some form of parental force, manipulation, and retribution to correct. Kohn 
(2005) also mirrors the sentiment that children are seen as fundamentally ‘bad’:
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At least in part, then, conditional parenting is based on the deeply cynical belief that 
accepting kids for who they are just frees them to be bad because, well, that’s who 
they are (Kohn, 2005, p. 22).
Behaviourism, commonly associated with the work of B.F. Skinner, was also an 
engrained way of thinking about children in terms of their outward behaviours 
(Kohn, 2005; Ruiz, 1995; Skinner, 1953) . As Kohn (2005) explains: 
[…] all behaviors are believed to start and stop, wax and wane, solely on the basis of 
whether they are “reinforced”. Behaviorists assume that everything we do can be 
explained in terms of whether it produces some kind of reward, either one that’s 
deliberately offered or one that occurs naturally (Kohn, 2005, p. 12).  
Rewards are one such way of manipulating the behaviour of children, or of 
rationalising the motivations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour, regardless of internal 
processes or feelings. Parental affection is seen as one such conditional reward which
is lavishly given as praise to reinforce ‘good’ behaviour, and withdrawn to 
discourage ‘bad’ behaviours.  
Various forms of punishment are also utilised to enforce moral conformity and 
obedience in authoritarian types of parenting. Punishment utilises fear of future pain, 
loss, or disadvantage as a means of demonstrating power and controlling the 
immediate behaviour of charges (Trifan et al, 2014). In this mindset, a child is 
viewed as an adult in training, and so when children deviate from acceptable adult 
behaviour (e.g. misbehave), adults view their role as a force which shapes them into 
ideal and virtuous adults. Children are not valued in their own right, as 
developmentally and individually unique persons living in the present, and so their 
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distinct ways of being in the world are judged through idealised and pre-determined 
lenses of good and bad.
As Plumwood (1991) asserts, the oppression of women and nature is founded in the 
rise of rationalism and reasoning. Parenting was not spared the impositions of 
rationalism, which aligns with religious values of what is good and right (Apple, 
1995; Boyce, 2014). Children were linked with the irrational (such as being silly, 
thoughtless, lacking logic or intelligence) and adults with rational (such as being 
level-headed decision makers and knowing what is ‘right and good’), much like 
many other dualisms of the colonial era which gave rational superiority to adult 
white males, and rational inferiority to women, children, nature, and non-white 
people (Plumwood, 1993; Warren, 1990, 1993). 
Plumwood (2002) emphasises how irrational such rationalism can be, in that it 
recognises the maladaptive outcomes of certain rational practices, yet persists under 
the guise of other rational justifications. Social scholars may demonstrate the 
disparaging relational outcomes of authoritarian parenting, yet it still sometimes 
persists under rational justifications of goodness, rightness, and effectiveness. For 
example, the Canadian government legally sanctions the corporeal punishment of 
children, rationalising such treatment as protecting both adults and children by 
maintaining order, yet it contradicts a wealth of scientific literature on the greater 
anti-social outcomes of corporeal punishment for both individuals and societies 
(Durrant et al, 2003; Zolotor et al, 2011).  
Baby trainers, whose influence is most notable in the treatment of infant sleep, 
exemplified the logic of adult superiority by combining the scientific evidence of 
‘training’ effectiveness with the cultural acceptability of adults instrumentally 
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‘improving’ children. Emmitt Holt (1907) and John B. Watson (Watson and Watson, 
1928) were influential baby trainers of the early 20th century, directing parents to 
keep babies on strict one-size-fits-all schedules and limit excessive warmth to 
prevent spoiling. 
The demands of modernity and its wealth of science-based parenting advice has 
blurred and confused many of these values and the personal rationales for 
detachment practices which still linger (Blunden et al, 2011).  For example, in more 
modern times the demands of full-time parental employment, including the 
employment of mothers, may lead to the use of some detachment and authoritarian 
parenting techniques, rather than fears of character damage (van Engen, 2010). 
While authoritarian parenting has lingered through intergenerational transmission 
(and perhaps more generally through the cultural acceptance of mastery and 
scientific approaches to relationships), Trifan et al (2014) suggests its prevalence in 
western countries is declining as parents reflect upon and question aspects of their 
own upbringing and encounter other parenting styles and practices. 
3.5 Attachment and Continuum
In 1945 Dr. Benjamin Spock rocked the parenting status quo by telling mothers to 
trust themselves and their instincts. This challenged scientific, medical, and 
patriarchal authority, and even created a backlash from the science community that 
accused Dr. Spock’s emphasis on ‘permissive’ parenting as causing the counter-
culture of the 1960’s (Rowold, 2013). Spock’s (1945) work paved the way for deeper
reflection on the parent-child relationship, and opened doors for more liberal and 
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controversial parenting styles and practices, like attachment and continuum 
parenting.  
In psychology, the theory that characterises the intimate binding of caregiver (usually
indicating the mother) and infant is known as attachment theory. Attachment theory 
was introduced by John Bowlby in the 1950s as a fusion of the differing theories 
about the mutual need for closeness between mother and infant (Etelson, 2007; 
Keller, 2013; Sears and Sears, 2001). He was joined by Mary Ainsworth, who 
established a range of attachment classifications, as well as documented evidence 
supporting the link between parent-child attachments and the qualities of children's 
future relationships (Ainsworth, 1989; Etelson, 2007). Ainsworth also identified that 
the most important factor in determining the quality of mother-infant attachment is 
the responsiveness and sensitivity of the mother to her infant’s cues (Ainsworth, 
1989; Keller, 2013; Sears and Sears, 2001). 
Attachment theory was extended by the paediatricians William and Mary Sears into 
the seven B’s of attachment parenting; birth bonding, breastfeeding, babywearing, 
bedding close to baby, belief in the communication of babies cries, beware of baby 
trainers, and balanced family life (Buskens, 2001; Etelson, 2007; Sears and Sears, 
2001).  The Sears’ B’s are intended to facilitate physical closeness and so enhance 
parental responsiveness and secure attachments. Although the Sears are not well 
published and their work is little explored in academic literature, mainstream 
attachment parenting styles (adopted in western cultures) are largely based on their 
advice (Etelson, 2007; Sears and Sears, 2001).  
‘Attachment parenting’ is introduced, practiced and interpreted in a vastly different 
ways by different people. Attachment parenting also comes with a mixed ontological 
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and epistemological position. It is a practice which was born from the science of 
attachment theory, is evidenced, supported, and furthered by science, but values 
innate and contextual parenting instincts, assumed to be congruent with evolved 
human biology (Etelson, 2007; Sears and Sears, 2001).  
Much like Bowlby (Bowlby, 1988) and Ainsworth (Ainsworth, 1989), Jean Liedloff 
observed parenting qualities such as responsiveness, trust, and communication in the 
hunter-gatherer communities of the Yequana people in South America. She 
disseminated her experiences in the controversial and widespread book The 
Continuum Concept in 1975 (Buskens, 2001; Etelson, 2007; Liedloff, 1975). 
Proponents of the 'continuum' or hunter-gatherer model of parenting also advocate 
that many hunter-gatherer values and practices are congruent with intrinsic human 
biology. As a result, they believe that intellectual and abstracted parenting values and
practices may have adverse developmental consequences (Buskens, 2001; Konner, 
2004). 
Mathews (2005) also takes issue with abstracted environmental values and practices:
[…] under the direction of abstract thought, agents intentionally intervene in a course 
of events to super-impose on it a set of abstractly conceived ends of their own 
(Mathews, 2005, p. 27). 
Equally, Rose’s experience with the Yarralin Aboriginals, recognises the relational 
contributions of hunter-gatherer cultures to relational knowledge, such as fitting into 
and permeating place – both spiritually and physically (Rose, 2002, 2005, 2008). 
Some hunter-gatherer cultures provide insights into resilient human survival which is
dependent upon strong and complex social and material attachments, distanced 
(although, not altogether disconnected) from the conditions of modernity (Mathews, 
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2008; Rose, 2005). That’s not to say that people in western modernity cannot form 
deep, mutual, caregiving relationships, but that modernity can create obstacles that 
both necessitate and enable the separation of parent and child (such as external 
employment and child care) (Roelvink and Gibson-Graham, 2009; van der Horst and 
van der Veer, 2008). 
In hunter-gather cultures such as the Yarralin and Yequana, children and parents 
work and live together in connective family groups utilising practices such as 
carrying infants constantly, sharing food communally, including children in daily 
tasks, sharing childcare among close family members, and allowing children to take 
risks (Etelson, 2007; Konner, 2004; Rose 2005; 2008). In some hunter-gatherer 
cultures everyone and everything merges (a continuum of sorts) – social dynamics 
mingle with ecological ones (Konner, 2004; Muir et al, 2010; Rose 2002; 2005; 
2008). 
While there are many important relational insights from hunter-gatherer cultures, 
followers of continuum and similar hunter-gather parenting styles may risk 
mistranslating and over simplifying specific practices and perspectives which serve 
the wellbeing of specific groups of people in specific times and circumstances, but 
which may not support wellbeing when such knowledge is misplaced (Buskens, 
2001). There is a tendency to romanticise the hunter-gather life-style as ideal and 
biologically perfect, yet these people often suffer their own types of difficulties and 
hardships, and so such knowledge should always be considered in the context from 
which it came (Konner, 2004; Muir et al, 2010). For example, these styles of 
parenting may be misinterpreted as child-centred, leading parents to believe that 
responsiveness means to do everything the child asks or to keep their children 
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constantly happy, and so struggle to maintain relational boundaries and look after 
their own interests in balance with their child’s (Buskens, 2001). 
The western ideas of authoritarianism and permissiveness - especially when they are 
constructed dualistically - may predispose those parents who seek to move beyond 
the authoritarian practices of the past to leap to the opposite extreme, permissiveness,
for fear of oppressing their children (Christopher et al, 2013). Rather, responsiveness 
implies an active dialogue (verbal, physical, physiological, emotional, and so on) 
between parent and child that helps both understand one another’s position and needs
- this does not negate the dialogical relevance of boundaries.     
The continuum parenting philosophy reflects the atmosphere of the environmental 
movements of the 60’s and 70’s, and links with the values of deep ecology (Buskens,
2001). Both privilege wilderness and the ‘natural’ as ideals, and conceptually focus 
on holism and connectivity (Buskens, 2001). As Plumwood (1991, 1993) criticises, 
such ideologies harbour dualistic tendencies, as they neglect the messy, diverse, and 
challenging aspects of relating and privilege a particular sect of being as ‘right and 
good’. Hunter-gather styles of parenting, as well as some accounts of deep ecology, 
discount technology and western people as a part of the continuum, and therefore 
neglect a great diversity of landscapes and cultures which are a part of greater 
relational webs (Buskens, 2001). 
While continuum and attachment parenting can contribute to a relational 
understanding of parenting (particularly from a biological and historical perspective),
and likewise deep ecology and wilderness-focused environmentalism can contribute 
to relational scholarship, our understandings may need to keep moving deeper to 
better grasp relationality in infinitely diverse contexts. 
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3.6 Resources for Infant Educarers (RIE)
The parenting style Resources for Infant Educarers' (RIE) was launched by Magda 
Gerber (an educator who worked in post-war Hungarian orphanages) and neurologist
Thomas Forrest in 1978 (Cooper et al, 2014; Gerber, 1979). It is an authoritative 
style of parenting which has refined the philosophies of attachment parenting to also 
include discourse on respect, relational politics, and the subjectivity of others. It is 
worthwhile to consider this particular parenting style, because it has not only shaped 
my parenting approaches and views and therefore my autoethnographic analysis, but 
it is a parenting style which has entered mainstream parenting discourse in the past 
ten years that reflects some of the core philosophies of Plumwood, Mathews and 
Rose. 
This parenting method is grounded in a like-minded respect for children, which 
entails encountering children with authenticity, viewing children as active relational 
participants, ‘whole’ people, and as possessing basic human qualities such as 
reasoning, self-preservation, caring for others, emotions, and so on (Cooper et al, 
2014; Gerber, 1979; Lansbury, 2014). This understanding of children challenges the 
dualisms which view children as incomplete, as requiring improvements/training to 
become people in the world, as inherently ‘bad’ in some moral contexts, and as 
mindless and irrational (Boyce, 2014; Cooper et al, 2014). 
RIE shares values of responsiveness and communication with attachment, 
continuum, and similar streams of parenting, but provides more specific boundaries 
for practices of respect. Some core practices of respect include not restraining infants
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and toddlers with devices (such as walkers, carriers, bouncers, and the like), allowing
infants to develop skills and autonomy at their own pace (for example, they don’t 
help a baby to walk or sit), being emotionally present during routine care practices, 
allowing infants to play without adult goals or interruptions, and keeping infant 
entertainment simple and infant-led. RIE practitioners also promote the validation of 
children’s emotions and experiences without taking them personally or directing 
them. For example, it is not the parent’s role to distract the child from how they feel, 
judge emotional value, or make emotions go away. Rather, they are present, 
responsive, and supportive of what is, and mindful to remain ‘unruffled’ in the face 
of their own stress. Upholding boundaries is another core component of respect in 
RIE. RIE practitioners describe ways that parents can create and maintain personal 
and social boundaries with reason, clarity, empathy, calm, and confidence in order to 
be an understanding, yet firm leader and role model (Cooper et al, 2014; Gerber, 
1979; Lansbury, 2014).
From my experiences engaging with RIE groups and literature, there is a tendency to 
view Magda Gerber’s work as gospel and definitive (as strict rules to follow), rather 
than value the individual circumstances of each parent and child’s journey. Respect 
is viewed as a static and definable concept demonstrated by very specific practices; 
rather, I would argue that respect is relational, fluid, and subjective. It is ironic that a 
parenting philosophy which aims to validate the individual subjectivities of children 
does not validate the different ways in which respect may be viewed and practised, 
especially in non-western cultures and contexts (Hammond, 2009).    
RIE’s ‘let them be’ attitude toward children is reflective of Mathew’s (2004, 2006) 
position that we should let environmental relationships unfold in their own way 
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while validating our own agency in change, rather than abstractly direct relationships
from a distance to meet certain ends:
By way of synergy then we do change the course of events, yet we do so while still 
letting the world be, in the sense that, in its engagement with us, the world is still 
following the contours of its own conativity (Mathews, 2006, p.102).
In this context, conativity describes what the world (or any being) wants for itself, 
and so in ‘letting be’ – whether in relation to children or more-then-human others – 
the imperative is to stop ourselves from allowing our own ideas, impulses, anxieties, 
beliefs, reactions, and so on to interfere (without consent) with the conativity of 
others. Like Mathew’s concept of human agency, RIE asserts that parents are present
and have a strong role in their children’s ‘becoming’, but rejects (in principle, if not 
always in practice) intellectually abstracted assumptions of ‘what is best’ for others, 
but rather encourages parents to step back and allow children and our relationship 
with them to evolve according to its own timeline (Gerber, 1979; Lansbury, 2014). 
Both philosophies take the position that others have subjectivities which are 
individual and valuable in their own right (much like Plumwood, 1991; 1993), and so
should be encountered as communicative kin. As Mathews so eloquently describes of
such a relational approach:
We seek to make contact with the self that they know, the self as they experience it – 
the subjective aspect of their being – rather than with aspects of the self that are 
outside their experience, such as synapses and neural pathways and unconscious 
behaviour patterns. When such contact with the self as they experience it – as subject 
– is made, and they communicate to us something of the meaning they have for 
themselves, we do in fact share a deep sense of mutual knowing, but this is a felt form 
of knowing, only secondarily translatable into information (Mathews, 2005, p. 78).
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Indeed, RIE ventures down an ontological path which asks parents to experience 
their children as they are, without the judgement and assumptions of past parenting 
concepts – to see a toddler having a tantrum as a soul struggling, rather than as 
someone behaving badly that needs adult correction.    
These ontological and epistemological linkages between parenting styles, such as 
RIE, and environmental scholarship strengthens and justifies parenting practice as an
important praxis for the latter. Additionally, further philosophical development of 
RIE could provide a very specific style of parenting through which to advance a 
praxis for environmental scholarship, and environmental scholarship could help 
practices like RIE develop a fluid philosophical and ethical grounding.   
3.7 Conclusion
Both parenting and environmental scholarship have ridden and responded to deeper 
waves of ontological and epistemological changes throughout the past century of 
western history. Plumwood’s (1991; 1993) descriptions of dualistic and oppressive 
dominant cultures can be seen in early 20th century authoritarian parenting, while 
deep ecology’s privileging of the ‘natural’ can be seen in forms of attachment and 
continuum parenting. Attachment and continuum parenting also speak to the 
metaphysical interests of Mathews (2005; 2010), and the indigenous relational 
knowledge championed by Rose (2002; 2005; 2008). RIE, a parenting style 
applicable to the current generation of parents, offers a more refined parenting 
concept based in notions of respect, authentic engagement, and letting children be, 
much like Mathews’ (2006) concept of post-materialist modalities and Plumwood’s 
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(1991; 1993) dialogical ethic. The ontological and epistemological links between 
parenting and relational environmental scholarship (and their embeddment in similar 
contexts and cultures) supports my position that parenting would serve as a practical 
means of embodying relational scholarship in both parents and children.
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Chapter 4 Methods and Methodology
Subjecting the world to an epistemological probe, then, is unobjectionable as long as
the world is considered pure object. When it is considered as subject however, such
probing appears a far less innocent endeavour. The appropriate approach to such a
world would appear to be not, in the first instance, to investigate it, but rather to
encounter it. […] To seek encounter with an other, then, is very different from
seeking to know it, at least when knowledge is understood in its scientific sense.
(Mathews, 2003, pp.76 – 77)
4.1 Introduction
As Mathews (2003) describes, understanding the subjective terrain of relationality 
cannot be satisfied through scientific information gathering alone, rather, 
relationships are understood in infinitely many ways, including through reflection 
upon such relational encounters with others. The methods I use to answer my 
research questions are founded in relational encounter – of generating and presenting
understandings of experience from the introspective reality of the self. I collect 
parenting stories, and reflexively analyse their relational content, in parallel with the 
relational scholarship of Mathews, Rose, and Plumwood to weave understandings 
and critiques of the relational aspects of parenting and of being in the world  – the 
power struggles, intimacy, love, culture, and material interactions. 
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We begin to understand encounter through the internal process of cyclically de-
tangling our biases or forestructures. This occurs within the real-time ebb and flow of
living and material experiences (Converse, 2012; Ellis, 1999; Ellis et al, 2011; 
Fleming et al, 2003). They cannot be captured, controlled, documented accurately, 
charted, or studied in a laboratory. They are unique in time and space, and cannot be 
repeated by self or others. They cannot be understood, even by the experiencer or 
researcher, as a single static truth. Interpretations of phenomena evolve through the 
developments of time and changing perspective (Ellis, 1999).
The methods I use in this project mingle the traditions of autoethnography (the 
reflexive analysis of self-experiences) and of phenomenology (the qualitative 
detangling of lived phenomena). In conjunction with internal processes of reflexive 
analysis, the action of writing the analysis chapters of this thesis helped me to distil 
understandings about the connections between parenting and relational scholarship 
and their practical significance to the aims of each.  These understandings provided 
insights and lived examples of both the intimate connection of relational 
(environmental) themes to parenting, as well as the ways in which parenting may be 
praxis for relational scholarship. 
4.2 Qualitative Inquiry 
The methodological foundations for this thesis fall within the broad field of 
qualitative inquiry – a field of research which aims to understand that which cannot 
be measured numerically. Rather, the researcher describes and interprets complex 
relationships in time and place (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). As such, this process is 
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interpretive, or it aims to understand and communicate understandings of phenomena
in terms of meanings, and how such meanings and understandings came into being 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Geanellos, 1998). Cresswell (2013) describes narrative 
inquiry (interpretation of written/spoken/illustrative representations of phenomena), 
phenomenology (understanding experience), grounded theory (theories generated 
from field data), ethnography (interpreting socio-cultural descriptions), and case 
studies (detailed analysis of a particular case or cases) as the primary routes of 
undertaking qualitative research. I utilise phenomenology and autoethnography 
(which includes aspects of narrative inquiry) to further my understandings of 
relationality. Concepts of relationality can be considered as both an encounter of self 
and other (phenomenology), and shaped by socio-cultural context 
(ethnography/autoethnography). Similarly to Mathews (2003), Plumwood (1991) 
describes relationality as a rejection of instrumentalism and a focus on the 
relationship between self and nature. I further refine that description to a focus on the
interrelationships of individuals who are engaged in giving and receiving care, such 
as in parenting.   
One glaring criticism of interpretive research is that its trustworthiness cannot be 
tested. In other words, it cannot be proved that the research findings were not made-
up to meet some predetermined ends (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). While empirical 
research can also be faked and believed without question, ultimately, if someone 
wanted to test the trustworthiness of empirical research they could replicate the 
methods and compare the results (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). You can’t replicate 
interpretive results in the same manner; they are unique in time and space. Indeed, 
different people will interpret encounters differently. However, interpretations may 
have generalisable context and meaning. For example, readers may connect with 
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common experiences, and as a person reading the experiences of another person, you
can use your own intuition and common sense to judge the plausibility of the results 
and the value of their particular meanings (Ellis, 1999; Koch, 1998). 
In this thesis, parenting experiences are linked to external literature about parenting 
and relational scholarship, which provide external support for particular arguments. 
Furthermore, the aim of interpretive research is not to reproduce accurate and 
detailed accounts of lived encounters. Rather, this thesis presents the creative 
communication of my interpretation and cyclic self-reflection of life experiences. 
This may not be objectively accurate, but it can still be honest, reflexive, and 
rigorous (Koch, 1998).  As Ellis writes:
Since we always create our personal narrative from a situated location, trying to make 
our present, imagined future, and remembered past cohere, there’s no such thing as 
orthodox reliability in autoethnographic research (Ellis, 1999, p. 674).
Within the interpretivist ontological view, no one can reasonably judge the validity 
of another person’s ‘knowing’ based on their own preconceived ideals (Converse, 
2012; Romano, 2012). If we want to further a relational understanding of life, then 
we need to consider all of the different ways of knowing it (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005; Fisher and Stenner, 2011; Romano, 2012). 
This process is not positivist, objective or scientific, so it does not make sense to 
evaluate it with terms from these traditions. This includes terms such as legitimacy, 
accuracy, reliability, and confirm-ability (Dumitrica, 2010; Ellis et al, 2011). For 
example, as Dumitrica (2010) explains, the legitimacy of research depends on how 
the society in which the research will be produced, interpreted and/or used decides 
what information constitutes truth (a positivist concept). I am not intending to 
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transfer objective facts and evidenced truths to my audience, and so I do not need to 
account for the accuracy or legitimacy of my informing materials (Ellis, 1999; Van 
Fraassen, 1976; Wall, 2006). Instead of considering this process under the shadow of
ontologically miss-matched concepts (such as legitimacy), perhaps this methodology 
needs to be examined and exhibited individually, and its’ validity and worth assessed
against its’ own research goals (Ellis et al, 2011; Koch, 1998). While I am 
accountable for my specified research goals and what I produce in response to them, 
I am not accountable for the research goals others may impose on my work based on 
their presumptions of what research ‘is’ and ‘should be’. As Ellis et al (2011) so 
poignantly write: 
Unless we agree on a goal, we cannot agree on the terms by which we can judge how 
to achieve it (Ellis et al, 2011, no page number).
Thus, to create a piece of research whose meanings and understandings can be 
trusted by others, transparency and richness (quality) of thought, process, and 
presentation are essential (Fleming et al, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; Koch, 1998). 
Transparency requires systematic critical-reflexivity from the researcher, particularly
to unveil pre-understandings (biases) and personal positions which cyclically shape 
understandings through time (Converse, 2012; Ellis, 1999; Humphreys, 2005; Sell-
Smith and Lax, 2013). Essentially, the researcher tells their audience: Here is my 
research question. This is my story of experience, carefully written and embedded 
with rich meaning. These are my pre-understandings and how I came to recognise 
them. This process is how I came to understand my experience. You don’t have to 
like it, but it’s reflexive, transparent, and meticulous. I invite you to interpret and 
reflect upon your own understandings of my experience and experiences of your 
own. These new understandings may move us forward in ‘X’ ways.
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4.2.1 Phenomenology
The term ‘phenomena’ can be used to describe happenings among self and/or others, 
such as aspects of culture and relationships.  Phenomenology means ‘to bring to 
light’ the experience or observation of phenomena to consciousness (Allen-
Collinson, 2011; Fleming et al, 2003). Phenomenology is both a philosophical 
tradition and a practical method for researching experience. The philosophical side of
phenomenology argues for the validity of experiential knowledge, particularly as it 
relates to understandings of consciousness, materiality, and their synthesis (Allen-
Collinson, 2011; Fleming et al, 2003; Gardner, 2017; Walsham, 2006). The practical 
side of phenomenology focuses on how researchers may communicate and analyse 
the meanings generated by experience to produce new insights which may be of 
value to others (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Geanellos, 1998; McNamara, 2005). 
The complex philosophical tradition of phenomenology was disseminated by the 
German philosophers Husserl (1859-1938) and his student Heidegger (1889-1976), 
and extended by others such as Weber, Schutz, and Gadamer (Converse, 2012; 
Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Husserl, 1900/2000, Koch, 1996). Heidegger
and Gadamer saw the need to value self-evidence and reflexivity in knowledge-
making when they pursued phenomenology, something that is often lacking from 
standard forms of research (Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Romano, 2012; 
Sell-Smith and Lax, 2013). 
The philosophical position of this research project is aligned with the work of 
Husserl’s student, Heidegger (Converse, 2012; Fagerberg and Norberg, 2009; 
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Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Koch, 1996). Husserl believed that a 
person’s prejudices would cloud the pure ‘essence’ of the phenomena they 
experience, and therefore require ‘bracketing out’ (Husserl, 1900/2000; McConnell-
Henry, 2009). Conversely, Heidegger and Gadamer viewed prejudices as a normal 
and deeply rooted part of how people understand the world, and are therefore a 
valuable component of understanding experience (Fleming et al, 2003; Gadamer, 
1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; McConnell-Henry, 2009). 
This research is best supported by Heideggerian phenomenology, as my pre-
understandings (and the questioning thereof) are critically important to understanding
relationships embedded in culture and subjectivity. The interpretation of socio-
culturally shaped meaning, embedded within experience, creates contextual 
understandings of phenomena (Fagerberg and Norberg, 2009; Gadamer, 1975; 
Heidegger, 1927/1962). Heidegerrian phenomenology also supports the view that 
research meaning is co-created between participant (for example, the readers of this 
thesis) and researcher, and that a researcher cannot be removed from the process, and
should be open and reflexive about their position (Heidegger, 1927/1962). This is an 
important point for the study of self-experience (Converse, 2012; Flood, 2010; Koch,
1996; Sell-Smith and Lax, 2013). 
The practical phenomenon under investigation in this thesis is relationality. More 
specifically, I explore the physical, mental, cultural, and metaphysical aspects of 
relationships of interdependence. The practice of phenomenology as a research 
tradition is aimed at just ‘letting things be’ (much like Mathew’s philosophical 
scholarship) while providing meaning and context (rather than theory) for the people 
who experience phenomena (Abawi, 2012; McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). The 
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outcome is specific to the time, place, and researcher, but can also provide 
generalised themes (such as about relationships) which may be meaningful to others 
(Abawi, 2012; Flood, 2010). 
The critiques levelled at phenomenology are much like those applied to interpretive 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Noe, 2007). They reflect a positivist 
epistemology, which seeks to evidence objective truth and fact, clashing with 
interpretivist epistemologies which seek to understand that which is subjective and 
not factual, true, or measurable (as described above). Within phenomenological 
discourse, pure phenomenology has been criticised as regarding its subjects as 
autonomous or free floating with a focus on introspective knowing (Noe, 2007; 
Stoller, 2009). The consequence of understanding experience as pure subjectivity is 
that such research does not further any arguments, as it does not take a stance on 
reality nor situate itself in a shared physical and metaphysical world (Noe, 2007; 
Stoller, 2009). Noe (2007) says that in order to move past such a dilemma 
phenomenology must be grounded in context, insomuch that experience is 
approached as an integration of the world with one’s own perspective, and that the 
knowing generated from experience is not introspective but connective. This 
acknowledges that no mind exists in isolation, and therefore experience is just one of 
the many manifestations of a shared world. Simply put, to contribute to an argument 
about the world, one must move beyond autonomous introspection and view 
experience as a body’s integration with the world. 
Phenomenology is commonly used in nursing research as a means for medical 
professionals to understand the experience of receiving medical treatment. This arena
of literature provides a broad testing ground for the practice and critique of 
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phenomenology (Geanellos, 1998; McNamara, 2005). Geanellos (1998) describes the
intersection of phenomenological practice and philosophy in nursing research, 
critiquing nursing research that lacks an acknowledgment of the philosophical 
responsibilities that result from using phenomenological methods. These 
responsibilities include: Bearing in mind the structure of interpretive understanding 
(such as how understanding comes about, the multiplicity of interpretations, and how
interpretations might be judged); the role of pre-understandings; questioning the 
perspectives which create textual data; and acknowledging the discourse surrounding
interpretative understandings. Geanellos (1998) concludes that working out ones pre-
understandings (also known as forestructures or biases) is the most important aspect 
of phenomenological work, as understandings are always born from our root 
subjective reality. Understandings do not suddenly appear from blank space, but are 
always built upon what we already know. Therefore, they are ontological as well as 
epistemological (Geanellos, 1998). As he describes: 
Consequently, researchers who use Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology are 
obliged to demonstrate the working out of their forestructures in terms of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Geanellos, 1998, p. 156).
I interpret Geanellos’ (1998) description of ‘working out of their forestructures’ to 
indicate that researchers should employ a process to reflect upon and communicate 
their forestructures to their audience. In this research project, I uncover my own pre-
understanding of various relational phenomena through a cyclic analysis processes. 
Heidegger’s cyclic process of reflexivity - called hermeneutics - is a significant 
means of linking the philosophical understanding of experience as knowledge, and of
the physical and mental processes of creating such knowledge (Fleming et al, 2003; 
Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; McConnell-Henry et al, 2009; Reeder, 
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1998). Hermeneutics is the interpretation of texts by cycling from the parts to the 
whole and back and forth, with no specific beginning or ending point (Fleming et al, 
2003; Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962; McConnell-Henry et al, 2009; Reeder,
1998). In the case of experience-based analysis, it broadly refers to the interpretation 
of any form of communication including conversation, text, video, audio, memories, 
thoughts, and personal journal entries. It represents the intersection of that which is 
physical – such as written text – with that which is subjective – such as the reasoned 
analysis of that text by a situated researcher (Reeder, 1998). In this thesis, I rely 
heavily on the conventions of language, storytelling, and writing to communicate 
meaning to readers, and to provoke questions about my own perspectives and biases 
and what they mean in terms of relational understanding. As Geanellos (1998) 
describes:
Buker refers to the relationship that develops between textual interpretations 
(epistemology) and self-interpretation (ontology) as the two directions in which 
hermeneutic research moves forward. For example, through the interpretive process 
one’s biases are revealed, perspectives altered and beliefs modified, thereby providing 
renewed understanding of the self through which other horizons may come into view. 
In this way, each return to the text allows a transformation through which an 
opportunity exists for different understandings of the self and of the text (Gaenellos, 
1998, p. 155).
As I will describe in the following sections, my pre-understandings are brought to 
light and changed through the action of writing stories of relational experience, of 
reading and re-reading those stories, of reading and critiquing associated relational 
scholarship, of communicating the insights derived from their synergies, and even 
through editing the chapters and re-considering them after a period of time. Such 
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inward and outward movement, flowing from physical happenings to intellectual 
perceptions, which are often tangled and sporadic, describes a fluid and inductive 
means of generating knowledge about the synergy of parenting and relational 
scholarship, and importantly how such meanings can embody the practices of others 
through ontological and epistemological inspiration. Hermeneutics, as a means of 
researching experience through text, links phenomenology to autoethnography. It is 
also an experiential and narrative-based research method which I will introduce in 
the next section. 
 
4.2.2 Autoethnography
Like phenomenology, autoethnography is another means to expand our realm of 
knowledge beyond static ‘truths’ and to incorporate the often missing forms of 
knowing that come from a deeper reflection and interpretation of lived experience 
(Romano, 2012). As Meerwald (2013) describes, autoethnography is a merging of 
the cultural studies of ethnography and the reflections of self-experience of 
autobiography, all while giving voice to a variety of interacting players. 
Autoethnography involves the documentation (mental, textual, audio, photographic, 
and others) and reflexive analysis of a lived experience from the perspective and 
socio-cultural paradigm of the self (Anderson, 2006; Ellis, et al, 2011; Ngunjiri, 
2010; Wall, 2006). This methodology also allows the researcher to progressively 
produce deeper meanings of cultural experience through continual reflection and 
refinement of innate and experience based insights, extended by critical engagement 
with various literary and social discourses (Ellis et al, 2011; Mest, 2008; Wall, 2006).
In this thesis, I will be utilising aspects of autoethnography to analyse my own 
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parenting experiences, but will be doing so with the intent to critically link parenting 
to the phenomenological concepts of the relational scholarship of Mathews, Rose, 
and Plumwood. 
During the past twenty years, the researchers Carolyn Ellis and Arthur Bochner have 
led the development, defence, and promotion of autoethnography as a robust research
methodology (Ellis, 1999; Ellis et al, 2011; Wall, 2006). They utilise evocative 
autoethnography, or a form of creative narrative, which allows the reader to both feel
and discover their own meanings and understandings without the descriptive 
abstraction of traditional ethnography (Anderson, 2006). Autoethnography removes 
the dilemma of trying to decipher and transcribe meaning from someone else’s 
external story, but instead highlights that we have yet to understand our own story, 
and so begins the journey of reflexively understanding the socio-cultural realm a bit 
closer to home. 
Autoethnography is a well suited means of utilising Heidegger and Gadamer’s 
phenomenological philosophies. Both tradition’s rigour and trustworthiness is 
dependent upon the researcher communicating ‘how things are’ through their own 
contextual lens (Koch, 1998). Koch (1998) affirms that reflexivity within 
phenomenological research is a significant means of upholding rigour, as it forms 
part of the researcher’s position, politics, and location. The interpretivist ontology 
and constructivist epistemology of both traditions make them advantageous partners 
for uncovering the valuable understandings of self-experience. 
Delemont (2009) sums up the six main criticisms of autoethnography. These 
criticisms assert that autoethnography cannot meet social science objectives and 
therefore cannot be considered ‘real research’. The criticisms include: 
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- Scholars should always try to observe social worlds from a distanced position to 
encourage unbiased and unfamiliar analysis. Autoethnographers can never be 
distanced from their own world, so their conclusions are based on their own familiar 
and biased perspective. Therefore, they cannot provide results which are generalised 
and useful to others. 
- Autoethnography can almost never be ethically implemented as others which 
feature in the autoethnography can usually be deduced as a result of how they relate 
to the author. 
- Autoethnography is purely experience and lacks the necessary analysis to define it 
as research. 
- Autoethnography chooses sides, in that it focuses its ethnography on those that are 
easy to access (privileged self) rather than those that may be more appropriate or 
ethically justified to address a particular social research topic. 
- Social scientists are not interesting, and the minute details of their lives are unlikely
to provide any analytic insights into most social research topics. 
- Paid academics have a moral obligation to collect, analyse, and publish research 
data. Contemplating yourself in an office all day does not meet this moral obligation 
(Delemont, 2009).        
Whether or not these criticisms have any merit depends upon the goals of the 
research being undertaken and how the researcher utilises autoethnography to 
achieve them (Ellis et al, 2011). Autoethnographers are people, and as such are most 
likely a part of some social phenomena. Therefore, they can potentially provide deep 
insight and perspective into a social science phenomenon, which is usually linked 
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though the commonalities of the human condition to other perspectives and the 
bigger picture. To privilege social research which only values data representing a 
simplified collective perspective, over research which deeply analyses one’s own 
perspective, denies the potential contributions and the linkages of all perspectives for
furthering social science knowledge (Anderson, 2006). 
As previously discussed, biases constitute a person’s forestructures – understandings 
of phenomena before undertaking research which are continually re-shaped through 
questioning and experience, including the experience of research (Fleming et al, 
2003). An autoethnographer can question their own experiences and can just as well 
as, if not better than, a researcher questioning someone else’s experiences. Both are 
equally capable of openly altering pre-understandings of the research phenomenon to
attain a greater level of knowledge. Bias is the foundation of all research, because we
want to grow our limited, biased, understanding of it (Fleming et al, 2003; Geanellos,
1998; Koch, 1998). 
The more familiar we are with a phenomenon the deeper we can question it, and the 
more we question it, the more familiar we become. Approaching social science 
phenomena from an unfamiliar and distanced perspective would be impossible, if not
undesirable, as the very point of research is to know more and thereby become 
familiar with phenomena. Indeed, this methodological approach is not intended to 
solve problems by sampling all sides; rather it is intended to understand the 
complexities of a continuum of relational interaction, for which there are no sides or 
end points (Fleming et al, 2003; Wall, 2006). To identify phenomena as worthy of 
research indicates that the researcher is making decisions based on a set of biases 
about the phenomena which inspired the researcher to want to know more. 
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Therefore, biases should be transparent and explored, but not distanced or ignored. 
The process of understanding biases uncovers why the research is valuable to people 
and how they flow on to shape research findings (Ellis et al, 2011; Fleming et al, 
2003; Geanellos, 1998; Koch, 1998). 
As Delamont (2009) elaborates, autoethnography treads a fine line with 
autobiography, and not research, particularly if autoethnographers present 
experiences which do not explicitly further specific research goals. Autoethnographic
material needs to be worthy of being reflectively analysed for a clear purpose. 
Communicating experience does not constitute research by itself; experience needs 
to be placed specifically as evidence for an argument (Atkinson, 2006; Delemont, 
2009; Noe, 2007). Any experience can be analysed regardless of whether it’s about 
yourself or others, but the experiences need to be able to support the overall 
argument of the research, otherwise, as Delemont (2009) points out, the material is 
not going to be analytically usable and therefore it is not ‘real research’. 
The success or failure of autoethnography as a form of research depends on how and 
why it is used. In this project, I propose that parenting may be praxis for relational 
scholarship, and that both share a dialogue which may further the other. I then 
present and analyse autoethnographic parenting experiences to build my argument. I 
use my parenting experiences as an example or demonstration to identify the 
underlying connections between parenting and relational scholarship. These stories, 
and the processes by which I analyse them, may also provide insights and criticisms 
for both. Every person is going to have a different parenting experience, but there are
commonalities across cultures, inherent to the human condition such as nourishment, 
touch, and communication, which underlie most of my stories. I can connect with 
75
Chapter 4
these underlying themes and their associated literature, and use them to make my 
study and its conclusions relevant to others. Within the scope of my research 
question, it does not matter that the parenting stories have come from me so long as 
their origins are transparent and they help elicit an argument. 
Any experience of parenting could be analysed here, but I choose autoethnography 
over other methods of collecting parenting experiences because it allows me to create
more depth in my analysis through reflexivity, as well as provide a more fluent and 
bountiful catalogue of stories collected over a longer period of time than could be 
expected of external participants. I am not attempting to define how people are 
parenting their children within a particular society, so collecting vast quantities of 
external parenting data would not be worthwhile. I only need examples of parenting, 
any parenting, to demonstrate the root connections between parenting and relational 
scholarship which support parenting as a praxis for the latter. Therefore, 
autoethnography is a perfectly suitable means for furthering my research in 
conjunction with phenomenology.   
4.2.3 Writing and Reflexivity as Method
My analysis process is inspired by Fleming et al’s (2003) recommendations, but 
tailored to meet the needs of an autoethnographical study as opposed to a study of 
participant experiences, as described in Fleming et al (2003). They observed that 
Heidegger and Gadamer outlined and justified the principles of hermeneutics in their 
texts, but did not provide a step-by-step process for researchers to work with 
(Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1927/1962). So, Fleming et al (2003) undertook the task
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of recommending a process for creating hermeneutic understandings, based on the 
original texts of Gadamer. It’s important to consider that the following steps are not 
rules for understanding. It is merely a transparent presentation of my process for 
creating understanding. As Gadamer (1975) believes, understanding does not need an
awareness of rules, nor do rules precipitate understanding as they can burden the 
interpretive process (Fleming et al, 2003; Gadamer, 1975). 
4.2.3.1 Purpose and Intent
As recommended by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), my process began by clearly 
outlining the purpose and intent of my research. This purpose followed me 
throughout the analysis, flowing and changing with my understandings, yet anchored
in the intent to know experiences of concepts of relationality in new ways.  These 
boundaries both initiated and guided my process for understanding and 
communicating meaningful experience (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
4.2.3.2 Provoke Pre-understandings
To create a meaningful foundation for understandings, we need a means to expose 
and communicate our pre-understandings, biases, and forestructures. Fleming et al 
(2003) suggests that pre-understandings can be illuminated through confronting and 
provoking conversation with a colleague, family member, or friend, followed by 
personal reflection and journaling. In addition to these methods, I use 
autoethnographic narrative as a useful means of uncovering pre-understandings, 
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connecting parenting experience with relational scholarship, and providing my 
audience with relational context. 
Narrative is not a focus of Fleming et al’s (2003) method, but in this analysis 
narration is my primary means of communicating and detangling experience. I kept a
journal of personal, uncensored happenings, thoughts, and feelings surrounding my 
parenting experiences. I then composed and presented a textual collection of stories 
about significant experiences or relational themes. These stories were written and 
presented in the style of Ellis and Bochner’s evocative autoethnography (Ellis et al, 
2011). Creative, and crafted with embedded meanings, these stories draw on 
memories, feelings, audio recordings, notes, pictures, conversations, social media, or 
other inspirational material I had access to. My first intention was to get my audience
to feel what I felt, appreciate my position, and become personally involved in my 
story (Ellis, 1999; Humphreys, 2005). My second intention was to communicate and 
interpret the meanings of my experiences as I experienced them. My narratives didn’t
need to be accurate, referenced, documented or hard-evidenced in an appendix, 
although many are documented to assist with recall. The use of creative writing is 
intended to invite readers into the story, implore them to reflect upon their own 
experiences and co-create meaning about the research which is complex, innate, and 
both emotionally felt and critically understood (Ellis, 1999). As Ellis (1999) 
describes to her autoethnography student: 
Well, yes, if you viewed your project as closer to art than science, then your goal 
would not be so much to portray the facts of what happened to you accurately but 
instead to convey the meanings you attached to the experience. You’d want to tell a 
story that readers could enter and feel a part of. You’d write in a way to evoke readers 
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to feel and think about your life and their lives in relation to yours. You’d want them 
to experience the experience you’re writing about (Ellis, 1999, p. 674).
As I have a background in scientific writing, writing creatively was a challenging 
part of this project. Getting personal and using an evocative expression was difficult. 
There is value and rigour in communicating my research in a way that is personal 
and fits with my epistemology. The process is a little messy, but there is meaning in 
the mess (Sell-Smith and Lax, 2013). Transferring lived experience into static text 
can remove some of the ‘life’ from experienced phenomena. I cannot literally insert 
the audience into my perceived reality, so creative writing is a suitable and portable 
alternative, but it requires a particular skill set to achieve a rich and easily 
understandable result (Ellis, 1999; Ferrarello, S., 2012). I propose that to produce a 
skilfully written autoethnography, I must write with the intent to convey meaning, 
rather than adhere to convention (Dauphinee, 2010; Koch, 1998). Every nuance of 
language has a particular effect on the reader, and as an autoethnographer I want to 
sculpt a clear but interesting means of communicating my understandings and 
insights (Sell-Smith and Lax, 2013). 
4.2.3.3 Creating New Understandings
In the previous step, I provoked insights into my pre-understandings through writing 
and reflecting upon my parenting narratives. In this aspect of the analysis, I look to 
others to help me move my understandings forward and to help me look at relational 
situations or themes in new light. I approached this task through conversation with, 
and interpretation of, external information sources such as academic literature, social 
media, audio/visual media, new experiences, and personal conversations (Fleming et 
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al, 2003). My pre-understandings evolved through time, as I undertook analysis, read
and conversed with others, mentally processed the multiplicity of tangled input 
surrounding my experience, and as I continued to experience life and parenting. This 
is the hermeneutic circle, cycling from pre-understandings to understandings to pre-
understandings – continual change informed by more change. I shift from the parts to
the whole of an experience and back again. No understandings are final truths. 
Finally, at the end of this thesis, I address my research question. My final insights are
intended to be a reflexive response to my inquiry, revealing my evolving 
understandings (changed pre-understandings) of the research phenomenon. These 
understandings summarise how I processed and presented my experiences in light of 
my pre-understandings, critically and openly informed by others (Fleming et al, 
2003). New understandings inevitably toss up new questions about the phenomenon 
of relationality, some of which inspire further exploration in subsequent analysis 
chapters. In my life beyond this project, the hermeneutic circle will continue to 
change my understandings as I continue to experience relationality and parenting far 
beyond the bounds of this research.  
4.2.4 Ethical Considerations
While autoethnography is generated by the self, it is also shaped by encounters with 
others. Therefore, I have an ethical responsibility for the representations of other 
people in my autoethnographic material (Dauphinee, 2010; Ellis, 1999). Other 
players constitute people who interact (in person or by distance) with myself and/or 
my child and pose interesting socio-cultural experiences, which I later record and 
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reflect upon through text. You may be able to easily identify specific people based on
their role or actions, for example, my husband would be easily identifiable without 
providing a specific name (Ellis, 1999). Family and friends may also be able to 
identify themselves within the autoethnography based on the story, even if the reader
is unlikely to (Ellis, 1999). To uphold personal and legal ethical values, I provided 
involved family and friends the opportunity to give written consent, with a non-
mandatory option to allow identification by name and location. I allowed participants
to view a draft copy of publishable results before submission. This ensured that they 
have fully consented to their representation and identifiability in this project. Despite 
obtaining consent, there are still topics, insights, and events that I won’t include as a 
part of this thesis, because they would be uncomfortable or offensive to some family 
and friends. As a part of this process, I obtained formal ethics approval from the 
Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Tasmania.
Additionally, the use of self-evidence in autoethnography eliminates the colonialist 
tensions of ethnography, where researchers studied other people from a position of 
power, and thus reinforced a superior/inferior social segregation among intersecting 
cultures (Dauphinee, 2010; Ellis et al, 2011). Thus, this methodology is respectful of 
Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose’s emphasis on detangling the lingering dualisms of 
colonialism and its oppression of indigenous people, particularly in the context of 
Australia’s settler history. As I am working within my own socio-cultural context, I 
can only represent my own views and interpretations of cultural values, even if I am 
reflecting upon an interaction with others, it is still transcribed from my own 
viewpoint.
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4.3 Conclusion
As Mathews describes:
The appropriate approach to such a world would appear to be not, in the first instance, 
to investigate it, but rather to encounter it (2003, p.76). 
Interpretive knowledge of encounter is a significant source of ‘knowing’ in daily life,
and so it should have an established place in academic research epistemology. 
Ultimately, we want to ‘know’ to further living, so it is logical that the experience of 
living should play a critical role in how we know. The greatest challenge for 
interpretive methodologies is to become as credible, available, and mainstream as 
objective science – a process of building person-to-person trust, as you would with a 
new acquaintance (Ellis et al, 2011). I must strive to present myself though my 
research as I would in person to build credibility with others; communicate with 
conviction, do what I say I will, disclose when things don’t go to plan, acknowledge 
what I don’t understand, reflect on the understandings of others, be critical but non-
judgemental, and project a positive and open intent. Many of these things can be 
more difficult in practice, but the more honesty, transparency and reflexivity I put 
into this presentation, the richer my meanings and understandings will be. I will then 
be in a better position to build trust and rapport with my audience, and further my 
research agenda. 
If you strip away the philosophies and traditions of research, you are left with people 
who simply want to know, and people who know instinctively through encounters. 
This knowing helps us to cope with life and move forward. It is not perfect, clean, or 
uniform, but it moves us on intellectually, spiritually, and physically. By exploring 
knowing through a reflection on my parenting experiences, in light of relational 
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scholarship, I want to connect with my audience and further a multitude of 
understandings about parenting, childhood, relational scholarship and the world of 
connections we are embedded within.  
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Chapter 5 The Dualistic Logic of Sleep Training
It's perfectly clear that the millions of babies, who are crying at this very moment,
want unanimously to be next to a live body. Do you really think they're all wrong?
Theirs is the voice of nature. This is the clear, pure voice of nature, without
intellectual interference.
(Liedloff, 1975, p. 206)
5.1 Introduction
In the relational scholarship informing this research, relationships among all ‘beings’
are assumed to be seamlessly interdependent and connective (Mathews, 2005; 
Plumwood, 1993; Rose, 2005). These connections are sustained through a dynamic 
and unrelenting flow of relational energy. This energy flow could be described as 
social – meaningful exchanges of give and take, facilitating deeper companionships 
and conflicts.  Therefore, the circumstances governing the social congress of people 
likely reveal how we are relating to others on broader ecological scales (Muir et al, 
2010; Plumwood, 2002). Plumwood (1993; 2002) utilised the male/female dualism 
to demonstrate that the human/nature dualism originated from a similar space of 
mastery and oppression. Likewise, in this chapter, I argue that sleep training infants 
(leaving infants to cry to achieve sleep) is yet another example of embedded dualism,
one that may have relational repercussions for those infants and their caregivers 
involved in this practice. 
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Dualistic thinking allows for the mastery of one body over another for instrumental 
gain, despite their mutual dependency. While the dominating party benefits 
materially from dualistic relations, ultimately, the suffering of the oppressed leads to 
the degradation of both through their often unseen and unacknowledged connectivity.
Dualistic thinking has deeply embedded itself in many aspects of modernity, and as I 
will argue in this chapter, its influence is evident in parenting. Dualism is a key threat
to the kind of relationality envisioned by Mathews, Plumwood, and Rose, because it 
challenges the value of dependency and interdependence with others, and thus 
defines our ethical boundaries and the balance of power with interdependent kin 
(Plumwood, 1993; 2002). 
In this research project I take a relational position to make my argument. As such, 
this work is not value-free, but supports the ontological values of the relational 
environmental philosophers Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose. In fact, it would be 
impossible to argue that we should be concerned about dualisms without presenting a
particular perspective or view of reality from which to base that argument. My 
argument is not intended to vilify parents who sleep train their infants or uphold 
similarly aligned values. It is understandable that people make choices to enable 
them to survive materially and socially in the culture or situation within which they 
live. Parents may use sleep training to cope with the struggles and expectations of 
raising children in modernity. Indeed, this speaks to a greater existential crisis where 
parents may have been oppressed in their own formative years, and so lack certain 
relational knowledge and skills which would support more empathetic and 
responsive parenting. To challenge normative choices that are seen as private and 
personal can be quite confrontational. Nonetheless, parenting is as much a communal
act as it is a personal one, and is informed just as much by shared and underlying 
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cultural beliefs as it is by personal circumstances (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Olza 
and MacDonnell, 2010). So, it is critical to the praxis of relational scholarship to 
question, no matter how contentious, how we nurture or hinder the relational 
capacities of future generations and ourselves in the process.
While I did not sleep train Evelyn, I did experience the sleep-related hardship that 
usually befalls new parents and subsequently so often precedes sleep training. This 
experience gave me insight into some of the cultural, social, and biological factors 
that might push people to sleep train their infants. Sleep training provides a 
comprehensive and illuminating example of parenting practices that are infused with 
dualistic logic. The attitudes that support sleep training also interconnect with other 
cultural attitudes of mastery and control. A consideration of these approaches is 
crucial for understanding the cultural premises of relational power relations. The 
following story details my introduction to night time parenting. 
5.2 I Just Can’t Stay Awake
(Composed from memories of before and just after Evelyn's birth in May, 2013)
As new parents we weren’t really sure what to expect at night. I was familiar with 
the sleepless and exhausted new parent stereotype. This image was usually presented
in a joking way, so I was not terribly worried about long nights. I was accustomed to
doing all-nighters for my university studies, so I thought I was well prepared for 
night time antics. In my excited anticipation of Evelyn’s emergence, I had her cot set 
up in our room many months before she was born. I had no particular feelings 
towards the cot. I assumed it was the standard sleeping space for babies. As far as I 
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knew, it was just a thing you put them in and they would sleep. I had not considered 
other sleeping options or that our relationship with this device would prove to be a 
problem. I even considered putting her in her own room without much concern, 
something that I could not even fathom once she was born. 
On May 28th 2013, in the early hours of the morning, Evelyn was born healthy and 
strong. When we took Evelyn home from the hospital, all of my assumptions about 
infant sleep and the depth of my role collapsed. She was unable to sleep longer than 
20 minutes in the cot, and fed every three hours. She would nurse for an hour and a 
half, I would change her nappy somewhere mid-feed, and then she would fall asleep. 
I would wait for her limbs to go limp (indicating she was deeply sleeping), then 
transfer her to the cot next to our bed. As soon as her body touched the mattress, she
would coil into a ball, roll on her side, and inch-worm around the cot until she woke 
up. I would then be bouncing, patting, and rocking the cot to try and keep her asleep.
Finally, when she would seem to be asleep, I would jump into bed and try to get to 
sleep as quickly as possible before the next feed. I would stare into the cot, paranoid 
about all of the weird grunting and gurgling noises she was making. I was unable to 
sleep on cue and under the pressure of knowing that I only had an hour of 
opportunity to rest. Then, just as I would start to relax, she would wake and the 
feeding cycle would begin again. I would drag my tired body out of bed and back to 
the rocking chair for more nursing. This went on for weeks. I ate sugary food night 
and day to help me stay awake and to comfort my anxiety. As a result, I gained a fair
bit of weight within the first three months. My fitness was very low. I was depressed. 
I felt weak, cold, sweaty, and very uneasy. 
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Figure 2 - Surfing the internet while newborn Evelyn sleeps. Photo credit: Michael Cook.
Sometimes Evelyn slept in my lap and I would trawl the internet on my laptop for 
advice to help me solve the problem of needing to stay awake to feed her coupled 
with her inability to stay asleep in the cot. I could not blame her for not wanting to 
sleep in the cot. Why should she accept a hard, cold and lonely cot as a substitute for
a warm, squishy, nourishing and protective parent? Bed-sharing seemed the most 
logical solution to sleep deprivation. Hook baby up to the boob, form a protective 
‘C’ shape position around baby, and snooze and feed throughout the night with 
minimal arousal. In my internet trawling, I discovered the safe bed-sharing 
guidelines based on the seven risk factors for sudden infant death and sleep 
accidents; they seemed completely practical, intuitive and well informed. Rationally, 
bed-sharing seemed the biological norm, and with pre-planned risk management, I 
reasoned that it should be just as, if not more, safe than cot-sleeping. Emotionally, 
the sleep deprivation induced depression/anxiety mixed with post-baby hormones 
made me extremely terrified of hurting my newborn. I couldn’t even walk through 
the house without terrorising myself with visions of all the horrible freak injuries she
could sustain if I accidently fell down the stairs or banged her head on a door jamb. 
The sudden infant death pamphlet from the hospital, my doctor, nurses, family, news 
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articles, were all condemning bed-sharing as a dangerous practice, calling it 
reckless and akin to murder and abuse. I asked the community health nurse for 
advice. She told me to put her in the cot awake and pat and rock until she was asleep
so she associates the cot with going to sleep. I had already tried this, and she did not
sleep longer than 20 minutes, coupled with the dilemma that you have to be awake to
rock and pat her to sleep in the cot. I was frustrated that not only did the ‘system’ 
instruct that babies must sleep in cots, but that bed-sharing was a ‘very dangerous 
practice’ and I would ‘roll on-top of her’. So what am I to do? 
Figure 3 - An example of a bed-sharing fear campaign. Photo Credit: City of Milwaukee. 
Then one night it all changed. Five weeks into parenthood, at 4am, unable to keep 
my eyes open, I involuntarily fell asleep while nursing Evelyn in the rocking chair, 
and slumped over on top of her. I suddenly woke in a panic and frantically checked 
her breathing, thankfully she was ok. I loudly sobbed to Michael (my husband) “I 
just can’t physically stay awake any longer, what am I going to do?” I was totally 
exhausted and losing the battle to stay awake during night time feedings. Falling 
asleep on top of Evelyn in the rocking chair and smothering her had become a real 
danger. We had reached crisis stage, and I knew I needed a more sustainable 
solution now. 
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To help get myself out of this dilemma, I experimented with different ways to 
simulate bed-sharing without actually bringing Evelyn into our bed (which was a 
lumpy cotton futon, and not suitable for bed-sharing anyway). First, I sawed bars off
the cot so I could get a hand and boob through. That was unfortunately awkward, 
and not very effective. Next, I had Michael go out and get me a foam mattress for the
floor to provide me with a firmer/flatter surface (than our bed) so I could nurse 
Evelyn lying down, and therefore be less likely to harm her should I fall asleep. Of 
course, I did fall asleep, Evelyn did not get smothered, and it was rejuvenating! 
Unfortunately, the foam mattress was incredibly thin, cold, and uncomfortable and I 
was still grappling with fears of suffocation. I eventually stumbled across the side-
car-cot set-up on the internet. So I removed the entire railing on one side of the cot 
and tied the frame to the side of our bed. I boobed her to sleep lying down with her 
in the side-car cot and me in my bed (although I spent a lot of time half in the cot), in
a semi-bed-sharing situation. I felt that the restricted nature of the cot sides and 
extra space would keep me from rolling onto her, and thus ease my unfounded 
paranoia. I was hyper-vigilant about adhering to the safe bed-sharing guidelines, 
and knew that despite the taboo and paranoia, it was the safest option for all of us. I 
was no longer at risk of falling asleep on top of her in the rocking chair or having a 
sleep deprived accident (falling asleep in a soft chair is a risk factor for accidental 
death as babies can just wedged into crevices and cushions). I could easily feed her 
in the night without either of us having to rouse or move very much. Amazingly, she 
was also very quiet now, no longer gurgling, grunting or spewing in her sleep or 
inch-worming around the cot, and I could relax and sleep longer and more fluidly. I 
had no idea of how many times she nursed at night, because I didn’t have to fully 
wake, nor did Michael or Evelyn. I didn’t need to worry about keeping up the 
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abstract feeding-changing-feeding-sleeping pattern recommended by the hospital. 
We both slept lightly but peacefully, and we would rouse simultaneously if she 
needed feeding or comfort or if something was wrong. My depression and anxiety 
reduced significantly after the first restful night, and we had turned a corner. 
My struggle with our night time sleep arrangements highlights the role of cultural 
imperatives in shaping personal experience. The rationalist opinion that I could kill 
my infant by bed-sharing contributed greatly to my anxiety, and prolonged my 
attempt to use a cot for solo-sleeping. The argument that bed-sharing was unsafe was
perpetuated by those around me, but without context, experience, or balanced 
evidence, and yet I took it to heart. This is likely due, in part, to the uncertainty 
caused by changing hormones, lifestyle adjustments, cabin fever, inexperience and, 
of course, sleep-deprivation. When the input of others was in conflict with my own 
imperatives I became confused, desperate, and prone to making knee-jerk decisions, 
such as sawing the bars of the cot. The internet was my saving grace. It allowed me 
to access articles, forums, and other sources of information that suited my values. I 
was able to get support and practical information from people who had been in my 
situation. I was able to do my own research on the risks of bed-sharing by accessing 
the original literature through my university account. This electronic connection with
others opened my eyes to all the different parenting philosophies around, and 
particularly directed me to the ones which suited my evolving values such as gentle 
parenting, attachment parenting, evolutionary parenting and synergy parenting to 
name a few. The internet provided a wealth of relational information and experience 
to which I would have otherwise had little access to. 
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I was both amazed at the power of bed-sharing and passionately angry about the 
impact of bed-sharing taboos and misinformation, including the presentation of solo 
sleeping as the only ‘safe’ sleeping option despite growing evidence to the contrary 
(Gettler and McKenna, 2010; McKenna and McDade, 2005). I can easily see how 
sleep accidents could happen when parents are ill-informed about safe bed-sharing, 
force themselves to stay awake until they suddenly involuntarily fall asleep with their
infant in a dangerous position such as on the couch or in an unprepared bed, and so 
how they also contribute to the ongoing false impression that all bed-sharing is 
dangerous (McKenna and McDade, 2005). Alternatively, parents reaching crisis 
point would be more likely to accept extreme and medicalised sleep-treatments, such 
as to sleep train their infant. As I will uncover below, sleep training, as a culturally 
informed solution to the ‘infant sleep problem’, is one such practice that warrants 
deeper investigation from a relational perspective. 
5.3 Sleep Training: A western solution to the ‘infant sleep 
problem’
Difficulty getting to sleep and frequent night waking and feeding is common in the 
first few years of life. Biologically appropriate, yet often chaotic, infant sleep is 
commonly accompanied by parental sleep deprivation, conflicting advice, social 
pressure, confusion, frustration, and the search for a solution to the ‘infant sleep 
problem’ (Blunden et al, 2011; Gettler and McKenna, 2010; James-Roberts et al, 
2006; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Owens et al, 1999).
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Bed-sharing is usually an effective and biologically appropriate approach to adopt for
balancing parent and infant needs at night, but it isn’t a viable choice for everyone 
(Blunden et al, 2011; Gettler and McKenna, 2010; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; 
McKenna and McDade, 2005; Thoman, 2006). Within the context of western culture 
and the circumstances of individual families, the decision to instigate solo-sleeping is
usually informed by popular concerns such as a fear of creating ‘bad habits’, 
fostering dependency, exposing children to adult sexuality, ‘spoiling’ (or instilling 
laziness and disobedience), and/or risking sudden infant death or sleep accidents 
(Blunden et al, 2011; Crook, 2008; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; McKenna and 
McDade, 2005; Solomon et al, 1993). Some parents simply find it uncomfortable 
sleeping next to a wriggly infant, while for others it is contrary to the mainstream 
western expectation that infants should be ‘taught’ to sleep independently and/or that
parents should retain their pre-baby sleep space (Blunden et al, 2011; Jenni and 
O’Connor, 2005; McKenna and McDade, 2005).
Sleep training is one approach that solves the ‘problem of infant sleep’ while 
adhering to the popularised values and recommendations of mainstream western 
parenting. The sleep training of infants refers to the use of various ‘extinction’ 
techniques (referring to the gradual extinction of crying, including methods such as 
controlled crying or cry-it-out) to achieve hands-off infant ‘self-settling’, ‘self-
soothing’ and resettling throughout the night (Blunden et al, 2011; France et al, 2003;
Owens et al, 1999; Tortorella, 2013). Infants are placed in a cot, awake, and left to 
cry for prescribed lengths of time (such as 10 minute intervals, increasing intervals, 
or even left for up to 12 hours as described in Weissbluth (2005)) until sleep is 
achieved with minimal parental intervention. This is repeated at every sleep session 
until after a number of days or weeks, crying diminishes upon placement in the cot, 
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and the infant is able to self-settle and resettle throughout the night (France et al, 
2003; Owens et al, 1999; Tortorella, 2013). 
Sleep training is usually intensely stressful for both parents and children (Middlemiss
et al, 2012). When sleep training fails to work, it’s usually because parents ‘give-in’ 
to their child’s cries (Blunden et al, 2011; France et al, 2003; Owens et al, 1999). 
Many public parenting centres and infant sleep schools support sleep-deprived 
parents with extinction techniques, particularly as clinical studies have demonstrated 
their effectiveness at achieving sleep (Blunden et al, 2011; France et al, 2003; Owens
et al, 1999; Tortorella, 2013). There is little research available which considers the 
social, relational, psychological, cultural or physical outcomes of sleep training. This 
is likely because long-term outcomes, particularly relational ones, would be difficult 
if not impossible to measure as well as potentially unethical to study (Blunden et al, 
2011; James-Roberts et al, 2006; Tortorella, 2013).
Independent infant sleep, which necessitates the use of sleep training for both 
practical and cultural reasons, is thought to have originated in Victorian Britain 
(Blunden et al, 2011; Crook, 2008; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). Independent sleep 
emerged in response to the Christian values of discipline and privacy (ordering and 
segregating space and people) (Arnott and Brown, 2013; Crook, 2008; Jenni and 
O’Connor, 2005). Sleep time presented an ideal opportunity to ‘teach’ infants self-
discipline, piety and obedience (characteristics valued by the church, as well as 
industry) by forcing independence, segregation and self-sufficiency (Boyce, 2014). 
This was thought to counter ‘spoiling’, where it was reasoned that too much 
indulgence in the dependency of infants and children made them lazy and 
disobedient subjects (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Solomon et al, 1993). 
94
Chapter 5
While independence and discipline were valued by Victorians for religious and 
governance reasons, those values were also useful as western countries began to 
industrialise. To ‘succeed’ (e.g. efficiently earn money) in industrialised societies 
requires one to be self-sufficient, obedient to employers or institutions, and 
disciplined in their work ethic. It’s no wonder some industrial cultures still have 
underlying fears of dependency in children. They may want their children to be 
economically successful, and so hold onto the underlying fear that childhood 
dependency will reward laziness and create self-centred and economically 
unproductive adults (Blunden et al, 2011; Crook, 2008; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). 
Likewise, a parent engaged in night time parenting may be more exhausted and less 
capable of being economically industrious, and therefore risk their family’s survival 
(van Engen et al, 2012). The ‘problem of infant sleep’ was redefined by the social 
changes accompanying modernisation, such as the increase in working mothers 
and/or single parents who required a full night of sleep to juggle the demands of 
parenthood and employment (Etelson, 2007; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005).
In the mid-twentieth century, the rise of scientific reasoning enhanced the 
medicalisation of sleep, usually catering to behavioural tactics. These approaches 
considered infants as a set of behaviours, rather than as dynamically subjective and 
contextual individuals. Such views went hand-in-hand with the reason-focused, 
masterful attitude of dualistic thinking (Blunden et al, 2011; Plumwood, 1993; van 
der Horst et al, 2008). Kohn (2005) describes the behaviourist view of children:
We see it also in programs that are intended to train little kids to go to sleep on their 
own […]. From the perspective of these programs, why a child may be sobbing in the 
dark is irrelevant. It could be terror or boredom or loneliness or hunger or something 
else. […] Experts who offer step-by-step recipes for “teaching” children to sleep in a 
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room by themselves, […] are concerned not with the thoughts and feelings and 
intentions that give rise to a behavior, only with the behavior itself (Kohn, 2005, p.20).
In this mindset, responding to an infant’s cry was considered a reward (Blunden et al,
2011; Crook, 2008; France et al, 2003). Rewarding a cry was tantamount to 
rewarding dependency or parental manipulation, which risked shifting the perceived 
power balance to the child. Consistently and persistently ignoring crying reinforces 
the parent’s power to achieve independent sleep. At the turn of the 20th century, 
early sleep training pioneer Dr. Emmitt Holt suggested in his baby care manual how 
parents should respond to night time cries:
One should get up and see that the child is comfortable—the clothing smooth under 
the body, the hands and feet warm, and the napkin not wet or soiled. If all these 
matters are properly adjusted and the child simply crying to be taken up, it should not 
be further interfered with. If the night cry is habitual some other cause should be 
sought. How is an infant to be managed that cries from temper, habit, or to be 
indulged? It should simply be allowed to ‘cry it out’. This often requires an hour, and 
in extreme cases, two or three hours. A second struggle will seldom last more than ten 
or fifteen minutes, and a third will rarely be necessary. Such discipline is not to be 
carried out unless one is sure as to the cause of the habitual crying (Holt, 1907, no 
page numbers).
His approach exemplifies the enduring attitude that infant’s needs can only be 
reasoned by adults, and are simple, knowable, and physical (such as cleanliness), and
that crying is a form of manipulation that should not be responded to for fear of 
behavioural habituation. Referring to the infant as ‘it’, also indicates an 
understanding of infants as objects rather than as centres of subjectivity in their own 
right.
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In the post-war period, a culture of detachment parenting persisted despite an 
understanding of the social value of mother-infant attachments emerging through 
Bowlby and Ainsworth’s work on attachment theory (Ainsworth, 1989; Bowlby, 
1988; Etelson, 2007; Leerkesa et al, 2010; Olza and MacDonnell, 2010; Swain et al, 
2013; van der Horst et al, 2008). The growing focus on new clinical research 
defining idealised infant sleep helped to maintain extinction as a mainstream 
behavioural treatment for perceived sleep problems (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). 
Unquestioned trust in clinically recommended extinction treatments enhanced the 
palatability and rigour of such practices, particularly as clinical prescriptions are 
assumed to be objective, true, and in everyone’s best interest (Jenni and O’Connor, 
2005). The demonstrated effectiveness of solving the sleep ‘problem’ with extinction
techniques played a significant role in justifying its use (Blunden et al, 2011; France 
et al, 2003; Owens et al, 1999; Tortorella, 2013). The assumptions that define the 
need for such a technique, namely what constitutes a sleep problem, are based on the 
cultural definition of ‘normal’ infant sleep, which, as Jenni and O’Connor (2005) 
reveal, is often unrecognised by practitioners and researchers. 
Owens et al (1999) reiterate that biologically appropriate infant sleep is clinically 
defined as a problem for both parents and infants, without recognition of the role of 
cultural imperatives, like cot use and solo-sleeping, in defining such problems. 
Furthermore, they maintain that routine-based sleep is ‘normal’, and that deviations 
from normal are damaging and to be treated with goal-orientated behavioural 
interventions, such as the removal of parental ‘rewards’:
Clinicians are often asked for assistance in managing children’s bed-time and sleep 
behaviour. This can range from problems with settling to sleep or night waking […] 
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Disruptions to normal sleep routines can have serious effects on the wellbeing of both 
children and parents[…] (Owens et al, 1999, p.281). 
They go on to conclude: 
Extinction is the theoretical basis for several different approaches to managing infant 
sleep disturbance. Extinction focuses on the way in which a child’s problem sleep 
behaviours (e.g., bed-time resistance, signalling to the parents during settling or 
wakening at night) are being maintained by inappropriate parental attention. Removal 
of the rewarding consequence results in a rapid decrease in the problem behaviours. 
That is, the child is not attended to, once put to bed, unless the parents judge it to be 
absolutely necessary. Extinction is invariably used in conjunction with stimulus 
control, in that regular bed-time and pre-bed-time routines are established. 
Unmodified extinction has effectively reduced settling and night waking problems in 
both case-studies and experimental designs (Owens et al, 1999, p. 283).
Baby care manuals have also played a large role in the dissemination and up take of 
mainstream parenting practices, as well as giving parents a practical guide for 
administering different ‘training’ techniques. They are an accessible and trusted 
resource for concerned parents, particularly as many are written by white male 
doctors of medicine and psychology (Arnott and Brown, 2013; Jenni and O’Connor, 
2005). There are numerous influential baby care manuals that advocate forms of 
sleep training. The earliest manuals are strongly focused on power and behaviourism,
emphasising strict routines, moral codes, and discipline in the form of limiting loving
contact between parent and child (Crook, 2008; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Rowold, 
2013; Solomon et al, 1993). These include, The Care and Feeding of Children, (Holt,
1907), Feeding and Care of Baby (King, 1913), and Psychological Care of Infant 
and Child (Watson, 1928). In 1946, Dr. Benjamin Spock ‘went against the grain’ and
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encouraged mothers to trust their instincts in the book The Common Sense Book of 
Baby and Child Care (Spock, 1946). While critics claimed that his methods were 
permissive and even helped to bring about the counter-culture of the 1960s, the 
manual still emphasised that children should not sleep with parents alluding to the 
concern that ‘bad habits’ would arise – he viewed ‘giving in’ to children’s crying as 
weak parenting (Blunden et al, 2011; Morelli et al, 1992; Spock, 1945). In the later 
part of the twentieth century many of the most popular manuals were about solving 
problems of modernity, such as giving working parents more sleep, rather than 
overtly trying to embed a rigid social code of morals and discipline (Arnott and 
Brown, 2013; Sinal and Tikotzky, 2012). None the less, they still included the same 
themes of routine, distancing, and extinction around sleep times (Arnott and Brown, 
2013; Blunden et al, 2011; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). These manuals include,  
Solve Your Child’s Sleep Problems (Ferber, 1985), On Becoming Babywise: More 
Than a Survival Guide (Bucknam and Ezzo, 1993), and The Contented Little Baby 
Book (Ford, 1999). 
In the analysis that follows, I apply Plumwood’s critique of modern dualistic thought
as a logic of domination to that discourse found in a raft of modern sleep training 
literature.  In particular, I refer to Tizzie Hall’s (2009) book Save Our Sleep, which 
was often recommended to other parents in my parenting groups. This will allow me 
to explore in more detail the structure, sources, and implications of sleep training 
discourse and practice from a modern source. While Hall’s (2009) guide is certainly 
more relaxed than earlier manuals (for example, ‘spoiling’ is not a concern here), 
strict routines and extinction, justified by a fear of dependency on parents at sleep 
times, are still prevalent means of control in the sleep training relationship.   
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This analysis is critical to the rest of the relational understandings developed in this 
thesis. It identifies that a dualistic logic permeates certain forms of parenting 
practices. Crisis situations, such as the one I describe in my own infant sleep 
narrative, may push parents to choose extreme solutions, justified by dualistic logic 
(e.g. such as rationalism, medicalisation, cultural norms, and so on). Indeed, the ways
in which relational power is balanced and exercised here also features as a 
foundation for all of the other forthcoming relational analyses in this research 
project. In fact, this analysis provides an essential theoretical platform for 
considering the motivating tensions in many relational encounters.     
5.4 Sleep Training and Plumwood’s Five Qualities of 
Dualistic Relationships
As previously introduced, Plumwood (1993) describes dualistic relationships with 
five characteristic features: 1. Denial, 2. Hyperseparation, 3. Relational Definition, 4.
Instrumentalism, and 5. Homogenisation. In the following analysis, these features 
become apparent in the way that parents and children are supposedly meant to relate 
to each other during sleep training. Plumwood (1993) often refers to the players in a 
dualistic relationship as the master (dominant, powerful, and oppressive) and slave 
(subservient or oppressed). The master is gendered as male, and the slave as female, 
in keeping with gender dualisms. The terms master and slave allude to the colonist 
tensions in history which have typified dualistic thinking, not just as a set of ideas, 
but as an expression of culture and justification for particular practices. I use these 
terms in my analysis to help me clearly identify the roles of the different players.   
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5.4.1 Denial
Common ways to deny dependency are through making the other inessential, denying 
the importance of the other’s contribution or even his or her reality, and through 
mechanisms of focus and attention. One way to do this is to insist on a strong 
hierarchy of activities, so that the denied areas are simply not ‘worth’ noticing 
(Plumwood, 1993, p. 48).
Dualisms are built upon the denial of the slave’s qualities, which otherwise connect 
the lives of master and slave (Plumwood, 1993). The inherent interdependency of 
master and slave makes the domination and degradation of the slave eventually 
unfavourable for both, despite the master’s immediate gains. The denial of mutual 
dependency through the rejection of the slave’s ‘human-like’ or subjective 
characteristics (those apparent in the master) allows the master morally and 
practically to justify the use of his slaves. Plumwood (1993) identifies that an 
effective way of undertaking denial is to order and manage the activities of the slave,
usually in a way that is rigid and abstract to conceal inherent common ground. A pre-
conceived schedule helps the master to achieve his own goals through purposeful 
activities, and also serves to deny the self-determined patterns of the slave. The 
‘hierarchy of activities’ secures the control of the master over the slave by turning 
interdependence into a one-sided managerial project (Plumwood, 2002).  
Within sleep training discourses and practices, the ‘hierarchy of activities’ takes the 
form of a rigid schedule of feeding and sleeping. In modern forms of sleep training, 
such as that espoused in Hall’s (2009) guide, the schedule is proposed as a means of 
making the infant’s needs (identified as predominantly feeding and sleeping) 
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predictable and therefore easy for parents to manage (France et al, 2003; Hall, 2009; 
Owens et al, 1999). As Hall (2009) explains: 
I believe routines are very important and a big help to parents learning to interpret 
their baby’s different cries. When following a routine, you will begin to distinguish 
between your baby’s hungry, tired or bored cries because when she starts to cry, you 
will be able to look at the routine and see what is due next [....] My routines also help 
babies to feel safe and secure. Your baby will know that her needs are being met and 
she has no need to cry, resulting in a happy, contented baby (Hall, 2009, pp. 4- 5). 
Hall’s explanation supports the assumption that all of an infant’s needs can be known
and reasoned by an adult. These are understood to be quantifiable in terms of the 
timing around activities such as feeding, sleeping, and cleanliness, and can therefore 
be satisfied with a schedule of activities. Such a view denies that infants are 
subjective individuals in their own right, and have emotional, physical, spiritual, 
and/or social lives which are just as complex as that of any other being. Her approach
is also centred on the presumption that infants welcome their management; that 
having their feeding and sleeping patterns abstractly controlled and timed gives them
a sense of security, and that the infant’s innate and dynamic patterns of bodily 
function are insignificant to the infant and/or the parent. 
Sleep training schedules are proposed to meet all infant needs, reasoned by others as 
valid or not. Hall presumes that infants will not usually need to cry to demonstrate a 
need because they will be predictably catered to in the schedule, or if they do cry, 
parents can look to the schedule to identify the next scheduled need. Therefore, when
infants are conceived as a simple set of ‘needs’ to be met, it can be reasoned by sleep
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trainers that crying during sleep training is not significant because all ‘needs’ have 
been checked off, which thus justifies non-responsiveness. 
As infants progress through treatment, they gradually begin to cry less at sleep times 
(Hall, 2009; Middlemiss et al, 2012; Owens et al, 1999). This reinforces the 
interpretation that the previous crying was just pointless ‘protesting’, and that the 
hierarchical schedule of feeding and sleeping was effective at addressing the infant’s 
assumed needs. In contrast to this reasoning, Middlemiss et al (2012) demonstrated 
that sleep training conditions infants to stop communicating their stress (to stop 
crying) at sleep times. This finding suggests that the absence of crying in a sleep 
trained infant does not indicate the absence of external or internal experiences 
requiring social or physical intervention or connection, rather, infants just give up 
trying to communicate them. 
Sleep training schedules deny that infants need or have the individual, contextual, 
responsive, spontaneous, and dynamic bodily patterns (in addition to feeding and 
sleeping) of a complex and connected person. They deny the value of social 
connectivity, contextual responsiveness, and validation, particularly at physically 
vulnerable times, such as during sleep (Blunden et al, 2011; Crook, 2008; Leerkesa 
et al, 2010). They deny that crying at sleep times could be indicative of a deeply 
emotional and very human response to being separated from a caregiver, or that such 
a response to separation is of any value. Sleep training denies parents the choice to 
respond empathetically and contextually towards their infants (except for scripted 
and timed responses, like patting the infant every ten minutes), because connective 
response is contrary to its goal of independent sleep. As Plumwood (1993) describes,
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such thinking also denies the dependency of others on the master, valuing and 
pushing the slave’s independence and self-reliance.  
In stark contrast is an ethic of responding to the infant’s communication with 
attentive presence of mind, taking in that particular individual’s subjectivity in that 
moment, without needing to judge the value of such communication (e.g. is it a need 
or want?), but validating it in its own right. Such a dialogical ethic is espoused by 
Plumwood, Mathews and Rose, and considered from different angles in many of the 
proceeding chapters of this thesis. 
5.4.2 Hyperspeparation
A major aim of dualistic construction is polarisation, to maximise distance or 
separation between the dualistic spheres and to prevent there being seen as continuous 
or contiguous. Separation may be established by denying or minimising overlap 
qualities and activities, and by the erection of rigid barriers to prevent contact 
(Plumwood, 1993, p. 49).
Hyperseperation continues the process of separating the master from the slave, 
particularly in regards to their spatial connections. Masters reinforce the process of 
domination by physically separating themselves from the dwelling spaces of their 
slaves. This independence ensures that the process of domination is not undermined 
by accidentally re-connecting with the enslaved (Plumwood, 1993, 2002). 
The sleep training agenda achieves the spatial hyperseperation of parent and child 
primarily through the use of cots and rooms. The goals of sleep training are only 
useful within the context of independent infant sleep. Therefore, the need for sleep 
104
Chapter 5
training is directly associated with the use of isolated and compartmentalised sleep 
spaces such as cots and separate rooms (Crook, 2008). Parents who use cots in 
separate rooms are obliged to fully rouse themselves, get out of bed, and walk across 
the house to re-settle or feed their infant periodically throughout the night. This can 
lead to sleep-deprivation, frustration and confusion. Instead of addressing the 
separation of parent and child, sleep training simply removes the obligation to 
respond. In bed-sharing cultures, such as practised in Japan, infant sleep is rarely 
viewed or experienced as a problem (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). Many Japanese 
believe that supporting dependency while both awake and asleep is a valuable part of
developing a socially interdependent person (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Morelli et 
al, 1992). Complex physical and social connectivity is consistently made available 
without the parent needing to interpret, reduce and identify the infant’s condition 
(Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Morelli et al, 1992).
In some cases, the fear of fostering ‘bad habits’ motivates parents to maintain 
physical and spatial hyperseperation from their infants (France et al, 2003; Owens et 
al, 1999). This may be reflective of the modern mistrust of emotions and other 
subjective means of communicating experience, in favour of objective and 
reasonable relational ‘knowing’, such as by identifying and treating behaviours 
(Plumwood, 1993). Hall (2009) claims that practices such as rocking, feeding, and 
providing any other social comfort to help infants to sleep is going to cause an undue
burden for the parent. 
[…] by the time your baby is twelve months old you could be getting up four or five 
times a night to rock him back to sleep between sleep cycles (Hall, 2009, p. 69). 
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Hall (2009) targets the infant as the source of the problem, irrespective of the role of 
separation (e.g. the cot and/or separate room) in intensifying that burden. Therefore, 
parents must maintain hyperseparation from their infants at sleep times because 
‘accidentally’ connecting with infants in their places of dwelling may undermine the 
parent’s control and the aim of sleep training to enforce independent sleep. 
5.4.3 Relational Definition
Although each is dependent on the other for identity and organisation of material life, 
this relation is not one of equal, or mutual, or equally relational, definition. The 
master’s power is reflected in the fact that his qualities are taken as primary, and as 
defining social value, while those of the slave are defined or constrained in relation to 
them, often as negations or lacks of the virtues of the centre (Plumwood, 1993, p.52).
Once the master is sufficiently distanced from his slave, and the subjectivity of the 
slave has been convincingly denied, it becomes apparent to the master that their own 
reality is superior to that of the dominated. The qualities of the slave which do not 
conform to the master’s ideals are viewed as an inherent flaw of the slave, or a 
negative reflection of the master, and a target of later instrumental ‘fixing’. Indeed, 
the master may even reinvent a new identity for the slave based on his interpretations
of the slave’s reality (Plumwood, 1993, 2002). 
Jenni and O’Connor (2005) argue that the biology of infant sleep is defined and 
situated within the context of culture, even by those that are presumed to be 
providing unbiased advice, such as medical practitioners and researchers. The 
106
Chapter 5
biological norms of the infant that do not adhere to cultural ideals are viewed as a 
medical disorder, or at the very least, as a temperament flaw reminiscent of ‘spoiling’
(Owens et al, 1999; Solomon et al, 1993). Such clinical disorders include the 
behavioural insomnia of childhood (difficulty getting to sleep) or sleep onset 
association disorder (requiring the help of another to sleep) (Blunden et al, 2011; 
France et al, 2003; Owens et al, 1999). As Hall (2009) warns: 
Also, be conscious that some babies think your sole purpose in life is to help him fall 
asleep (Hall, 2009, p. 19).
However, Hall (2009) thereby alludes to the belief that infants don’t voluntarily 
conform to idealised independent sleep, and that communicating the need for social 
connection with a parent is manipulative and lacking virtue (Blunden et al, 2011; 
France et al, 2003; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). Hall (2009) presents sleeping through
the night as a skill learned through the process of sleep training and that it prevents 
‘serious sleep problems’. As she states: 
How to sleep for long periods by himself is one of the first skills you need to teach 
your baby. However, one in three children under the age of five does not have this 
skill and, out of these children, 30 percent are said to have a serious sleep problem 
(Hall, 2009, p. 20). 
She illustrates that what constitutes a ‘serious sleep problem’ is defined by her own 
assumptions of what constitutes acceptable infant sleep – that infants should self-
settle and sleep through the night – anything divergent to this is a ‘serious problem’. 
She also believes that sleep is a skill to be taught, rather than an inherent bodily 
function that matures as a matter of course, therefore justifying the intellectual 
intervention of another person to ‘teach’ and shape such ‘skills’.
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The ways in which the masters inform themselves of the needs of their slaves cater to
their own values and patterns of thinking. For instance, the ‘problem of infant sleep’, 
in most cases, is likely not a problem for infants, but a problem defined by adult 
stakeholders (Blunden et al, 2011; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Sinal and Tikotzky, 
2012). This ‘problem’ originates from underlying cultural directives and is further 
reinforced by science and reasoning at the exclusion of subjective communication 
and knowing (France et al, 2003; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Owens et al, 1999). The
objective master views his own form of knowing and understanding as ‘best’, for self
and others (e.g. resonating with the old saying ‘mother knows best’). Therefore, 
objective infant sleep prescriptions may aim to redefine the infant’s identity and 
relation to the parent in line with rational adult ideals for them. This undermines 
instinctive, individual, contextual, and relational forms of understanding individual 
infants and their sleep.  
5.4.4 Instrumentalism 
Although the relationship is usually presented as being in the interests of the 
dominated as well as the dominator, it is apparent that those on the lower side of the 
dualisms are obliged to put aside their own interests for those of the master centre, that
they are conceived of as his instruments, a means to his ends (Plumwood, 1993, p.53).
The master wields his power to force the enslaved to conform to his cultural 
imperatives. Such forced assimilation, void of social connection, furthers the 
master’s goals under the reasoning that it is beneficial to the enslaved because it 
superficially elevates their status to appear more like the master. In practice, 
assimilation benefits the master by reinforcing the assumption that ‘master knows 
108
Chapter 5
best’, that the master’s culture is ‘right’ and ‘true’, and that others are objects like 
tools or instruments to meet his righteous ends (Plumwood, 1993; 2002). 
As previously discussed, the ‘problem of infant sleep’ is most likely not a problem 
for individual infants. Sleep training is an instrumental means of forcing infants to 
conform to the parent’s sleep culture. To justify the instrumental actions of sleep 
training, the parent must step in and interpret the infant, create their own reasoning 
about who and what their infant is, and act in ways which may be heavily shaped by 
culture and problem-solving agendas, irrespective of the qualities and reality of the 
individual infant (Crook, 2008; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). With abstract 
interpretation comes many assumptions about what is or is not being communicated 
and why, whose reality is more important (the parent judges what a ‘real’ infant need
is), followed by a new moral code to cater to the infant’s adult-constructed identity 
(Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; Leerkesa et al, 2010). 
When the parent and child are physically and/or emotionally distanced, parental 
interpretation of the infant and instrumental action based on those interpretations 
become a manifestation of adult mastery over the enslaved infant. The adults’ 
interpretation of the infant is infused with their own wants and needs (such as 
wanting more sleep) and cultural directives (such as to avoid ‘bad habits’ or 
spoiling), and therefore justifies instrumental actions taken against the infant’s 
condition, such as to sleep train. The ways in which the child’s existence is shaped as
a means to the ends of the parent is complicated by the parent’s fundamental 
connections to the child. As Plumwood describes: 
Although some of the mother’s interests entail satisfaction of the child’s interests, they
are not identical or even necessarily similar. There is overlap, but the relation is one of
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intentional inclusion (her interest is that the child should thrive, that certain of the 
child’s key interests are satisfied) rather than accidental overlap (Plumwood, 1991, p. 
20).
The parent produces the child, and is then obliged to care for the child so as to 
continue (at the very least) their own genetic lineage and uphold social and cultural 
expectation to care for one’s own young. This occurs among many other possible 
layers of connection and benefit (such as emotional love and companionship) 
depending on the particular relationship. Therefore, when the parent encounters 
parenting situations which conflict with their own needs or expectations, in 
instrumentally dominating situations like sleep training, the child is then subject to 
instrumental treatments which suit the parents’ reality and reasoning. In this way, 
parents can ‘win’ the perceived opposition, rather than working through relational 
struggles together, through encounter and dialogue.     
5.4.5 Homogenisation
More than polarisation is needed if a relationship is to be an appropriate one for 
domination. The dominated class must appear suitably homogeneous if it is to be able 
to conform to and confirm its ‘nature’. In homogenisation, differences among the 
interiorised group are disregarded (Plumwood, 1993, p. 53).
The instrumental assimilation of the slave ensures that they conform to the master’s 
culture to facilitate the master’s ends. To apply a program of assimilation to the 
enslaved assumes that they are a mostly uniform and homogeneous group of 
subjects, or that there is little value in individual uniqueness. The program of 
assimilation will target their commonalities to both negate individuality as well as 
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reinforce homogenisation. Uniform groups are much easier for the master to manage 
as they are both more predictable and easier to manipulate (Plumwood, 1993; 2002).
Sleep training imposes a ‘one size fits all’ approach to infant sleep. It holds little 
regard for the individual qualities, patterns and needs of each individual child and 
family, and applies a set of specific and uniform rules to achieve the generalised goal
of independent sleep (Crook, 2008; France et al, 2003; Jenni and O’Connor, 2005; 
Owens et al, 1999). Sleep trainers (who disseminate techniques through baby 
manuals) do not have a personal investment in (or knowledge of) the individual 
infants subjected to their programs. Sleep training regimes can only be conceived 
through generalising the child into a stereotyped creature or thing, which can then be 
slotted into the prescribed program by addressing those generalised qualities (such as
waking frequently at night, or being dependent on a parent to get to sleep). Hall 
(2009) reflects the attitude that the generalised nature of the child is manipulative and
in conflict with the parent’s intentions:
It’s amazing just how clever babies can be. I have come across some babies who will 
try anything to get out of going to bed (Hall, 2009, p. 187). 
Imposing a generalised regime on any infant prioritises a treatment of 
commonalities, over understanding individual infants as they are. As Jenni and 
O’Connor (2005) point out, many strictly imposed cultural sleep regimes do not 
allow for a ‘best fit’ of individual biology and cultural expectation, which in turn 
may hinder the social, emotional and physical development of children by 
contradicting their innate bodily functions and experiences. The homogenised 
identity given to infants by sleep trainers segregates them as a homogeneous kind of 
creature, warranting a different set of ethical considerations, and justifying a practice 
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which targets the sleep resistant qualities of their common nature. Within the realm 
of sleep training, there is very little, if any, consideration of the complex and 
subjective being of children and the ethical ramifications of such revelations 
(Blunden et al, 2011; Trevarthen, 2011).
These five qualities of dualism, as evident in the practice of sleep training infants, 
demonstrate that dualistic logic has permeated parenting practice as a cultural 
expression of underlying ontological and epistemological values. From this 
understanding I can begin to recognise and reveal dualistic logic in my own 
parenting experiences and relational assumptions. As I will continue to explore, 
parenting practices such as sleep training, while oppressive, are not necessarily easily
defined in terms of 'good' and 'bad' or 'right' and 'wrong'. 
5.5 The Paradox of Relational Connectivity vs. Boundaries
Sleep training can sometimes also be understood as a social boundary that is done for
everyone’s best interest. The rationale behind this view is worth deconstructing in 
order to better understand some of the underlying assumptions of sleep treatments. 
One of the tenets of this view is that if the parent is mindful and validates the child’s 
discomfort during treatment, then it is a respectful and justified practice that benefits 
the parent and therefore the child. This view assumes that validating the child’s 
experience provides relational respect and justification, and that if the treatment 
benefits the parent then it will also benefit the child through having a more rested 
parent during the day and/or because the child may get more sleep. 
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While presence of mind and validation of another’s reality is in line with practices of 
mutual respect as suggested by Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose, to use them as 
justification for any treatment is potentially dangerous as it fails to consider the 
ethical merit of the practice itself and what constitutes mindfulness and validation to 
the person undergoing treatment. If an infant cries when physically separated from a 
parent, does verbal validation (e.g. “I see you are upset when I leave”) and the 
mindfulness to make such a reflection on their infant’s feelings, make much 
difference to an infant who may or may not fully understand the meaning behind 
verbal validation, particularly when it is physical disconnection that instigated 
crying? 
This view is also fraught with desires for perfection. There is perhaps an underlying 
goal that adults and children should get perfect sleep to be perfect people, whether 
that is defined scientifically, medically, or personally, which goes hand-in-hand with 
a fear of suffering or failing. I would suggest that perhaps there is relational meaning 
and learning when things are not perfect, and that the tensions caused by a lack of 
perfection can spark relational and personal growth.  
As I came to understand during previous research on the relationality of mutualistic 
gut bacteria (Cook, 2012), boundaries are a critical part of mutual relationships as 
they protect players from hurting each other, whether intentionally or by accident. A 
significant part of parenting (as I see it) is helping new people to navigate the 
boundaries of self and others. Appraising the value of sleep related boundaries 
underpins the psychoanalytical and developmental theories of medicine and science. 
So then, is sleep training a valid relational boundary to prevent harm to either or both
parties? 
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To answer this question, we first have to determine the scope of a parent’s 
responsibility to the connectivity of their children. If a child voices unease about 
being disconnected from a parent at sleep times, is the role of the parent to maintain 
relational connectivity until the child moves away in their own time, or is it 
relationally justifiable for a parent to place disconnecting boundaries at sleep time to 
protect themselves and therefore the relationship as a whole? Is there a middle 
ground in which a parent slowly encourages independence without the sudden 
disconnect of a sleep training event? Or, should parents reshape their expectations 
and modify supporting environments to ease their own suffering with little 
interruption the child’s individual patterns (e.g. let them be, and take full 
responsibility for one’s suffering)? 
As discussed above, part of the parental harm suffered around infant sleep is likely 
linked to the cultural need for infants to sleep alone, in cots and/or separate rooms, in
the first instance. Therefore, we first need to question the cultural imperative to insist
on independent infant sleep. As such, if the ‘problem of infant sleep’ is not seen as 
the fault of the child, but rather (in many cases) is deemed a relational struggle 
instigated by cultural imperatives for independent sleep within the context of 
particular individuals and environments, then the child is not violating a parent’s 
boundary, they are merely living their biological imperatives within the reality they 
were born into. These imperatives usually require the connectivity and care of 
another person to be fulfilled. I would argue that the basic tenet of parenting is to 
provide connectivity which supports children as they move into the world in their 
own time. If a child voices that they are not ready for disconnection, then forcing 
disconnection to prevent another kind of harm is akin to ‘throwing the baby out with 
the bath water’. As Rose (2002) describes, a dialogical ethic is a responsibility to be 
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open and responsive with others. As such, the ethic is not to uphold particular moral 
rules; rather, the ethic is to be engaged in the moment and context of the relationship.
Likewise, Plumwood (1991) asserts that maintaining connectivity is an individual 
responsibility of caring for others:
With nature, as with the human sphere, the capacity to care, to experience sympathy, 
understanding, and sensitivity to the situation and fate of particular others, and to take 
responsibility for others is an index of our moral being. Special relationship with, care 
for, or empathy with particular aspects of nature as experiences rather than with nature
as abstraction are essential to provide a depth and type of concern that is not otherwise
possible. Care and responsibility for particular animals, trees, and rivers that are 
known well, loved, and appropriately connected to the self are an important basis for 
acquiring a wider, more generalized concern (Plumwood, 1991, p. 7).
Care, in this instance, is the maintenance of mental/physical/metaphysical connection
to each other through struggle, rather than disconnection to end the struggle. The 
instigation of parental boundaries can conflict with responsibilities of parental 
connectivity and care. To know what boundaries align with the premises of 
relationality requires the deconstruction of every instance within unique contexts. 
Even then, there may be no clear ‘answers’.  
Of course, this is a philosophical argument, within the context of each individual 
family living the messy nuances of such an experience, the argument may be 
different. I was able to maintain connectivity with my infant and survive by bed-
sharing, but this may not be the experience of others. Sleep training to prevent 
serious sleep related harm to the parent, in modern contexts, may indeed be 
preferable when all else fails to save the parent for serious harm, and therefore the 
relationship as a whole, even if the practice in-and-of itself is oppressive to the child. 
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As with many aspects of relationality, the resulting ethic of care may depend on the 
nuances and severity of the individual's experiences within their own concept of 
reality, and will never be perfect in practice. 
The question of a parent’s responsibility (or that of any other caregiver in a position 
of power) to the connectivity of their infant is at the heart of relationality, yet such 
questioning highlights a paradox between connectivity and boundaries. These 
deconstructions also question to what extent we strive for perfection and ideals in our
relationships, or allow relationships and struggles to unfold in their own time and 
find relational meaning and learning in their difficulty. This is a paradox with no 
universal answers, but rather philosophical leanings to maintain connectivity and 
struggle together, rather than ‘fix’ those in our care.    
5.6 Conclusion
Sleep training infiltrates a fundamental social relationship with intellectual and 
managerial imperatives reflective of Plumwood’s five qualities of dualistic 
relationships. The decision to pursue sleep training is much more than just a casual 
personal choice, but is compounded by cultural and historical imperatives, forms and
sources of parenting knowledge, and external pressures (such as economic pressures)
(Crook, 2008; Plumwood, 1993; 2002). Dualistic culture serves to further the modern
interests and authority of science, which are tangled amongst the motivations for 
practicing sleep training. Sleep training offers parents a reasoned and objective 
solution to the socially constructed ‘problem of infant sleep’. This approach institutes
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a one-size-fits-all and intellectually abstracted regime to change ‘problematic’ bodily
patterns (Jenni and O’Connor, 2005). 
Developing the capacity to form deep and complex understandings of others requires
relational participation and experience (Rose, 2008). Sleep training negates mutual 
participation and experience through systematic silencing. The achievement of 
idealised infant sleep, through the dis-synchrony of crucial social bonds, must come 
with some level of relational cost, especially to the empathetic and communicative 
abilities of both parent and child (Leerkesa et al, 2010; Olza and MacDonnell, 2010; 
Swain et al, 2013). It is imperative then, that those promoting the ideals of relational 
scholarship question parenting practices, attitudes, values, and circumstances which 
may embody dualism – for both those who utilise its practices and those who are 
subjected to them.  
Don’t stand unmoving outside the door of a crying baby whose only desire is to
touch you. Go to your baby. Go to your baby a million times. Demonstrate that
people can be trusted, that the environment can be trusted, that we live in a benign
universe.
(O’Mara, 1997, p. 6)
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Chapter 6 Negotiating Caregiver Power
It has been said that absolute power corrupts absolutely. That is true in our homes
as well as in our world. To raise peaceful humans we need to be peaceful humans.
There is no other path to peace than peace.
(Knost, 2013, no page number)
6.1 Introduction
Sleep training provides a very potent and somewhat clear-cut example of dualistic 
logic in modern parenting. While analysing the power relations of sleep training, I 
began to wonder how dualistic logic has penetrated other, more mundane parental 
power struggles over such matters as where to go (or not), with whom, wearing what 
clothes, and at what times. These everyday instances where parental control is 
evidenced are usually focused on safety (such as keeping your child from running 
into traffic), utility (such as getting your child into the car to go shopping), and social
expectation (such as putting clothes on). Children are unique individuals, but they are
also highly dependent upon caregivers to keep them alive and help them navigate the
world. Caregivers are usually physically and cognitively more powerful. In turn, a 
biological parent is dependent on their child (in most cases) to continue their genetic 
lineage, which is reinforced by the more apparent benefits of parenting such as love, 
attachment, fulfilment, and companionship. 
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The physical and cognitive ‘weaknesses’ of children might make them vulnerable to 
manipulation by others. Many times we make decisions for our children that may be 
at odds with their realities, whether we know it or not. This does not imply that the 
child or anyone else universally knows what is best for self or other in any given 
situation, but that in making decisions for someone else, in giving care to someone 
who is ‘weaker’, there is the chance of conflicting interests and the abuse of power. 
Care-giving presents a potentially easy opportunity for dualistic practices/attitudes to
be utilised to enforce the position of the stronger party – whether the stronger party is
aware of it or not (his/her taken-for-grantedness of this situation is innocuous, 
particularly so if they believe without question that their position is ‘right’ and 
‘true’). 
On the flip-side, in an attempt to avoid oppressive and dualistic parenting practices, a
parent may assume that all parental control is inherently dualistic, and so slide into 
an equally unbalanced permissive relationship which allows the child’s domination 
of the parent, which is to their mutual detriment and/or deprives the child of valuable
guidance, protection, and leadership. Parents are thus in a complicated situation of 
determining how to utilise their power, and for what ends. In this chapter, I will 
cultivate an understanding of theories of ‘self’ and ‘other’, explore how relational 
participants (such as parents and children) may achieve solidarity where abilities and 
qualities are not equal, including in my own parenting situations where control may 
or may not have been oppressively dualistic.
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6.2 The Currency of Control
(This story was composed from journal notes in June and July 2014. Evelyn was 
approximately 13 months old)
Getting Evelyn dressed was one of our most common battles. She started to resist 
getting dressed at around one year of age, which only intensified as she became 
more capable and self-assured. It came to my attention that our battles were a result 
of different priorities. I wanted her to get dressed, she wanted to be naked. Who is 
right?
Figure 4 - Evelyn, about 14 months old, happily throws off her clothes to run naked. Photo 
credit: Kaseen Cook
I would say, “Let’s put your clothes on so we can go in the car”. 
She shouts, “No!”
So I try another tactic - make it fun, “Weeee! Rocket booster pants ready for take-
off!”
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“Noooo!”
I rethink my approach, “Ok, how about you help me put your clothes on. Show me 
your dressing skills.”
“NOOOO!”
I start to get annoyed and insist, “Sorry, but you have to get dressed. We can’t go to 
the shops naked.” 
Evelyn sobs loudly, “Nooooo!!!”, then drops to the ground like a wet noodle.
Where do we go from here? My first thought is just to force the clothes on. I’m 
stronger than her, and it’s an easy solution. So, I try it out:
“Ok, here comes your shirt, I’m going to pop it on your head” 
As soon as I start to force it on her, she begins to scream and kick, and her 
resistance intensifies. I don’t feel comfortable with this and back off. Doubt starts to 
creep in. If she gets her way, then won’t she grow up to be an entitled monster? In 
the back of my mind I can feel the pressure of culturally engrained fears and 
assumptions coming to the surface. Such as, ‘good’ children obey adults, and 
resistance indicates that she’s a ‘spoiled brat’ - logic that I remember believing 
without question before having my own child. I automatically feel that I am entitled 
to enforce my way, because I am the adult, I know best. My way is supposedly for the
common good, for her good, so she doesn’t get cold, so we can go to the store, but 
her reaction makes me feel like an oppressive tyrant. This doesn’t feel right. 
Shouldn’t she be entitled to the same respect for her reality as any other person? 
Why are my priorities more important than hers?
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Then I wondered, how can I make our priorities the same? Or more so, how I can I 
get her to willingly do what I want without feeling like a cruel dictator or just give 
up entirely and let her run naked through the shops – surely there is a diplomatic 
middle ground.  
I say to Evelyn, “Let’s do a trade. You get three choc chips if you get dressed. Trade 
choc chips for clothes”. 
Her eyes light up, and she says in agreeance, “Choc!” 
Priorities merged! She happily lets me dress her. 
I then realised that my version of diplomacy is actually just bribery. I paid for her 
compliance with chocolate currency. Or worse, I was manipulating her with sugar to
meet my own ends without consideration of why she did not want to get dressed in 
the first place. In essence, my approach may be no different from using punishment, 
but instead of using fear as a motivator I used rewards. Can both our priorities be 
balanced without manipulation, or is this just not possible? Am I, as the parent, 
obliged to force my own imperative just to ‘get the job done’, even if it is sugar 
coated? 
The next time I approached Evelyn to get dressed I thought I would experiment with 
a different approach. I would put my expectations out on the table, and then back off 
and let her meet them in her own time, with her own reasons.
I started with the usual, “Time to get dressed so we can shop.”
She replied, “NOOO!”
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So I casually said, “Ok, when you’re ready.”, and put the pants down on the floor 
next to her, and we went back to what we were doing. 
Five minutes later, Evelyn picks up the pants, and she asks me “Pants?” 
I happily reply, “Sure cutie, let’s get those pants on.”
Without the pressure of my prodding, engaging in conflict, or the use of sugary 
manipulation, she chose to get dressed and accept my guidance. Perhaps, in this 
case, to meet social expectation or maybe she is more likely to cooperate when she 
feels understood, given the power of choice (requested instead of demanded), and is 
not under attack, or possibly she was just motivated to go to the store. 
My previous approaches to getting dressed assumed that she did not want to ‘fit-in’, 
that she wanted to be resistant and uncooperative, to engage in battles for power. I 
assumed that getting dressed was about power, mine over hers, and that to get her 
dressed I needed to ‘win’ the encounter. Such interactions, which I had tried to 
manage as conflicts or contestations, are perhaps instead better approached by 
providing leadership that would support Evelyn’s desire to connect, and accept that 
sometimes my leadership would also be questioned. Social processes take time. It 
would seem likely that children also strive for acceptance amongst others because, 
after all, others provide them with identity, nourishment, and protection. 
Subsequently, I realised that it was perhaps my attitude and assumptions about 
Evelyn’s motivations that could make all the difference between my providing 
leadership or wielding force and manipulation in our interactions. Of course, that’s 
not to say that we didn’t still butt heads on occasion about getting dressed. However,
it did highlight for me the importance of recognising different subjectivities in terms 
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of their relational connection, rather than opposition, as evidenced here regarding 
the issue of control in care-giving.  
6.3 The Perils of Doing Runners
While theoretically and practically complicated, mutually supportive relationships 
are possible - given enough time and understanding – as revealed here with such 
mundane matters as getting dressed, but what about those involving significant risk?
(This story is composed from journal notes from December 2014. Evelyn is 
approximately 18 months old)
 When Evelyn was about a year and a half old she suddenly became interested in 
‘doing runners’ (e.g. running away from me, especially in public). She would not 
want to hold my hand when we were out walking, and would start to tantrum if I 
insisted that she stay with me. One afternoon we had just finished having tea at 
Nan’s house, and we were walking back to the car. Nan’s house was near a 
moderately busy main road, and so I insisted that she hold my hand as we walked to 
the car. She wanted to walk by herself, and became frustrated. She started screaming
and thrashing about, and broke free of my grip. She bolted towards the road, and I 
ran after her, grabbing her shirt, tripping on my untied shoe, and hitting the 
pavement just before the road, dragging Evelyn down with me. She started crying 
and we hugged as I carried her back to the safety of the car. Driving away, I was 
uneasy thinking about what could have happened if she had run into the road. From 
that moment on, any notion of giving Evelyn a choice about holding my hand around
risky situations was gone. Furthermore, if she was in a bad mood and likely to fight 
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me, I insisted that she be carried, and so better restrained. Even if she resisted and I 
felt bad, I told her I was sorry, but that I would be restraining her around cars and 
roads for her own safety. I cannot reasonably leave such life-and-death decisions to 
my toddler. 
It would seem, I decided, that I was destined to use forceful and undemocratic 
control at least in some instances of parenting in order to maintain the bigger picture,
prioritising Evelyn's safety. I do not trust my negotiating skills or Evelyn’s impulse 
control adequately enough to chance her getting hit by a car, and so I enforce my 
control over dangerous situations to its fullest degree. The best I can offer Evelyn is 
empathy for her situation by trying to reflect to her that I understand why she is 
frustrated.    
 
6.4 Reflexive Analysis 
The power struggles between me and my daughter have never occurred in a vacuum, 
but within a landscape of material things, symbols, and values. I require Evelyn to 
wear clothes because public nudity is generally not acceptable in our culture. We 
also live in a mild climate, and the contrast in temperatures and weather conditions 
amongst spaces highlights not only the need for protective coverings for our bodies, 
but that outside of contained spaces we have to use clothes to maintain our comfort. 
It’s likely that at the time, Evelyn was too inexperienced with different spaces to 
understand the need for clothing to maintain comfort – perhaps going out in the nude 
would have helped that learning. We also have vast technological developments to 
thank for making cheap and fashionable clothes readily available. I cannot deny that 
I may have also been motivated to dress Evelyn because of the ‘cuteness factor’, and 
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because I enjoy buying her clothes. Perhaps, in a different climate and culture, she 
would have had the choice to be naked. 
Likewise, we live in a rural location where cars are the main mode of transport. 
Indeed, automobility is especially predominant in Australia, and in our towns and 
cities there are cars continuously being driven, parked, and manoeuvred amongst a 
vulnerable traffic of pedestrians. The urban morphology, systems of governance, and
technological advances that have made housing and transport infrastructure possible, 
all contributed to the encounter described above and in which I had to restrain 
Evelyn. Experience, focus and impulse control are important skills to keep you alive 
around cars, and something that still requires development in most toddlers, 
necessitating their parental protection. Safety is also culturally valued and 
emphasised in the western world - what Ulrich Beck termed a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 
2009). Such states sometimes include a great deal of associated fear and anxiety, as I 
have experienced, heightened by many horror stories in the media. Indeed, fear of 
something horrific happening to our children can be an overwhelming instigator for 
wielding forceful parental control. Deciding which risks to modify, and how to go 
about doing it, can be relationally difficult and complicated.      
Evelyn’s defiance reminds me that she is an individual person, and I cannot fully 
control her, at least not without a fight. She has her own preferences, her own ideas, 
her own interpretations of the social and material world around her, and she acts 
accordingly. To dominate her will and replace it with my own, to meet my ends, 
feels tantamount to the motivations of oppressive control. Yet, there are many things 
she has yet to learn, and as a parent I feel my role is to provide safety, nourishment 
and guidance, which I assume she cannot provide for herself. Of course, as she is 
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unfamiliar with our wider culture and worldly dangers, my role as a parent, at least in
part, is to provide leadership to help her fit-in and stay safe. If she does not 
understand the purpose of some of my directives and resists them, then how do I 
negotiate the application (or suspension) of my power, and to what or whose ends? 
This question is critical within the context of relational scholarship because 
interdependent kin are rarely equal in physical, mental, and other capacities, and so 
the delicate dance of relational exchange can be vulnerable to domination by the 
‘stronger’ party. I am wary of modelling and practising mastery in my parenting, yet 
I also need some degree of control while Evelyn still requires social and material 
guidance and protection. Such is the nature of the caregiver paradox. 
6.5 Plumwood’s Concepts of Self and Other 
Concepts of self and other can be used to reveal the underlying tension of the 
caregiver paradox described above. Both parent and child have a notion of their own 
‘self’ as well as of the ‘other’ formed in relation to the ‘self’ (and vice versa) which 
guides the qualities of the power relation produced by and between them. The self-
other binary is fundamental to identity-formation and therefore critical to 
understanding many other oppositional pairings, such as male/female, human/nature, 
and parent/child (Plumwood, 1991).   
Plumwood’s (1991) concepts of self and other are clearly demonstrated in her 
critique of deep ecology. Deep ecologists have identified three conflicting forms of 
self: indistinguishability, the expanded self, and the transpersonal self. All of them 
carry elements of dualistic logic through their oppositional and universalising 
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qualities. For example, some deep ecologists, such as Fox (1984), view the sharp yet 
artificial division between humans and nature as problematic, but then respond with 
the equally oppositional variant of the self based on indistinguishability – where 
humans and nature are literally without any differences or definition (see Fox, 1984, 
1990). Plumwood (1991) argues that this version of selfhood is far too powerful and 
general.  Individual distinctiveness does not cause dualistic opposition, and in fact, a 
unique self is critical to both the creation of and resilience of reciprocal relationships.
The greater the diversity of distinct individuals, the more opportunities there will be 
among these individuals to create connections where each provides a unique kind of 
support to others, while also receiving something they do not possess themselves. 
Similarly, as another version of selfhood, the expanded self also undermines the 
uniqueness of individual selves (Plumwood, 1991). With the expanded self, the self 
is posited as ‘something’ that we identify with, and so if we identify with others 
(such as through empathy), then they also become self – and so then our concept of 
self expands to incorporate others as self (Fox, 1986; 1990). This assumes that self-
interest (egoism) negates reciprocal relationality, and that the opposite - self-sacrifice
- is required (Plumwood, 1991). 
Boundaries created by individuals to prevent the exploitation (intended or not) of 
one’s self are considered self-interested, yet are critical to maintaining the wellbeing 
of the self, and by extension, the relationship as a whole. For example, I do not let 
Evelyn hit me when she is angry, and so I help her to mediate this impulse by 
blocking her. This self-interested boundary protects my physical body as well as my 
connection to Evelyn, as I would soon come to dislike and avoid being around a 
child that hits me. 
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Mutualistic bacteria in the human intestine provide a clear example of the critical 
importance of relational boundaries for maintaining mutuality. For example, the 
human gut has developed a finely adapted mucus layer in response to diverse 
bacterial activity to prevent bacteria from exploiting (digesting) the lining of the 
intestine, which would severely harm or kill the person and undermine the reciprocal 
relationship between person and gut bacteria (Macpherson et al, 2009). 
Within such reciprocal relationships, it is to the advantage of both participants for 
each to protect essential self-interests, and thus protect their role within the 
relationship from degradation by others. Deep ecology’s expanded self assumes that 
participants will be able to both know the detailed nuances of the other’s weaknesses,
and be able and motivated to protect them from (intentional or unintentional) 
exploitation (Fox, 1986; 1990). Such relationships, void of self-interest, would be 
very vulnerable to disturbance, if not impossible to sustain. Self-interest is essential 
for reciprocal relationality, but needs to be tempered dialogically and contextually.  
Plumwood’s (1991) critique of deep ecology also includes a critical appraisal of the 
concept of the self as a transpersonal self that seeks to identify the self as embodied 
in the universe by rejecting personal attachments, concerns, and emotions (much like
the Buddhist perspective on avoiding suffering e.g. Fox, 1990; Immergut and 
Kaufman, 2014; Plumwood, 1991). For example, Immergut and Kaufman (2014) 
argue that anxiety and threat (felt by the self in relation to others) are symptomatic of
a dualistic logic. Concerns about self-esteem and self-appraisal, for example, exhibit 
anxiety about, and sensitivity to, the perceptions and judgements of others. In this 
situation, the self cannot be defined without its dualistic or oppositional pairing with 
an other. Self is always in competition with the other to secure resources without 
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costs, such as criticisms from others. Since this dynamic is taken by Immergut and 
Kaufman (2014) to be infused with dualistic logic, they propose the Buddhist-
inspired concept of a transcendent ‘no-self’ as an alternative to the anxious-self:   
In contrast to sociology, the self in Buddhism is understood as an illusion or, in more 
traditional terms, ‘‘no-self’’ (anatta in Pali). The self is merely a label projected onto 
the bundles of constantly changing psycho-physical elements called the khandas in 
Pali. Thoughts, feelings, moods, attitudes, physical parts, or movements of the body 
are all simply changing, impersonal interactions that arise and pass away. To identify 
with them, to hold on to them, or cling to them as ‘‘my self’’ only invites suffering 
according to Buddhism because we are trying to stabilize what is inherently not stable 
(Immergut and Kaufman, 2014, p. 272).
In their interpretation, the self is viewed as a social construct, a non-solid reality, and
because it arises out of dependence, the self cannot exist as an independent agent. 
No-self is constantly embedded in the dynamic of relationality, and thus attachment 
to a stable self creates suffering (Immergut and Kaufman, 2014). 
This account of the self, while reflective and revealing, assumes that suffering is 
inherently ‘bad’, and therefore if something such as attachment to others or to 
materials causes suffering, it should be discarded. To assert that socially constructed 
concepts of the self facilitate oppression and suffering, and that such suffering should
be rejected, and then to propose an equally oppositional concept, the no-self, seems 
again to overshoot the messy and complex encounters of living relationships. How 
else can we meaningfully understand others if all social constructs are false and 
rejected? To be social with others, and not just human others, we need some means 
of interpreting and understanding sensory input. Therefore, to reject the social 
construct is to reject the opportunity to understand self and other in manifested social
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contexts. Imposing a single social construct on others who construct understandings 
of relationships differently is oppressively dualistic, not the social construct itself. 
The rejection of the self by replacing it with the concept of the no-self, is also a 
social construct, as it is a means of understanding the construction of social 
existence. It would seem impossible to escape the existence of social constructs when
engaged in interdependence, just as it is impossible to escape the unique subjectivity 
of individuals unless, of course, we transcend social relationships altogether, which 
appears implausible as well.      
Furthermore, the anxious-self need not be dualistic. Anxiety, like suffering, 
internally pushes the relational process of reflecting upon and understanding one’s 
connections to others. It may also reveal threats and vulnerabilities within oneself, or 
perhaps flag situations where connections with others are under threat from the 
actions of self or other. The ability of both individuals to identify and respond to 
threats helps both of them to maintain empathetic barriers which prevent 
exploitation. We need to identify with the “[…] thoughts, feelings, moods, attitudes, 
physical parts, or movements of the body […]” (Immergut and Kaufman, 2014, p. 
272) to be able to reflexively understand them and why they arise when we connect 
with others, and to potentially change them if they are not in line with mutual 
intentions.      
The concept of the transcended self seeks to rise beyond being merely human, to be 
something free from earthly connections associated with suffering, such as the 
suffering inflicted by being oppressed by or by oppressing others. As Plumwood 
(1991) argues, this concept lacks an understanding of the central role of unique social
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dynamics, particularly of attachment to others (and the associated suffering), in 
facilitating reciprocal relationships:              
Because this "transpersonal" identification is so indiscriminate and intent on denying 
particular meanings, it cannot allow for the deep and highly particularistic attachment 
to place that has motivated both the passion of many modem conservationists and the 
love of many indigenous peoples for their land (which deep ecology inconsistently 
tries to treat as a model). This is based not on a vague, bloodless, and abstract 
cosmological concern but on the formation of identity, social and personal, in relation 
to particular areas of land, yielding ties often as special and powerful as those to kin, 
and which are equally expressed in very specific and local responsibilities of care 
(Plumwood, 1991, pp.15-16).    
Likewise, the strong attachment I share with my daughter retains many of the 
connections of our relationship, even if we encounter conflict or suffering. The 
intangible attachment between myself and my daughter does cause a great deal of 
suffering and worry, but that does not mean that I want to transcend beyond our 
attachment for fear of the suffering caused by it. On the contrary, it motivates me to 
use that suffering to make our relationship stronger, to build greater empathy and 
understanding of myself, of her, of our connections with each other and of those with
others beyond us. 
To transcend suffering and attachment is to move towards dualistic oppression and 
away from reciprocal relationality – if you do not deeply feel relational 
disconnection, then what motivation will you have to maintain connectivity with 
others? In the practice of sleep training, parents are conditioned to ignore the gut-
wrenching pull of their infant’s cry. In this situation, there is an attempt to transcend 
the suffering caused by the parent’s attachment to their infants by reasoning it away 
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and ignoring it. To become numb to the suffering of both self and other is to pave the
way for dualistic instrumentalism to meet some new abstract ends (such as 
independent sleep in the case of sleep training). Those that benefit from oppression 
may lack an adequate level of attachment to the oppressed (both seen and unseen) to 
truly feel suffering (and do something about it) when their own wellbeing is 
threatened by such oppression (Mathews, 2003; Plumwood, 1991).         
From this overview, I resonate with Plumwood’s view that we are not just self and 
other (a term indicating a singular perspective of the world from self), but one self, 
one centre of subjectivity, considering the world and subjectivity of other selves, 
seeking understanding and awareness of a connection without compromising core 
individuality or self-interest. As Plumwood (2002) relates: 
We need a concept of the other as interconnected with self, but as also a separate 
being in their own right, accepting the ‘uncontrollable, tenacious otherness’ of the 
world as a condition of freedom and identity for both self and other (Plumwood, 2002,
p.201). 
Moving beyond the oppositional and exploitative dualisms of self and other should 
not entail scrapping the notion of self, of being different from others, or of having 
self-interests. In fact, retaining and understanding individuality, in concert with 
relational connections, gives strength and resilience to our relationships with kith and
kin. 
Having a position or concept of self and other aligned with the tenets of relational 
scholarship is essential for understanding when one’s control of the other in care-
giving is oppressive or mutually supportive. Control may not be dualistic when it 
delineates self from other with empathetic boundaries or limits, validates and 
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respects the uniqueness of self and other, and protects self-interests from 
exploitation. It is likely, depending on circumstance, that these qualities of control 
may be indicative of leadership, and protect and promote relationality, rather than 
degrade it. 
6.6 Standing in Solidarity, Leadership
The concept of solidarity is also helpful to further an understanding of the nuances of
mundane, yet very complex, power conflicts between self and other. Solidarity 
describes a form of unity amongst and/or between individuals and communities, 
usually defined by certain ethical obligations (Mallory, 2009; Scholz, 2008; 2013). 
Solidarity can be social (individuals joined by commonalities), civil (such as justice),
and/or political. Political solidarity arises when a group of individuals join to 
challenge a particular injustice, and create bonds among each other to achieve a 
particular goal, such as found in a political or social movement (Scholz, 2008; 2013).
The stronger the bond among members, the more likely individuals will be to 
respond to one another with moral consideration. Individuals in this group each take 
part in reflexive practice, recognising their own role and experiences with the 
injustice, so as to understand and further their collective cause by assembling a 
diverse range of perspectives (Scholz, 2013). 
Mallory (2009) questions whether the language of political solidarity can be 
accurately and effectively utilised in describing the solidarity of human and non-
human spheres. While she does not really answer this question (although she tends to
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favour Plumwood’s (2002) argument that non-human others can be political), she 
observes:
Political solidarity for Plumwood is a relation in which one (or, as is more suitable for 
our purposes, the collective) does not claim an identification with the other—political 
solidarity describes a relation in which beings are motivated to act on behalf of others 
with whom one admits one does not (necessarily) share experiences, interests, 
worldviews, or subjectivity. However, those standing in solidarity become joined both 
with the object of solidarity and others involved in struggling for change through the 
shared recognition of injustice and oppression and through acting to change it 
(Mallory, 2009, p. 8).
Scholz (2008) believes that political solidarity between humans and non-humans is 
not possible due to the lack of cognitive reasoning in non-humans (and hence their 
ability to identify with and act on common political causes). She attests that political 
solidarity is a human concept, one in which non-humans do not and cannot 
participate. Although, Scholz (2013) does suggest that people may provide political 
solidarity on behalf of non-humans, or that social solidarity might be a more 
inclusive concept. Given the immaturity of infant and toddler cognitive skills, 
Scholz’s argument might also indicate that political solidarity would be difficult to 
achieve with infants. Interestingly, Scholz (2013) conveys that political solidarity 
does not always entail a democratic outcome. In other words, a leader can make a 
decision which is in both parties’ interests (such as avoiding a life or death danger) 
even if the weaker party does not agree. Scholz’s understanding is contrary to that of 
Plumwood (2002) who states that: 
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[…] an appropriate ethic of environmental activism is not that of identity or unity (or 
its reversal, indifference) but that of solidarity—standing with the other in a 
supportive relationship in the political sense (Plumwood, 2002, p. 202). 
The key issue here is whether non-humans (or children) are capable of identifying 
and sharing common political interests with other people, and thus able to stand 
together not just socially, but politically. Scholz’s argument attests that to be truly 
‘human’ and capable of politics requires the ability to reason. Plumwood (1991) 
counters that reasoning, when used to identity self from other, or human from nature,
reveals threads of dualistic patriarchy. Reasoning is taken to be masculine and a 
purely human quality in opposition to qualities such as emotion, which are taken to 
be feminine and ‘natural’ and of little value for understanding the world. I argue, like
Plumwood, that political solidarity – to stand with another to achieve shared 
intentions – does not necessitate ‘human-style’ reasoning (though neither does it 
exclude it), but rather it requires communication, participation, and common intent 
(Hawkins, 2009; Plumwood, 1991; 1998). 
Indeed, many of the basic elements of survival such as nourishment or protection 
could be taken as common political intentions that do not necessitate shared 
reasoning. For example, both people and our gut microbiota share the intention of 
gaining nourishment from the relationship, and each is actively working to maintain 
this goal politically (responding to threats, reinforcing barriers, exchanging 
nourishment and communicative particles, and so on). Yet, I do not sit down with my
gut bacteria and have reasoned and decisive conversation about how we intend to 
overcome the threat of antibiotics to our mutual interests. The players who strive to 
obtain such political goals do not need to perceive them in the same way as each 
other in order to meet them together. Even among reasoning humans, such as a group
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of people banded together to end toxic dumping, each member of the group is going 
to have a different motivation, perspective, and experience with toxic dumping, and 
potentially different ideas about how to achieve their goal, but this does not 
automatically negate their common intention to work together to end it. 
One of the assumptions of dualistic logic is that non-human or oppressed others do 
not possess their own internal ethical standards, decision making capabilities, or 
subjectivity, and therefore their perspective is either non-existent or of little value to 
human ends. Plumwood (2002) calls for a more open ethic to account for the 
differences of perception among non-human kin, while still retaining common 
interests. It would seem that we do not need to know how others process social and 
material contexts to be able to form some sort of understanding of their intentions 
within them. 
For example, when Evelyn was a newborn she could not provide a rational or logical 
argument to explain how she determined that she wanted to be held. Whether or not 
she used reasoning or instinct or any other form of understanding to come to her 
decision was irrelevant. From her perspective she needed to be held, and as a 
responsive parent I validated her perspective and held her, even if from my position I
could not reason why. The key to our solidarity was open communication in concert 
with layers of mutual intent – she cried to be held and deep in my being, driven by 
my love and attachment to her, I understood what I needed to do to maintain both of 
our interests, so I held her. As Plumwood (1991) attests, this constitutes respect. In 
contrast, in sleep training for example, infant needs are purely reasoned by others. If 
the adult does not perceive that the infant has any valid reason for crying, then that 
cry is deemed to be of little importance to either party and is ignored, thus 
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undermining the infant’s subjectivity and the parent’s connection to it (Owens et al, 
1999).         
If solidarity can be achieved among individuals with different realities, then I would 
also propose that the leadership provided by the ‘stronger’ participants would 
strengthen the benefit and effectiveness of that solidarity. In this case, while 
leadership represents a type of ‘hierarchy of power’, it does not imply 
instrumentalism (as in other dualistic examples of hierarchies of power). For 
example, in the case of activism, Plumwood (2002) states that people may provide 
leadership on behalf of wombats to meet a common interest – to save wombat lives, 
albeit with different motivations and perspectives from both wombats and people. 
We may identify in solidarity with an animal, say a wombat, expressing our solidarity 
by being willing to undertake political action on their behalf (working to remove them 
from vermin status, for example)[…] (Plumwood, 2002, p. 200). 
Likewise, parent and child are different selves with different perspectives, yet can 
share common intentions, and thus as a more experienced and ‘stronger’ individuals, 
parents can provide a powerful leadership role to help achieve those common 
interests without such a hierarchy of power implying dualism. As Scholz (2008) has 
described, solidarity does not need to be a democratic process, or even one of equal 
suffering or experience. Navigating the power relations of self and other is a very 
delicate and contextual relational art that is not always logical or fits into previous 
assumptions of what constitutes ideal relationality. 
So, how does solidarity relate to determining when control is not dualistic? As we 
have seen here, a hierarchy of power that may be understood as a classic feature of 
dualism, does not necessarily entail dualism, as in the case of leadership. A parent 
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can provide benevolent and empathetic leadership on behalf of their child, even if it 
conflicts with the child’s interests. If control of the other is ultimately preserving 
significant common values on which the relationship depends, such as valuing one’s 
existence, then control in this instance is not dualistic, but supportive of the 
relationship as a whole. Preventing Evelyn from running into the road, even if it 
conflicts with her interests, is an example of parental control (and at times force) that
preserves her life, and therefore the connectivity of our relationship as a whole. 
Additionally, self-interested boundaries and barriers between individuals do not 
imply dualistic style hyperseperation, instrumentalism, or denial of the other's 
connection. In parenting relationships, mutual benefits may derive from both 
biological sources (passing on genetic legacies and the provision of nourishment) and
from social sources as well, such as love, protection, attachment, friendship, and 
companionship. These mutual benefits are likely maintained with complex barriers to
prevent self-interested exploitation. Some of these barriers may be subtle and 
socially constructed. When Evelyn told me ‘”No!” in response to my request to get 
dressed, she was asserting a defensive social barrier to protect her interests from 
aggressive and unreasonable (as she did not view getting dressed as reasonable) 
exploit by myself. Indeed, social barriers which retain mutual interests in parenting 
(or any other socially beneficial relationship) may be easily undermined by 
oppressive social values. For example, ‘talking-back’ may be viewed as unacceptable
behaviour (as challenging authority) and reprimanded or discouraged in some way, 
thus undermining some of the child’s self-protective barriers. As discussed earlier, 
relationships need not, and should not, exclude the individuality of the self or the 
existence of relational, responsive, and empathetic boundaries between self and 
other. 
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To communicate a social expectation, while respecting her barrier “No!”, allows her 
the space to create her own reasoning for getting dressed, such as to fit-in with our 
group. This approach did not always result in getting dressed on any given day, 
because every encounter is unique in its own right and our cooperation waivers day 
to day with all the highs and lows of life and parenting. 
It is equally difficult to break free of focusing my parenting tactics in terms of 
successes and ends, such as achieving a fully clothed child, rather than as moments 
within long-term relational processes. Sometimes, when mutual connection was 
lacking and we were under pressure, I would exploit our relationship with chocolate 
bribery to just ‘get the job done’. Indeed, the productive and busy nature of 
modernity certainly puts additional pressure on parents and children to ‘get on with 
it’ and ‘hurry up’. This leaves less time to negotiate power relationships in mutual 
ways, and increases the incidence of perceiving encounters of self and others as 
oppositional. When you need to get to work and your child will not get dressed, 
stress and pressure are going to challenge your connection with your child, as well as
your ability to establish common goals or navigate division.  
While not easy, I have come to understand that I need to approach our encounters by 
considering Evelyn as a unique self. Furthermore, I need to be aware of my 
preconceptions of her (e.g. do I assume she is going to be uncooperative?). I need to 
listen to, understand and respect her barriers, even if I may need to overrule them to 
keep her safe. It may not be practically effective, efficient, perfect or easy (in terms 
of modern expectations of achieving parental ends), but more so, this analysis is the 
start of a process of shedding a lifetime of assumptions about the meaning and 
treatment of self and other. 
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In the examples of self from deep ecology as discussed earlier, the reaction to 
identifying problematic culture or relational dynamics seemed to champion the 
opposite concept without regard for deeper relational complexities. Indeed, I can see 
in my own experience of negotiating power with Evelyn that I tended to gravitate 
towards simplistic and targeted opposites, from rational (“Get dressed so we can 
shop”) to emotional (“Wee! Pants are fun!”), from force (“Alright, I’m putting these 
pants on”) to bribery (“Trade you chocolate for getting dressed?”). All of these 
approaches carry hidden threads of dualistic logic. It was only when I moved beyond 
viewing myself in opposition to Evelyn’s self, that a bigger picture of self and other 
emerged. I was anxious and uncomfortable about Evelyn’s resistance to getting 
dressed and uneasy about using aggressive approaches, yet because I was interested 
in relational development, that self-anxiety guided the adaptation of my approach 
toward connection, understanding, and cooperation – not toward mastery and 
oppression. 
Plumwood (1991) defines respect as a process of valuing the other in their own right,
separate to their instrumental value. I can assume that Evelyn value’s her own life 
and existence, as do I value her life and my relationship with her, and so to forcibly 
protect her from cars can be done with solidarity. A parent can make a leadership 
decision, which may conflict with the reality of the child, without disconnecting. I 
can restrain Evelyn against her will around cars while still supporting/understanding 
and validating her feelings of frustration, we can still communicate to each other and 
retain our connection through conflict. Indeed, the ‘problem’ with the situation is not 
Evelyn, but the dangerous cars. It’s all about approach, subtle communications and 
actions which instil leadership without disconnection. Indeed, I could have 
approached restraining Evelyn oppressively by treating her as a ‘problem’, by 
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reacting with anger or annoyance at her ‘disobedience’, picking her up and ignoring 
or denying her frustration and so become emotionally disconnected from her 
experience. These care-giving choices do not happen in isolation, and are reflective 
of greater ontological attitudes and relational patterns and connections. 
6.7 Conclusion
After completing my analysis of dualistic logic in sleep training (presented in the 
preceding chapter), I began to fear that parental control in any form may likewise be 
symptomatic of the dualistic logic that informs much contemporary parenting. 
Through this subsequent chapter’s analysis of caregiver power, however, understood 
in terms of self and other, and incorporating concepts of solidarity and leadership, I 
have come to the conclusion that control in parenting, in and of itself, does not imply
dualism. Dualistic control is bedded in oppositional and instrumental uses of power, 
void of attachment and any desire to understand the particular individuality of the 
other (unless it enhances instrumentalism for personal ends). Dualism is ultimately 
detrimental to many of the possible benefits arising from a relationship, and 
reflective of intentions to dominate for personal gain rather than to lead in solidarity 
(Plumwood, 1991; 1998; 2002). 
The individualised qualities of myself and my child (manifest, for example, in 
different priorities about getting dressed) and the barriers which prevent the collapse 
of our mutual connection/existence (such as when I restrained Evelyn around cars) 
are not symptomatic of dualism, but are instead significant (albeit challenging) 
features of care among diverse kin. Indeed, control, as benevolent leadership, when 
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utilised sensitively in context, and with empathy, intimacy and understanding, can be
beneficial to both parties, and reinforce the resilience and strength of the greater 
relationship. 
In the situation of getting dressed, my tactics of force and manipulation were akin to 
the instrumentalism of dualistic logic because they lacked an understanding of 
Evelyn’s ‘self’. They allowed a one-sided focus for me on my own imperatives, and 
ignored the greater relational dynamic underlying getting dressed, such as fitting in 
socially and culturally. The act of getting dressed, as a social expectation, required us
to take the time to process and understand it as such and to develop a supportive 
relationship based on leadership which then enabled us to move forward with greater 
solidarity. This process was not (and is not) easy, quick, or clear-cut. I am still 
working through similar relational encounters, shedding my own engrained 
assumptions and training, and all while Evelyn develops, communicates and acts 
upon her own understandings of me (and everyone else) in new and amazing ways. 
It’s only now that I realise how confused and unsure my leadership skills have been, 
due to fears of damaging our relationship with dualistic-style control. I worried that 
all control was destructive, which left me feeling guilt-ridden and deflated whenever 
I’d had to assert my position. This process has opened my eyes to how important 
unwavering leadership truly is for maintaining connectivity among those who share 
investment in an intimate relationship, yet still need to negotiate divisions in power 
and perspective. In practice, however, the line between dualistic instrumentalism and
leadership is very easy to blur, especially in the middle of challenging parenting 
moments. 
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Chapter 7 Judgement
When we only look at behavior, we stop seeing the child and only look with an intent
to judge whether we need to reward or punish. When we look behind behaviour, we
see that little struggling human, our little human, who needs our help with
something.
(Eanes, 2016, no page number)
7.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I developed an understanding of how dualistic logic 
may manifest in parenting relationships, and then unpacked the fine line between 
oppressive control and leadership when one cares for a ‘weaker’ other. These 
thoughts, values, and actions which guide our relational lives do not just suddenly 
pop into existence, but have an intricate ontological and epistemological background 
that I will explore in this chapter. 
On the very surface, such ontological and epistemological qualities are apparent in 
how people interpret or judge themselves and others. Judgement is an action, but the 
form it takes is founded in moral or ethical frameworks. As Chappell (2014) 
describes, ethics (or moral philosophy as he calls it) is the practice of applying reason
to the question: How should life be lived? Judgement is a form of reasoning. It is a 
means of questioning, testing, and refining different actions and patterns of relating 
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within the scope of one’s own reality (Chappell, 2014). In this chapter, I identify two
distinct forms of value-based reasoning. I call one open-ended ethic, and the other 
closed-ended morality. Understanding judgement and its underpinning ethical/moral 
frameworks is necessary for understanding how we shape our perceptions of others, 
how we reason our actions towards others, and in what ways judgement may support 
the connectivity of relationships or, alternatively, facilitate the domination of others.  
7.2 The Roles of Judgement
Judgement usually entails forms of praising and shaming of either the 
material/entity/person (self or other) or their actions. Judgement is contrary to 
empathy (understood as the ability relate to the positions/conditions of others), in 
that, the judge presents a one-sided view of the event in relation to their own interests
and moral standards. For example the judgement ‘you’re a bad-girl’ raises the 
question: bad for whom? What makes someone bad? To call a child a ‘bad-girl’ 
means that the child is violating the adult’s moral ideals and behavioural 
expectations, and is therefore lacking in virtue. Judgement, in and of itself, is not 
necessarily symptomatic of dualistic logic, but rather, it depends on the intent with 
which it is used and the subtleties of its use. As Mathews (2003) describes, 
judgement is a survival tactic which helps us to identify threats and maintain social 
order: 
In light of such an awakening to my own vulnerability, I begin to pass judgement on 
what is before me […] To exercise judgement is to affirm those aspects of reality that 
are compatible with my vital interests and to set the rest “beyond the pale” (Mathews, 
2003, p.95). 
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The phenomenon of shame (and similarly guilt) is an interesting result of judgement 
which could serve to either strengthen relationships or to degrade them. Yang (Yang 
and Rosenblatt, 2001) describes the sensation of shame: 
When one feels chang-pee [shame] one would like to hide in a little mouse hole, to run
away, or to die. In chang-pee one feels heat, a fever in one's cheeks. Often chang-pee 
is a sudden, brief feeling. It is typically felt in public. There is also a long-term chang-
pee. Feeling long-term chang-pee, one would try to avoid others who know and are 
reminders of one's shame (Yang and Rosenblatt, 2001, p. 363).
As I described in my previous analysis, particular empathetic boundaries among kin 
are critical to prevent the exploitation (intentional or not) of each other’s 
vulnerabilities. Shame is one potential social boundary which may have biologically 
and culturally co-evolved to maintain intimate social relationships. Shame occurs 
when one appraises themselves from the viewpoint of another, either directly 
receiving judgement or imagining that judgement (Scheff, 2003). We value the 
opinion of others when they are integral to ourselves. Likewise, what others think of 
us (or how we imagine what others think) can influence what we think about 
ourselves and our own identity. As Mathews (2003) describes, judgement (to judge 
and be judged) heralds the development of self-consciousness and an awareness of 
the vulnerability of the individual self to the power of others:
This shift is perceived, in the frame of the story as a fall, because awakening to one’s 
individuality or separate existence instantly entails awakening to one’s vulnerability, a
vulnerability that remained unrecognised as long as one continued to experience 
oneself as immersed in a primordial (imperishable) unity. To become individuated 
then is to fall from the omnipotent “participation mystique” of primal 
146
Chapter 7
un(self)consciousness into the anxiety and fragility of individual self-consciousness 
(Mathews, 2003, p. 94). 
Shame can be divided into several different affect types depending upon context and 
culture, but the most common types include embarrassment or everyday shame, guilt,
and character shame (usually as judgement imposed by others) (Scheff, 2003; Yang 
and Rosenblatt, 2001). Guilt is described by Bedford and Hwang (2003) as an 
internal feeling of violating one’s own standards, or of feeling inadequate in a way 
which is assumed to negatively affect others. Guilt entails a feeling of responsibility 
and empathy for others without harming self-image. Guilt is associated with adaptive
social responses such as exploration and reflection to make amends. In contrast, 
character shaming imposed by an external other is associated with maladaptive and 
defensive behaviours such as depression, anger, evading responsibility, and poor 
self-image (Bedford and Hwang, 2003; Czub, 2003; Luby et al, 2009). 
As I have experienced, parenting can be riddled with moments of guilt. Here is an 
example of one such occasion when I felt that I had failed as a parent: 
(This story is composed from journal notes in March 2015, Evelyn’s age: 22 months)
The day we moved into our caravan on our new block of land, I was feeling 
completely overwhelmed with responsibility and demands. I was trying to move 
furniture and unpack boxes, and the weather was wild and windy and shaking the 
caravan and my wits. Evelyn was constantly demanding that I to do this and that for 
her, and I got so overwhelmed that I exploded in an angry rage and told her to leave 
me alone. She looked a little confused at first, then sad and hurt. I fell into a lump on
the couch and cried amongst our messy piles of stuff. I felt so much guilt and anguish
for getting angry at her, this innocent little human who loves me. The thought of 
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hurting her or making her feel bad about herself was unbearable. She was just being
a two year old. She can’t get her own food, and two year olds just speak what’s on 
their minds. I told her I was really sorry for getting angry, and we took a break from 
trying to be productive to recoup. 
Such guilt motivated me to do better in the future, such as by evaluating my coping 
strategies with stress, and recognising situations that create such rage and changing 
them. Depending on what individuals do with guilt, particularly if a reflexive process
is applied, guilt may signal and motivate change in more relationally connective and 
dialogical ways (Bedford and Hwang, 2003; Czub, 2003). Indeed, guilt does not just 
implore parents to relate more mindfully to the ones they care for, but reveals that 
self-consciousness is an essential part of even a young toddler’s social life, and that 
guilt is a shared experience. For example: 
(This story is composed from journal notes May 2015, Evelyn’s age: 24 months) 
One morning Evelyn was playing with a wooden stacker toy and decided to start 
flinging the base (a wooden square with a dowel pointing out) around in the air. I 
was sitting next to her and got clocked in the face with one of the pointy corners. It 
was very painful, and I screamed ‘Ouch!’ and grabbed my face. She looked startled 
by my reaction and then her head sunk, and she buried her face in my shoulder. She 
displayed guilt. I consoled her guilty conscience and let her know I was ok and there 
were no hard feelings. 
Evelyn felt guilty because she judged herself against her own internal ethical 
standards, felt responsible, and displayed remorse at their violation. I could see how 
she felt from her facial and body expression, and my trust in her was restored. I knew
she understood the ramifications of her actions, and that she did not intend to hurt 
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me. What would have been the result if I had yelled ‘bad-girl’, and shamed her 
character? The identity of her character would be in question and such an attack may 
have activated her ‘fight or flight’ response, such as to avoid me (a reminder of 
shame) or to be self-defensive and angry (Czub, 2013; Scheff, 2003; Yang and 
Rosenblatt, 2001). Rather than feeling and accepting internal guilt which facilitated 
her making amends with me, imposed character shaming may have overshadowed 
that guilt and resulted in disconnection and maladaptive behaviours. 
Jaffe et al (2015) indicates that cultures with low levels of guilt tend to show greater 
social dysfunction, and that the phenomena of guilt is both universal but also variable
(identifying its cultural and biological origins). Judging one’s self and actions against
an internal ethical standard (and feeling responsibility for it) is a much different 
proposition to being judged by others as a person or an action. Indeed, judging and 
being judged by others is much more likely to stray into the realm of relational 
dysfunctionality as it imposes the moral imperative of one reality over another 
(without empathetic understanding of the other), resulting in reactions such as anger, 
self-defence, psychopathy (such as depression), the institution of authoritarian social 
hierarchies, and potential dejection or rejection from the group depending on the 
degree and frequency of the judgement (Bedford and Hwang, 2003; Luby et al, 2009;
Scheff, 2003). This kind of judgement can go beyond indicating certain universal 
ethical or moral standards and stray into destructive oppression. 
Yet, if others did not voice their interpretations of reality or how our actions affected 
them, it would be much harder to build an understanding of their position. As 
Plumwood (1991) suggests, voicing ones position while valuing the other in their 
own right, without judgement based on our own reality, is the critical difference 
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between maladaptive judgement and communication which helps to build an 
understanding of others (Czub, 2013; Plumwood, 1991). Judgement’s role in shaping
the beneficial and/or degrading qualities of relationships likely represents a very 
delicate balance of responses and responsibility tempered by the complexity of 
communication and context.
7.3 Closed-Ended Morality
In this analysis, closed-ended morality refers to the use of de-contextualised, black-
and-white moral codes or rules to apply judgement to a circumstance and/or a 
person’s character or identity. This kind of morality is guided by a rigid set of 
specific relational rules based on facts and truths, usually determined by a governing 
body (such as a parent, religion or culture) to maintain order. The judgement always 
comes down to good or bad, black or white, yes or no (it either conforms to or 
violates a rigid moral code), and hence is closed-ended and reminiscent of dualistic 
logic. 
7.3.1 Punishment
Punishment (or the threat of punishment) is a key means of forcing others to uphold 
moral codes and retain social order by imposing conformity (Bedford and Hwang, 
2003). Punishment involves inflicting pain on another as retribution for ‘immoral’ 
actions and/or as a means of discouraging that behaviour in the future through 
associating that behaviour with pain (Bedford and Hwang, 2003; Straus, 2010; Straus
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and Paschall, 2009). Punishments can involve one or a combination of many 
different painful instruments that are variously emotional (such as criticising 
character or withholding love), physical (such as spanking), financial (such as 
withholding earnings or taking away possessions), and/or social (such as exile or 
isolation). Dualistic logic assumes that subordinate others do not possess their own 
internal ethical standards, and therefore universal moral codes are taken to be 
unquestionably right and true and enforcing them a righteous act (Plumwood, 1993). 
Such thinking rationalises maintaining moral standards (and therefore social order) 
effectively and efficiently at any cost (Mathews, 2003). Paradoxically, while 
punishment produces immediate results, those results do not confer lasting or long-
term prosocial behaviours. Indeed, Slade and Wissow (2004) found that the more 
frequently a child was spanked in the first two years of life, the more likely they were
to have anti-social behavioural problems upon entering school a few years later. 
Indeed, punishment (particularly corporeal punishment) often has long-term anti-
social outcomes (which are variable depending on the individual and severity of 
punishment) (Bugental et al 2003; Kim and Kochanska, 2015; Straus and Paschall, 
2009). 
While punishment is sometimes framed as providing ‘consequences for actions’, this 
assertion denies that actions have their own consequences. If a child touches a hot 
stove they get burnt, the painful burn is the consequence of the action. If a parent 
then sends the child to a time-out chair as punishment for defying their instruction 
not to touch the stove, then this encounter is no longer just about why one should not 
touch the stove, but also about reinforcing authority, order and a hierarchy of power. 
Resentment, anger, shame, defeat and disconnection begin to brew. Punishment is 
personal - it sends and reinforces a message of separation and control – the power of 
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one self over the other. Such a show of power also displays the vulnerabilities of the 
child (physical and emotional), which are instrumentally utilised to enforce 
obedience.
7.3.2 The Dualisms of Closed-Ended Morality
Good and bad, right and wrong, like human and nature, are disconnected concepts, 
void of the complex and contextual grey area which acknowledges their connection 
and meaning. As previously introduced, the closed-ended praising judgement ‘good-
girl’ hides relational meanings, such as: good for whom? In oppressive situations, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ are terms of perspective, division, and definition originating from 
an oppositional perspective. Such terms deny an understanding of others and fail to 
acknowledge that others may uphold a different ethic. They reflect a patriarchy 
which rejects the notion that (repressed) others also have perspective, subjectivity, 
and autonomy (or that these are of any value) whether they belong to nature, woman,
slave, or child (Mathews, 2003; Plumwood, 1991). In the following story I recount 
my own initial awakening to the oppressive qualities of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ judgements 
in parenting.      
(From memories June 2013, preceding my parenting journal, Evelyn’s age: 
newborn) 
When Evelyn was just a newborn, I spent a lot of time looking on the internet while 
she slept on my lap. I came across an interesting parenting trend concerning 
judgement. It entailed the avoidance of applying personal or judgemental labels to 
children, particularly those used to praise and shame children such as ‘good-girl’ 
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and ‘bad-girl’. Instead the focus of the parental response was on the task or action, 
not the child/person. The judgemental sayings are replaced with responses such as 
“Wow!”, “Show me more”, “How do you think she felt?” and so on. These new 
responses are intended to be responsive without identity labels (such as good or 
clever), and/or encourage children to reflect on what happened and why. These 
rationales were fuelled by research such as the work done by Carol Dweck (1986; 
2017) on fixed and growth mindsets. She found that children who are praised 
frequently with phrases such as ‘you’re so clever’ avoided situations which 
challenged their ‘clever’ identity, and as a result self-limited opportunities for 
growth and interaction. This parenting trend was also motivated to avoid the 
negative outcomes of character shame, such as poor self-image and the manifest-
destiny of that poor image. 
Suffice to say that I was convinced by the rationale of these arguments, and 
implemented their strategies as best I could. I came across this trend when Evelyn 
was still only a newborn, before I had gotten in the habit of constantly saying ‘good-
girl’ to her. Michael was on-board with this suggestion and implemented it well. Of 
course, there were still many people around us using good and bad rhetoric with and
around Evelyn. “Good-girl’ in particular seemed to be an ingrained and automatic 
response to a range of behaviours for many people (as it was for me before I was 
made aware of it). As such, I didn’t feel comfortable telling well-meaning others to 
stop calling Evelyn a ‘good-girl’ or ‘clever’, although I came close on one occasion 
involving shaming.
(This story is composed from journal notes from November, 2014, Evelyn's age: 17 
months old) 
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It was a sunny Saturday afternoon, and we were visiting a friend’s house. There 
were a dozen or so other people there, milling about, and making friendly chit-chat 
over food. Evelyn was entering the post-lunch crazy-time, and was in, around, and 
all over the place. She spotted a mound of colourful toys in one corner, and dragged 
Michael over to check them out. She sorted through some blocks, then, with a twinkle
in her eye, suddenly picked one up, and playfully chucked it at Michael’s head, 
giggling. Michael, dodged the toy, and looking a little embarrassed said, “hey, don’t
throw that at my head”, and then redirected Evelyn to a new activity. Suddenly a 
lady, whom I didn’t know particularly well, turns to Evelyn, and with an exaggerated
scowl on her face, says: “No throwing, you are very naughty”.  I looked back at her 
in shock trying to control my rage (who is she to be scolding someone else’s kid?!). I
was unable to come up with a response which articulated my aggravation, so I just 
turned away and moved on.   
Good and bad, and naughty and nice, are general, black-and-white terms that reflect 
assumed innate personal qualities from within the confines of a single ‘true’ reality. 
They don’t clearly articulate emotional meaning, cause and effect, motivations, or 
problem solving in relational encounters. When the lady shamed Evelyn for throwing
a toy, the meaning she was likely trying to communicate was ‘your actions could 
injure someone’, ‘this concerns me’, ‘I’m trying to help you learn’, and ‘injuring 
someone is not in line with my moral code’.  Instead, Evelyn may have heard ‘you 
are a bad person for throwing, and I don’t like you’. I felt angry at her comment, 
because I did not want Evelyn to feel that she was an innately ‘bad’ person by 
behaving like the toddler she was. Such polar judgements lack an understanding of 
the context and circumstance of the event. I would agree that intentionally injuring 
someone is undesirable, but I would not have considered this the case, nor inflicting 
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shame the best relational approach. Toddlers have not fully developed executive 
function or impulse control, and it is certainly not uncommon for one to do 
something impulsive – taking risks is essential for learning about the active nuances 
of relationships. Lobbing a toy at someone and laughing does not seem to be the act 
of an inherently malicious person, but of a toddler who wants to play, connect, and 
explore. 
Indeed, if Evelyn were an adult, would the woman have voiced her judgement so 
freely and self-righteously? Suissa (2013) argues that ‘good and bad’ judgements 
(using praise as an example) are both instrumental and reductionist, and highlights 
the point that adults and children may receive different moral treatments.  
[…] the situation raises interesting questions about why we praise each other, and 
about the sense in which praise, as a social practice, is embedded within a complex 
moral context. Trying to answer these questions leads into further philosophical 
discussion about our moral attitudes towards adults and children, and the differences 
between them (Suissa, 2013, p. 6). 
Closed-ended morality also reveals a conceptual dualism in the divorce of emotion 
(feminine and child-like) from reason (masculine and parent-like). Plumwood (1991)
highlights that emotion is integral to reasoned morality, as care and empathy are born
from care-giving experiences and provide a depth of understanding that is not 
possible with abstract concepts of morality, such as those found in reasoned moral 
codes. 
With nature, as with the human sphere, the capacity to care, to experience sympathy, 
understanding, and sensitivity to the situation and fate of particular others, and to take 
responsibility for others is an index of our moral being. Special relationship with, care 
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for, or empathy with particular aspects of nature as experiences rather than with nature
as abstraction are essential to provide a depth and type of concern that is not otherwise
possible. Care and responsibility for particular animals, trees, and rivers that are 
known well, loved, and appropriately connected to the self are an important basis for 
acquiring a wider, more generalized concern (Plumwood, 1991, p. 7).
Thus, the use of a rational moral code to praise and shame children is divorced from 
any effort to understand the developmental and circumstantial context in which the 
child acted. Such understanding would require openness and empathy on the part of 
the adult, as described by Plumwood (1991). Passing judgement on others (whether 
praise or shame) is yet another glimmer of dualistic logic. Emotion is linked to 
children who exemplify emotional impulse, and reason is linked to the parent who 
conceptualises moral codes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to meet predefined behavioural ends.
As Plumwood (1991, 1993) describes, such polar reasoning justifies the oppression 
and judgement of emotions and beings that are conceptualised as emotional by the 
dominator. 
This raises the question, how did such black-and-white moral thinking (and 
practices) become so enduring? 
7.3.3 Original Sin and Dualism
In western culture, close-ended morality surfaces in the themes of judgement 
originating from the Christian story of creation (Boyce, 2014; Mathews, 2003). As 
the story goes, Adam and Eve were the first man and woman. They were created by 
God in his own image, to live eternal lives in the Garden of Eden. They were warned 
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by God not to eat fruit from the Tree of Life, for eating from this tree will give them 
Divine knowledge of good and evil. A serpent convinced Eve to eat from the tree, 
and she then shared the fruit with Adam. They gained knowledge of good and evil, 
and were judged by God for their disobedience. They felt shame as both an internal 
guilt and external disgrace. God exiled them from paradise to suffer on earth. They 
then populated the earth, and their descendants were born with (and born from) this 
original sin (Boyce, 2014; Mathews, 2003). Boyce (2014) argues that the concept of 
original sin has played a significant role in shaping modern western values, practices,
identities, and relationships:
The creation story was the spiritual foundation on which the western world was made, 
directing how people understood the divine, each other, the natural world and, above 
all, themselves. […] Today the influence of original sin is most obvious in the 
distinctive discontent of modern people – the feelings of guilt and inadequacy 
associated not with doing wrong but with being wrong (Boyce, 2014, pp. 9-10). 
This view also crops up in the historical motivations for sleep training infants.  
Discipline, such as sleep training, served to repent original sin, and thus instil virtue 
in children as early as possible. 
The best hope for children was rigorous training, and the Puritans discovered that their
infants could be taught to repent from a remarkably young age (Boyce, 2014, P. 78). 
This was particularly important when childhood mortality was high (Boyce, 2014). It
was imperative then, that parents pre-judged the ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of their 
children so as to mould the shape of their moral character in line with religious 
doctrine – in no uncertain terms as efficiently and effectively as possible.  Given the 
anxiety one would have felt about being judged by God (and the social obedience 
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and stability this would have provided), it certainly isn’t surprising that the relational 
frameworks and values promoted by the story of Adam and Eve have permeated the 
lives of these people and those who have descended from Christian cultures.  
Christian moral law is certainly not as overtly prominent in secular western culture as
it once was, but the underlying values and instruments of these laws still linger (such 
as not causing physical harm to others, and externally shaming, including by means 
of punishment, those who do). These moral codes provide a rational, tried and tested 
means of retaining order, predictability and safety in a world of suffering. As 
Mathews describes:
[…] the world is perceived as a classic vale of tears, and we achieve our humanity by 
responding to this in a rational manner by instituting a rule of moral law which, 
though repressive, enables us to deal collectively and in a dignified manner with the 
dangers that threaten us (Mathews, 2003, p. 101). 
Not only does moral order provide people with a framework for social survival, it 
also defines their identity within a secure hierarchy of power. God dominates and 
then separates himself from Adam and Eve, and so Adam and Eve, created in God’s 
image, are also entitled to dominate, shame, and punish their sinful subordinates 
(such as ‘nature’, animals, indigenous people, women, and children) to maintain 
moral order and self-preservation (Mathews, 2003). This hierarchy is the foundation 
of dualistic logic, and it allows a single perspective or moral imperative to rule all. 
As Plumwood (1993) describes, dualistic logic allows for the domination of others to
preserve one’s own position of power - just as God maintained his power by exiling 
Adam and Eve after they gained divine knowledge of good and evil from the Tree of 
Life (Mathews, 2003). Plumwood (1993) theorised that dualistic practice is typified 
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by denial (God overlooks that Adam and Eve were made in his own image and thus 
denies that their decision to defy him must also reflect his image and their connection
to him), hyperseparation (Adam and Eve are exiled from Eden), relational definition 
(God’s will is taken as primary, Adam and Eve’s actions against his will are seen as 
‘sin’), instrumentalism (Adam and Eve are subjects of God’s laws, punishment and 
shame are God’s instrument for enforcing those laws), and homogenisation (Adam 
and Eve are seen as universally sinful, and so their descendants also carry their 
universal sin).  
If dualistic logic and closed-ended morality have been a key mode of ensuring our 
survival and progress, how do we safely move beyond it? As Mathews (2003) 
suggests, venturing beyond the moral codes, judgement, and rationalism that 
provides order and relative safety for many requires reassurance that the vulnerability
of new relational frontiers will not cause harm, but a new mode of thriving. Parenting
is one such way to gently move forward by valuing children in their own right, as 
individual subjective beings, not good or bad characters or subjects of rigid moral 
codes to manipulate with judgements and imposed shame. A reflexive parenting 
evolution could offer a direct and long-term means of moving towards a dialogical 
ethic while retaining a safe social order (e.g. without sudden violent social uprisings).
By acknowledging the perspectives of others and reflecting upon the contextual and 
subjective complexity of daily encounters, parents may demonstrate to their children 
that the vulnerability experienced while encountering others with openness, while 
risky, can also offer the opportunity of gaining profound intersubjective 
understanding and personal growth that may reap many relational benefits. Indeed, 
parenting provides a rich opportunity to foster a social system of open-ended ethics –
for both children and parents. 
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7.4 Open-Ended Ethics
7.4.1 A Narrative about Empathetic Limits 
As previously discussed, ‘discipline’ is often an area of parenting practice which can 
sometimes easily become dominating and judgemental. Before having my own child,
I believed that discipline was about forcing conformity (through judgement, 
punishment, and shame), as an essential part of developing a child’s character 
(obedience) and a source of a parent’s pride or shame (do others think my child is a 
brat or well behaved?). After having Evelyn I began to question these assumptions. I 
wondered how one could ‘disciplined’ respectfully. Laura Markham’s (Markham, 
2013) process for setting empathetic limits is one possible means of applying and 
modelling an open-ended ethic (or an approach to relational engagement based in 
subjective, reflexive, and contextual understandings of others) in a care-
giving/leadership role. Below, I describe how I began to evolve my own application 
of open-ended ethics in encounters with Evelyn.             
(Memories from May 2013, preceding my parenting journal, Evelyn's age: newborn)
When Evelyn was barely a week old, the child health nurse visited our house to do a 
health check. During the visit, she asked me if I had thought about what sort of 
parenting style I would use. At this stage I had no idea there were different styles, 
but I remember saying that we thought it was important that she be disciplined – not 
in the sense of being punished, but more so in setting rigid limits and high 
expectations and strictly enforcing them. At that stage, I assumed that discipline was 
an important part of parenting her character, and I did not want her to become a 
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‘spoiled’ or disrespectful youth. The attitude of the culture around me instilled the 
belief that ‘kids these days’ are disrespectful and spoiled due to permissive 
parenting. Such reasoning sounded logical enough and I accepted it without 
question. 
Discipline was not much of a concern in the first year of Evelyn’s life. She would 
feed, sleep, play and ride around in my carrier. It was during this time that I became
exposed to a vast resource of different parenting approaches. In passively 
encountering articles and conversations around the topic, my views about the role of
limits and discipline in shaping character were greatly shifted. I began to view 
traditional discipline (as in rigid limits enforced with punishment) as more aligned 
with the approaches of baby trainers, to condition and control behaviour in line with
adult ideals. This was in contrast to gentle parenting approaches which considered 
childhood behaviour and our response to it within developmental and empathetic 
contexts. As her mobility and skills increased, and she began to find herself in sticky 
situations, setting limits suddenly became something we would need to face. 
I was a big fan of Dr. Laura Markham’s blog AhaParenting.com (Markham, 2013). 
Her parenting advice was aimed at creating empathetic and reciprocal parent-child 
relationships. She based her approach, termed ‘empathetic limits’, on the 
authoritative (not authoritarian) style of parenting described by developmental 
psychologist Baumrind (Baumrind, 1966). Dr. Markham argues that while popular 
opinion views parenting in black-and-white terms – giving-in as opposed to 
controlling – that there is a third way, a more respectful way of responding to 
children as whole people and helping them to meet developmentally appropriate 
expectations. This approach resonated with my relational views, so I read her 
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instructional advice about setting empathetic limits, and prepared myself for 
practising it when the time came. 
To practice setting empathetic limits she describes starting from a position of 
understanding and reflecting the child’s point of view. Limits need to be reasoned 
(and sharing that reasoning with the child), and the parent provides acceptance and 
support for the grieving of that limit and for moving on. The aim is to maintain the 
limit without severing connections. This practice stems from the belief that parents 
and children are on the same team and help each other maintain boundaries, rather 
than assume that boundaries are oppositional power struggles. 
While setting limits does entail control, the difference is that the emphasis is not on 
controlling the character or core of the child (as in punitive approaches), but to 
create a barrier to actions which may result in some form of reasoned harm and to 
redirect those actions to more acceptable avenues. She further stipulates that 
empathetic limit setting is not about the quantity of limits, but about carefully 
selecting a meaningful reasoning for setting a limit (e.g. for the psychological and 
physical safety of self and others) and empathetically but firmly maintaining limits in
concert with context, development and understanding. In this way, the child’s 
autonomy is retained and their emotional response is validated and processed, while
actions are shaped within the cultural bounds of acceptability and safety. The parent
is not just ‘setting limits’, they are providing leadership to help children ‘fit-in’ to 
social landscapes without judging (either positively or negatively) the character of 
the child. 
(This story is composed from journal entries in June 2014, Evelyn's age: 14 months 
old) 
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As Evelyn transitioned from baby to toddler, I encountered more situations where I 
needed to intervene in her actions. Setting empathetic limits can be challenging as it 
requires an understanding of the context, emotions, and motivations of the players, 
which is not always obvious. Additionally, as she became older and more assertive 
she displayed stronger reactions to my limits. One such common limit-inducing 
encounter occurred around drawing on the floor and walls with crayons. She would 
be happily sketching on her paper, then gradually make her way onto the floor with 
the crayons. 
Figure 5 - Evelyn, about 15 months, wildly stabbing some paper with a marker. Photo credit:
Kaseen Cook
I would initially respond, “I know you love sketching. Please sketch on the paper, 
not the floor. Sketching on the floor damages it.”
Sometimes she would be happy to go back to drawing on the paper, but at other 
times the impulse to draw on the floor was too great and she would say, “No!” and 
continue drawing on the floor. 
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So I would intervene, “Evelyn, I can see you can’t stop yourself, so I’m going to help
you by removing the crayons now. We can try colouring again later.” 
She would start to cry and scream as I removed the crayons from her hand. I would 
offer my support, although she usually didn’t want to be touched or talked to. I 
questioned if I was empathising correctly. My attempts to verbally empathise seemed
to anger her, so I would just sit with her in solidarity. Once things had calmed down 
I would reintroduce the crayons, and reinforce the expectation that they only be used
on the paper. I would still have to reinforce the same limit a few more times in the 
future, but as time passed she stuck to the limit more and more. 
Of course there were times when I felt that I was punishing her by man-handling the 
crayons off of her when reasoning failed, and I wondered if the ‘empathy’ part of the
limits was actually getting through in my approach, as she appeared to not want my 
verbal or physical validation. I also wondered if I lacked particular empathising and
understanding skills. While empathetic limits are not as instantly effective as 
punishment or abandoning the cause all together, I have noticed that over time it 
becomes less and less necessary to escalate limit-setting to the intervention stage, 
and that verbal reasoning is more effective as she understands concepts like 
‘danger’, ‘injury’ and ‘appreciation’.  
Further, I wonder if Evelyn’s urge to draw on the floor was driven by an urge to 
connect with the world around her. If children didn’t experiment in this impulsive 
way, through physical experience, it would be difficult for them to gain a complex 
(and functional) understanding of their relational world and their role in it. How we 
respond to this testing behaviour (with judgement or guidance), and how children 
view themselves as a result, becomes an important relational issue.
164
Chapter 7
To a certain extent, only Evelyn will truly know her motivations to draw on the floor,
but as she was otherwise content at the time, it’s likely that she was curious about the
properties of the floor as a drawing surface or maybe, but less likely, my response. 
Drawing on the floor created a cascade of connections – to the crayon (how it feels in
her hand, how it glides across the surface), to the floor (how the floor changed when 
attacked by a crayon), to me (how I respond to her actions) and to herself (how she 
evaluates herself in light of the variety of social and material responses to her 
actions). These connections did not only take the form of boundaries, but also of 
responses. Boundaries can be seen as relational end-points – ‘stop!’, whereas 
responses are relational openings – ‘what have we learned about our connection to 
the crayon, floor, our parent, and ourselves?’. Perhaps some boundary setting 
concepts overlook the value those connections in favour of maintaining order and 
self-control or of just stopping the discomfort of boundaries as soon as possible. 
These hidden communications (between child, crayon, floor, parent and self) may 
help children to understand their place in the ‘the web’, understand (material and 
living) others, and why one needs to be responsively self-regulating in these 
encounters – to avoid damaging their relational web. 
Upon deeper reflection on this experience, I believe that limit setting empathy may 
not just come from reflecting upon her emotions and trying to console them, but in 
accepting her emotions. In this case, to empathise is not to try to ‘make things 
better’, but to acknowledge that she is not ok , to grieve the loss of the crayon with 
her, and to value her reality and experience of grief and frustration. I realise now that
I expected my empathy to make her feel happy (or be less upset) about removing the 
crayon. I felt confused and worried when my empathy, which was mostly a 
bombardment of anxious sounding attempts to comfort her, was met with rejection. 
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My own discomfort with her grief pushed me to want to soothe the sad feelings 
away, rather than value and acknowledge them in their own right. My worried tones 
probably projected the feeling that how she felt was not ok and that she was being 
reluctantly punished, and/or that I was not sure of the limit myself. Rather, the intent 
was to block the behaviour of drawing on the floor, because it is in our mutual 
interest not to vandalise our rental home (and be evicted), and as the leader my 
responsibility to uphold the mutual value of shelter. 
I have later refined the nuances of the technique to include being calm, firm, and 
accepting in my demeanour. In this way I want my tone and body language to project
that I am ‘helping’ her maintain the limit (rather than punishing or shaming her 
character), that I accept and understand her impulse as well as her reaction to the 
limit on that impulse, and that I will be nearby to ride the wave of emotion. If my 
reaction is calm, without the subtle reactive judgement of being 
anxious/angry/disappointed perhaps she will feel more accepting of herself, a step 
towards learning how to ‘let things be’. Empathetic limiting setting may not be met 
with warm happy hugs, but I’ve learned that relational encounters need not always be
happy to be valuable. 
7.4.2 Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose on Ethic
Children, like adults, make mistakes and achieve things, but these moments and 
things do not comprehensively define who they are, their core ethic, or relational 
intentions. I may espouse the values of relational scholarship, but in practice I still 
live life as many western consumers do. I waste resources, I drive a car, and I 
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sometimes parent in ways that contradict my own parenting principles. This does not 
make me ‘bad’, it makes me situated. It means that I am a person comprised of 
millions upon millions of different circumstances which have brought me to where I 
am, and who I am, right now. It means that I am living within the context of 
Australian life, and that, while I can reflect, critique and venture to experiment with 
parenting and life styles which align with relational ideals, I am still apart of the 
bigger picture and greater webs of connection and influence which I cannot control 
and which evolve slower than the concepts directing them. This is especially true for 
children, who are not only dealing with the extreme highs and lows of physiological 
development, but also learning to navigate social and material landscapes. How we 
respond to (and define) their actions and perceptions is a critical part of helping 
children to understand who they are and where they fit in to bigger webs of 
connection. While ‘good-girl’ and ‘bad-girl’ and other judgemental responses situate 
the identity of children in relation to certain rigid moral codes, it is the modelling and
practising of an empathetic understanding of both self and others which drives the 
formation of a relational ethic and individual responsibility (Scheff, 2003). 
Empathetic understanding comes from reflection on intimate relational experience, 
and cannot be adequately derived from judgements of good and bad which lack 
critical relational engagement and understanding – particularly if the origins of such 
judgements are linked with dualistic ideology.
As previously described, open-ended ethic refers to the use of open-ended 
questioning, empathy and communication to arrive at contextual and flexible 
understandings of relational encounters. This ethic is born from subjective internal 
standards of responsibility (as opposed to externally imposed morals), a concern for 
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others and respect for their subjectivity. Open-ended ethics are governed by internal 
guilt and responsibility, rather than external shame and punishment. 
Plumwood’s relational and open-ended ethic is rooted in respect for the reality of 
others, which also requires a respect for the difference of others:  
I have suggested that recognition of and respect for the intrinsic value of the other is 
an essential adjunct to an ethic of care and respect for difference […] it will not be 
respect just for those aspects of the other in which it resembles us, and hence will 
entail respect for difference (Plumwood, 1993, p. 160). 
This ‘dialogical ethic’ involves attributing mind-like properties to others so as to 
view others with the potential for qualities such as agency, autonomy, and creativity 
(Bannon, 2009; Plumwood, 1993). To understand the value of such properties in 
others also requires sensitivity to them (entailing experience), of being open to 
understanding, and to responsively communicate. As such, Plumwood’s ethic 
describes a foundation for relational problem solving which attempts to account for 
the higher and common values and contexts of individuals, yet does not undermine 
the differences that make the mutual benefit of relationships possible.   
Mathew’s (2003) concept of panpsychism resonates with Plumwood’s concept of 
attributing mind-like properties to others. Panpsychism, as defined by Mathews, 
broadly describes the theory that all matter has psychic properties (Mathews, 2003, p.
27).  This theory establishes the connectivity of matter through a collective 
consciousness, but does not go so far as to suggest a holism which denies 
individuality, such as in some understandings of deep ecology. A collective 
consciousness describes a world made from one fabric, but infinitely differentiated 
into unique forms (Plumwood, 1991; Mathews, 2003). In contrast, holistic theories, 
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such as the concept of indistinguishability in Deep Ecology, assert that all beings are 
undifferentiated from the whole (Fox 1984, 1990; Plumwood, 1991).  A collective 
consciousness suggests a higher level and universal form of communication among 
all matter. This hints at a common ethic based on the value of existence (in whatever 
form that may take). This idea resonates with her other socio-ecological injunction, 
to ‘let things be’ or to step away from viewing matter instrumentally and to 
acknowledge its existence in whatever form it takes.   
Rose (1992) recounts what appears to be an expression of open-ended ethics within 
the culture of the Yarralin people of the Victoria River Valley:
’Good’ and ‘bad’ are all part of life on earth, and what is ‘good’ in one context may be
‘bad’ in another. Moral actions are those which sustain balance, immoral ones are 
those which violently threaten it. […] [Dreaming/creation] Stories are not so much 
about rules as they are about types of actions and responses; they demarcate 
relationships through recounting events. It is up to individuals to identify choices and 
consequences, and relate them to their own living experience (Rose, 1992, p. 103). 
In this account of ethic, the individual is driven to pro-social behaviour, or to repair 
damaged relationships, through internal guilt-like feelings of responsibility which are
steeped in context and an understanding of the people and materials involved. ‘Good’
and ‘bad’ are not rigid concepts measured from a single ruler, but flexible 
assessments of circumstance. 
Open-ended ethics, in theory, helps to overcome issues of subjectivity in morality. 
An open-ended position does so by questioning and empathising with individuals, 
and thus creates a common ethical platform among individuals that is flexible and 
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contextual, albeit more vague and complex than clearly defined, closed-ended moral 
rules. 
As in panpsychism, a common ethical platform among individuals could be 
identified as valuing one’s existence (Grusin, 2015). Therefore, if all entities value 
their own existence, as evidenced by their enduring presence, then an internal ethic 
which respects and acknowledges the existence of others in their own right may 
represent a foundation for a common ethical position (Grusin, 2015; Mathews, 
2003). While not as easy to understand or implement as pre-defined rules of ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’, such respect for the perspective or existence of others allows for 
relational problem-solving without needing to dominate the other. Such an open-
ended ethic would be cultivated from the collective ontological growth of 
individuals. 
Indeed, the process of questioning parenting practice and its assumptions, and 
writing this thesis, has further advanced my own internal ethic. I can now recognise 
the times to put my own judgements aside (and the value I place on them), and to 
accept that others feel or act from the context of their own reality, and consider how 
to move forward with respect for multiple subjectivities or at least in solidarity with a
common value, such as enduring existence. Such development is a long-term and 
complicated form of growth that rises out of relational experience and of 
unconditional questioning – it isn’t easy, perfect, or quick. My open-ended ethic is 
still a work in progress, and perhaps that’s because it has no end-point, continuing to 
evolve over time and within the contexts of each and every encounter. 
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7.5 Conclusion
The popular media suggests we have to train our babies to control themselves, to be
independent, to sleep, and to obey, as if these were not things that had intrinsic value
and would be learned naturally, as a matter of course, in human society. 
(O’Mara, 1997, p. 4)
As O’Mara (1997) suggests above, perhaps we should question the need to train 
children to obey a rigid moral code, and trust that children can develop an internal 
ethic which is respectful of self and others through experiences and reflection on 
encounter. Such experiences and guidance may illuminate the mutual benefits of an 
open-ended ethic that is respectful of difference and context. 
To critique something as seemingly innocent as calling a child ‘naughty’ may seem 
trivial, but it reveals a yet another symptom of dualism and domination lingering in 
modern societies. It tells of a history of moral judgement originating from the 
Christian story of Original Sin, and of the social order and security (for most) which 
arises from enforcing such conformity. Yet, such dominating conformity is 
potentially oppressive for interdependent kin. The punishments and other instruments
which enforce such moral laws are instantly effective, but do not confer long-term 
relational connection, nor offer any means of understanding others in context or 
helping them to work through their struggles. Punishment brews character-shame 
which perpetuates dejection and unrest rather than motivating relational growth and 
responsibility as in internal forms of self-judgement (guilt). 
Parenting which supports the formation of (and trust in) an internal open-ended ethic 
may be a practical means of moving beyond closed-ended morality, and foster 
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respect for the subjectivity of others. The process of setting empathetic limits, as 
described in my story, may be a way of modelling and embodying the use of an 
open-ended ethic in leadership or care-giving situations. Equally, re-conceptualising 
children as whole individuals with connective intentions, rather than blank slates to 
be filled or adults in training, means that not only do we trust that children will 
develop an internal ethic as a matter of course and encounter, but it acknowledges 
that they are whole and connective people who do not need to be trained to conform 
to a certain moral code.    
Questioning practices, assumptions, and actions of self and other seems to be the 
most important step to take towards raising children through relational encounters 
and with relational world-views. These questions include: Why did I do that? Why 
did she do that? What do I value? What does she value? Why? What does this mean 
for myself and others? Where did this assumption come from? How else might I 
view this situation? It is only with questioning what is comfortable and assumed in 
our lives that we can begin to unveil hidden power structures and political and/or 
ethical frameworks flowing through our relationships. Once we can identify these 
features, it may then become possible to move beyond them (if needed), consider 
new structures, and merge relational intentions with relational practice, albeit 
imperfectly at times. 
One slightly obvious, yet key, understanding that I am realising through this process, 
is that relationality and dualism are highly contextual and rarely clear-cut. Indeed, 
relational theories and dualistic theories can sometimes feel conceptually polarised – 
as if all encounters are either reciprocal or oppressive, or open-ended or closed-
ended. This may not be so, even though it can sometimes be easy and necessary to 
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interpret and label encounters in such a way. Likewise, a feature of one dualism does 
not mean that every relationship with that quality will be dualistic. In the scope of 
living, relationships are a tapestry of struggle, of solidarity and dualism, and of 
travelling between and among different states of benefit and degradation. 
If we live in webs of relation, then an infinite continuum of relationship ‘types’, 
including dualism, may co-exist and interact in their own right. Perhaps more 
reciprocal forms of relating cannot exist without the learning gained from 
experiences of dualism (interestingly, such a theory exists about the evolution of 
mutualistic gut bacteria from pathogens; see Herre et al (1999) and Leigh (2010)). In 
that case, what we are really aiming to achieve with relational philosophies and 
open-ended ethics is an awareness of and sensitivity to connection, difference, and 
dialogue so that we don’t blindly squash our interdependent kin. The aim may not, or
should not, be to exclusively form relationships and encounters which are mutually 
beneficial and reject all others. Such a conceptual state may be just as ignorant to the 
valuable richness of relational interaction as dualistic ones. 
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Chapter 8 Panpsychism and Parenting
San, The Princess Mononoke: Even if all the trees grow back, it won't be his forest
anymore. The Forest Spirit is dead.
Prince Ashitaka: Never. He is life itself. He isn't dead, San. He is here with us now,
telling us, it's time for both of us to live.
(From the animated film Princess Mononoke, by Miyazaki, 1997)
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters of this thesis, I came to understand how dualistic oppression 
may manifest in parenting, explored the fine line between oppression and leadership, 
and unveiled the background and dynamics of the moral and ethical frameworks 
embedded in relationships of care. In this final analysis chapter, I question: how do 
we discern who is worthy of moral and ethical consideration, and why? 
Panpsychism, or the theory that all matter is conscious, provides a theoretical 
platform to help me construct such an understanding. 
My analysis of panpsychism will feed into an analysis of storytelling as a means of 
bringing such world-views into parenting practice. Mathews (2003) and Rose (1992; 
2005; 2011) draw upon the value of fairy tales and storytelling to argue that such 
expressions of culture have a role in how people understand and value others. I will 
analyse the animated movie Princess Mononoke (Miyazaki, 1997), a favourite in our 
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household, to better understand how aspects of panpsychism may be embodied in 
children through such stories.     
8.2 Lentil Friends
Figure 6 - Evelyn's friend, the jar of lentils. Photo credit: Kaseen Cook.
 (This story is composed from journal notes in June 2015, Evelyn's age: 24 months) 
“Mum, can lentils talk?”
As Evelyn’s question reveals, inquiring after such unexpected qualities as the 
consciousness and linguistic capability of seemingly inanimate materials, was a big 
preoccupation of hers. I would often respond to these questions by pretending to be 
the voice of the lentils (or of whatever thing she wanted to talk to). I was never sure 
if this was the ‘right’ thing to do, as it seemed a bit dishonest. I couldn’t tell if she 
believed the lentils were really talking or if she knew it was just me, but she loved it 
all the same. Indeed, Evelyn gave honorary life to and befriended many different 
materials. The jar of lentils slept in bed with us; she fed it food, and talked to it. After
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a few months, the jar of lentils was forgotten about, replaced by other friends. While 
the jar of lentils was among one of her more imaginary friends, this ability and 
motivation to find friends in different materials was intriguing. I wondered if 
Evelyn’s ability to make such friends revealed not just an active imagination and 
pretending, but a certain sensitivity to and openness to the mentality of matter.
(This story is composed from journal notes from June 2016, Evelyn's age: 3 years 
old)
One year later, I had the jar of lentils out on the table so I could take a picture of 
them for this chapter. Evelyn found the jar and said: 
“Hey Mum, look at this!” 
I couldn’t help probing to see if she could reflect on her relationship with them: 
“Oh yeah! Do you remember when you were friends with the lentils?”
Evelyn: “Yeah”
Me: “Why were you two friends?”
Evelyn: “Because they’re cool. They’re Dad’s and beautiful colours.”
Me: “Do you think lentils can talk?” 
Evelyn: “Nah, they’re our food. Can I touch them?”
Me: “Sure, just keep them in the jar please”
Evelyn proceeded to swirl her hands inside the jar of lentils, looking up with a smile 
to tell me: 
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“They made my hands filthy.” 
When Evelyn was younger, she was open with the lentils, and she engaged in a 
human-style dialogue with them (for example talking, feeding, and sleeping with 
them). A year later, she reflected that she was attracted to them because they were 
‘pretty colours’, and perhaps because they were important to Dad who ate them 
regularly at the time. It was obvious that she eventually learned that lentils do not 
talk, even if I pretend to be lentils. Perhaps she never really believed they could talk, 
eat, or sleep, but rather she was just ‘trying it on’ with them for fun or to see what 
would happen. She can now reflect on one of their roles in our lives – they are food 
and apparently still fun to play with. 
Perhaps, being sensitive to the relational capacity of others involves processes of 
being open during encounters, while also reflecting and being discerning. This 
process might involve refining the senses to detect the relational qualities of others, 
and of being open to the potential for relationships. It would seem, to understand 
potential relational participants ‘well enough’ to be discerning, without being 
oppressive or disconnecting, necessitates not only engagement, but ontological and 
epistemological views which facilitate an inner openness and capacity. The theory of 
panpsychism, which I will analyse in the following sections, may help me to 
understand the value of such relational openness, and how it may be fostered in 
parenting practice. 
177
Chapter 8
8.3 Panpsychism
As previously discussed, panpsychism suggests that matter is fundamentally 
conscious or mind-like, and as a result, connective (Karman, 2012; Mathews, 2003; 
Plumwood, 1993; Rucker, 2006; Skrbina, 2006). Or as Mathews (2003) describes: 
I characterise any view that reunites mentality with materiality, and thereby dismantles
the foundational dualism of Western thought, as panpsychist, inasmuch as it attributes 
a psychic dimension to all physicality (Mathews, 2003, p.4).
As people may have little to no understanding of what it is ‘like’ to be anything other
than themselves, describing matter in terms of mentality may have the undesirable 
consequence of defining experience and consciousness in human terms. Rather, in 
relation to panpsychism, mentality and consciousness usually describe the ability of 
matter to have subjective experiences, or to ‘know what it is like to be something’. 
The term ‘know’ does not necessarily imply thinking or reflexivity as in human 
consciousness, but describes the rudimentary time-space awareness of matter 
(Karman, 2012; Smith, 1978; 2008). 
Reductionist, rationalist, and positivist thinking would implore us to believe that if 
you crack open a tree and it has no brain, then it cannot be conscious or mind-like. 
From this perspective, brain equals consciousness, and subjectivity stems from the 
complex electrical communication within brain cells – it is nothing more than 
complex biological mechanics. The modern scientific paradigm is naturalistic, in that
it suggests reality is governed by knowable and fixed ‘truths’ of the physical world 
which can be deduced from empirical observation (Klemm and Klink, 2008). 
Panpsychism sounds utterly ridiculous from this perspective. Not only is there no 
clear ‘hard’ evidence for the consciousness of matter, but such a notion defies 
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modern logical reasoning about the Newtonian physics of life and requires a 
mainstream reworking of what constitutes consciousness (Gao, 2008; Karman, 
2012). 
As Mathews (2003) describes, theories of consciousness have long been held in 
terms of mind, such as a spiritualist position, or in terms of matter, such as a 
materialist position. Mathews (2003) argues that these prevailing positions exemplify
the mind-matter dualism, and thus deny the unification of mind and matter. 
Materialism, in particular, has dominated Western views of consciousness, and has 
fostered the perspective that the more-than-human parts of the world are merely inert
'things' that can be shaped and designed to meet the imagined ends of people 
(Mathews, 2003). Mathews (2003, p.27) defines materialism as: 
I propose here to vary traditional usage by adopting the term “materialist” to apply to 
any view that defines materiality or physicality in terms exclusive of mentality, 
regardless of whether or not further purely mentalistic or immaterial phenomena are 
posited. Materialism will, in other words, be understood as a theory of matter rather 
than of mind. (Mathews, 2003, p. 27)
Panpsychism provides a position on consciousness which argues that matter is 
fundamentally mind-like, and thus heals the theoretical divisions between 
spiritualism and materialism to create a different lens through which to see and 
understand the world.
There are two divisions of thought on the origins of consciousness, with respect to 
panpsychism. Materialists suggest that consciousness is emergent, in that ultimates 
(meaning the most basic division of matter – subatomic particle, string, wave, quark 
or other) are not conscious, but how they are arranged (such as into brains) suddenly 
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allows the emergence of conscience experience (Gao, 2008; Karman, 2012). In 
contrast, panpsychists believe that consciousness cannot suddenly appear as a result 
of some particular physical organisation and interaction of matter, therefore the most 
logical explanation is that ultimates are intrinsically conscious. If all of matter is 
made of ultimates, then all matter must be conscious in some form (Gao, 2008; 
Karman, 2012). 
Quantum physics research supports the notion that all matter is fundamentally 
conscious. Quantum mechanics is the division of physics concerned with describing 
and defining the behaviour of atoms and their subatomic particles (Karman, 2012; 
Klemm and Klink, 2008). The behaviour of quantum particles is not always 
predictable or linear, and so phenomena in this field of science have led to theories 
about other mysteries which concern the interaction of the physical and non-physical 
world, such as the nature of consciousness (Klemm and Klink, 2008; Shan, 2008). 
Researchers such as Klemm and Klink (2008), and Gao (2008) have provided 
reasoned and experimental quantum evidence that the basic claim of panpsychism 
could be ‘true’ - that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter.
Gao (2008) argued that the ‘causal efficacies of consciousness’ (how mind effects 
matter) could be observed during the phenomena of Quantum Collapse. He describes
consciousness as an interaction of physical processes and subjective experience. In 
quantum mechanics, the location of atomic particles can usually be predicted through
mathematical equations which describe particles as ‘waves’. During a quantum 
collapse the particles can no longer be described by this equation, and unexpectedly, 
the measured phenomena appears to be different to the observed phenomena. In 
quantum mechanics it is acknowledged that the observer interacts with the 
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phenomena and so has an effect on the phenomena which is different to the measured
effect. As a result, the observer experiences states of matter that are different to what 
is measurable, and so, because of the effect observers have on the ‘causal efficacies’, 
Gao (2008) concludes that consciousness must be a fundamental property of matter. 
If consciousness were independent of physical matter (reductive and emergent), or 
contained within the brain, then consciousness would not have any effect on physical
phenomena outside of the brain, such as quantum collapses. 
Klemm and Klink (2008) describe a similar scientific/quantum reasoning for 
panpsychism. They define consciousness as the ability to choose among different 
alternatives, even if the entity cannot reflect upon the choice. As such, choices create 
a dialogue of meaning among conscious entities with outcomes that are neither 
random nor determined (but sometimes predictable). Klemm and Klink (2008) argue 
that quantum systems of microphysical particles show properties of choosing among 
alternatives. They provide several different examples of experiments where 
identically prepared particles repeatedly treated in the same way opted for different 
resulting energy levels. While the likelihood of the particle becoming any particular 
energy level could be calculated, there was still uncertainty in the result. They assert 
that opting among alternatives is evidence for the fundamental consciousness of 
matter. They reason that such a quantum explanation of consciousness is neither 
dualist, idealist, nor transcendental, but represents a third option that avoids 
materialism. It asserts that the fundamental proto-consciousness of matter is 
unreflective (not personal, no-self, “I” only arises from a reflective consciousness). 
The unreflected consciousness can only be defined by what it spontaneously 
produces, by its dialogue with others, by its intentionality, and the meaning created 
by such spontaneity. 
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Klemm and Klink (2008) recognise that their model of panpsychism does not answer
the ‘combination problem’ of panpsychism, in which there is no explanation for the 
different complexities of consciousness. For example, people are composed of 
billions of unreflective conscious particles, yet those particles combine to form a 
whole ‘person’ with a distinctively complex and reflective ‘human’ consciousness. 
Indeed, how do we draw a boundary around what constitutes the whole and distinct 
subjective ‘entity’, the particle or the person, the experience or the physical? There is
yet to be a promising quantum mechanical explanation for these different levels and 
combinations of consciousness.
Mathews’ (1991) concepts of panpsychism were inspired, in part, by her early 
interest in the work of the 17th century philosopher Spinoza. Spinoza demonstrated 
the link between ethics and metaphysics through his ‘proofs’ about the form and 
properties of matter (Mathews, 1991). He describes ‘bodies’ as different modes of a 
common ‘substance’, described by qualitative attributes. Such bodies perceive 
themselves differently to how they are ‘in themselves’ (Mathews, 1991). ‘Conatus’ 
was a significant concept of Spinoza, and is described as a thing’s inherent 
determination to want to exist, and therefore oppose destruction (Mathews, 1991, 
2003). Spinoza’s work laid the groundwork for Mathews’ concepts of panpsychism 
by arguing that matter has a universal, yet differentiated, ‘intellect’ or consciousness,
and because matter displays conatus, it warrants ethical consideration.  
Mathews (2003) provides a metaphysical understanding of panpsychism, and touches
upon spirituality as a part of understanding relationality: 
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To adopt a panpsychist outlook is to enter the terrain of “spirituality”, since it opens up this 
possibility of communicative engagement with a responsive world that incites us to assume 
an attitude of eros in relation to it (Mathews, 2003, p.10). 
Mathews (2006) recognises the significance of cross-cultural experiences of spirit 
phenomena as another understanding of the mentality of matter. She elsewhere notes 
that spirit phenomena occur across cultures, and are described within the 
assumptions and languages of each culture, but are united by a common – more than 
material – core: 
What to call such a view of reality, one that represents reality as consisting of matter, 
yes, but matter imbued with possibilities of inspiritment? I have argued that this view 
is reached by acknowledging the cross-cultural evidence of inspiritment emanating 
from a host of religious, spiritual and occult traditions, but that at the same time it 
requires that we step back from the specificities of these traditions. In light of this it 
would seem to be an error on our part to call such a view, as the Romantics did, 
panentheism, because the appeal to theism in panentheism is still culturally relative. 
That is to say, panentheism still belongs within a particular religious tradition: 
inspiritment is equated, in panentheism, with a culturally specific phenomenon, 
namely the manifestation of an infinite and all-powerful, providential deity. A more 
metaphysical, less religiously loaded name than 'panentheism' is needed. One 
possibility in this connection is panpsychism, or, like the Romantics seeking to avoid 
the reductivism of pantheism, we might coin the term panpsychism, to indicate that 
though everything is in mind, mind nevertheless by its very nature exceeds matter 
(Mathews, 2010, p. 235). 
Furthermore, Mathews’ version of panpsychism describes subjectivity as a result of 
reflexivity, which makes conscious existence a unified self-realising system 
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(Mathews, 2003, p. 74). This is in contrast to the quantum mechanics view of Klemm
and Klink (2008), above, for whom matter is fundamentally unreflexive - they assert 
that reflexivity belongs to more complex forms of consciousness.  Mathews (2003) 
also likens consciousness to energy, linking the objective study of consciousness and 
energy in quantum mechanics with the metaphysical experiences of spiritual 
consciousness as energy, both separate from and connected to the physical: 
Thus the primal field cannot be characterised in traditional dualistic terms, inasmuch 
as it enjoys aspects of both the traditional mental and the traditional physical without 
being reducible to either. In this respect the nature of this field is perhaps not so 
different from energy itself, which is now arguably the fundamental variable in 
physics. Energy is pure activity, which exists, or occurs, nonlocally, indivisibly and in 
potentia, in field form, as well as locally, divisibly, and in actuality, in material and 
other manifest particle forms. Energy is mysterious to physicists precisely in that its 
many nonclassical aspects seem more evocative of mentality then of physicality, as 
physicality was classically conceived (Mathews, 2003, p. 49-50).
Mathew’s approach to panpsychism reawakens the importance of reflecting upon 
culture and belief (or subjective and experience-based knowing) in moving towards 
reciprocal relationships among humans and non-humans, and moving away from 
dualistic oppression and the instrumental treatment of significant others (Mathews 
2003; 2005). 
Likewise, Plumwood (1993) describes panpsychism as the mind-mindedness (or 
mind-like qualities) of matter, connected in dialogue. Plumwood (1993) argues that 
respect for the universal (but very diverse) intrinsic consciousness of matter warrants
an inclusive ethical position towards all matter. This imperative is intended to 
counter the oppressive moral hierarchies of dualism, such as mind-body (Bannon, 
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2009; Plumwood, 1993; Skrbina, 2006). At first glance, this theory of panpsychism 
appears to imply that people value consciousness, and so if all matter is conscious, 
then we must consider all matter as equally worthy of ethical consideration. I 
challenge this assumption throughout the following analysis, and therefore evolve 
my understanding of why panpsychism is valuable to the theories and practices of 
relationality.  
Plumwood identifies two types of panpsychism, strong and weak (1993; see also 
Andrews, 1998). Strong panpsychism is the view that full consciousness is present 
everywhere, in all matter. Weak panpsychism is the view that each ‘natural entity’ 
has distinctive mind-like qualities. Plumwood (1993) believes that weak 
panpsychism is a preferable concept to the strong version as it respects difference, 
rather than prescribing the same kind of consciousness to all matter. She proposes 
that weak panpsychism may be able to facilitate an inclusive ethic for all earth 
‘entities’ which provides equally weighted concern for the subjective needs of 
diverse others. Plumwood (1993) defines respect as valuing an individual’s 
subjectivity in its own right, regardless of our own position. She also asserts the 
importance of difference among individuals within relationships, as a rebuttal to the 
equally oppressive assimilating holism described by some deep ecological thinkers 
(Plumwood, 1993; see also Bannon, 2009). She goes on to specify that the mind-like 
qualities of all entities are defined by intentionality, which includes qualities such as 
sentience, choice, and goal orientation (Plumwood, 1993). 
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8.4 Moral Hierarchies: Evelyn and Lentils
As Andrews (1998) argues, Plumwood’s thesis is (unintentionally) compatible with 
moral hierarchies (the very thing she warns against) due to the potential to rank the 
intentionality of entities based on the number, complexity, and integration of 
different kinds of intentionality. Such ranking can flow on to moral judgements and 
value ranking of others based on comparisons and assessments of various 
manifestations of intentionality. Furthermore, if one of the aims of her theories is to 
respect difference, then it is dangerous to assume that we can know anything about 
the mind-like qualities of other entities or matter. We cannot know if others 
experience intentionality, or if the qualities of intentionality can even be 
conceptualised for others by people in terms of what we experience as intentionality. 
Rather, respect for difference may not entail a respect for subjectivity, as the 
subjectivity of others can only be interpreted, not objectively known. 
For example, I can grab Evelyn's lentil friends and acknowledge that we are 
connected through a common energy and like-mindedness. What ethical standards do
I apply to them? Is it ok to cook and eat them? Will they feel pain like I can? How do
I respect their reality when, apart from what I can sense of them, I don’t know what 
they experience? They are red, hard, bumpy, and inanimate and don’t appear to be 
alive or aware of me or display any concern for themselves. This is all I understand 
of my particular jar of lentils, so, instinctively I would not feel any ethical obligation 
toward them. How do I know if this ethical position (or non-position) based on my 
interpretation of my jar of lentils is actually respectful of their subjectivity (as 
Plumwood would want from an inclusive ethic)? Indeed, what constitutes an 
individual lentil entity? Evelyn considered the entire jar of lentils as a single entity, 
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but how do we know what constitutes an individual centre of subjectivity in the 
lentil's world?  
My experience with lentils tells me it’s ok to cook and eat them. I don’t have to be 
concerned with respecting their subjectivity in order to flourish within my webs of 
relationality. Experience and reflection are critical for making these ethical 
judgements, because one needs to know what is ‘good’ for one’s self to survive in 
webs of relationality. This does not mean that I do not have a significant and highly 
complex relationship with the lentils, after all they can flow through and become part
of my body (as Rose (2002) describes of embodying place), but that my duty of care 
is more so to the creation and dynamics of lentils and those entities and systems 
which support such creation.
It would not serve me well to have the same ethical position towards Evelyn, 
someone with whom I am deeply interconnected and interdependent. In contrast to 
the lentils, I can sense and interpret Evelyn's qualities and experiences that appear 
like my own. Therefore, I can form an ethical and empathetic response to Evelyn as a
whole interconnected person. My interpretations and ethical responses may come 
close to respecting her subjective needs, which would likely reflect how I would 
want to be treated in her position. As we are both people, we appear to share similar 
physical, spiritual, and mental desires and experiences. As Andrews (1998) points 
out, I feel an ethical stirring about Evelyn (in part) because I know that she cares 
about her own well-being, just as I do about myself. My ethical response is also 
shaped by culture, circumstance and many other factors. I consider Evelyn to be a 
single entity animated by a unique spirit. My duty of care, and subsequent values and
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practices, towards Evelyn are not just toward her physical body, but towards her 
inner person as well. 
As this example shows, and Andrews (1998) argues, the differentiation between 
different types of consciousness – the lentils with no spirit and Evelyn with a spirit – 
represent a moral hierarchy. I treat them and privilege them differently and 
instinctively approach them from different ethical positions, because I prioritise and 
place more value on those who have qualities like my own and are more likely to be 
significant interdependent participants. 
However, Plumwood’s inclusive ethic (which springs from her ranking the 
intentionality of consciousness) may not even be possible or warranted. Beyond what
I can sense, I do not understand the subjective aspect of lentils. I cannot form a 
practical ethical response that is respectful, because I would ask, respectful of what? 
Their subjectivity? The very thing that I do not and cannot sense, experience, or 
know? The best I can do is to acknowledge their unique subjectivity, but this is not 
helpful for guiding my actions towards lentils. Practically, I cannot move on with my
own life and do what I need to do to survive, if I do not have some form of moral 
hierarchy and discretion in how I relate to others. Therefore, the personal moral 
hierarchy is essential for making sense of the profound complexity of experience and
allowing us to get on with living, despite the possibility that we may be unaware of 
our full impact on certain others. 
Perhaps Plumwood was inspired to describe the different kinds of intentionality of 
matter, because intentionality is an important discriminating feature for herself and 
others. Judging others based on how they display intentionality, or perhaps how we 
imagine they experience/use intentionality, may be one important means of 
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discerning who is most like us, who is close to our own niche and interconnected to 
our own web of relations, who we might be able to find common ground with, and 
how we might be able to communicate with them. While there are obvious 
oppressive dualisms which are destructive to those who are engaged in them, I 
wonder if preventing the oppression of all others (like oppressing my jar lentils 
because I am ignorant of their subjectivity) is really problematic or even avoidable. 
As we probably do not and cannot exist in ‘perfect’ webs of relationality, some 
members of our web of relation (or ourselves) will probably suffer some form of 
dualistic or instrumental treatment as a matter of course through the trials of relating, 
but this may not necessarily undermine the bigger picture. I would also assert that 
‘respect’ - to value something in its own right, as Plumwood (1993) describes - may 
not be practically possible as 'value' is always dependent upon the perspective which 
produces it. In other words, one cannot separate the subjectivity of self and other 
when valuing the other ‘in its own right’ – we cannot fully know what its ‘own right’
is. To value something with openness should not discount the role of self, but rather 
examine the perspective and judgements of self while interpreting and forming 
understandings of the other. In this case, I would rework respect (in line with 
Mathews (2003)) to mean being open to and engaged with the subjectivity of the 
other, but to also ‘let it be’. 
Rather than interpreting Andrews’ (1998) criticism as degrading the value of 
panpsychism, it highlights the relational need for moral hierarchies in forming and 
maintaining functional webs of relation, and it suggests a different, yet equally 
critical, role for panpsychism – nurturing relational openness. This critique identifies 
that moral hierarchies help us to prioritise a vast diversity of relationships of 
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interdependence. As not all relationships are the same, they cannot be expected to 
receive equal respect or equal consideration. Additionally, hierarchical relationships 
do not automatically entail dualism or destructive instrumentalism. 
8.5 The Panpsychist Value of Princess Mononoke 
As previously described, Evelyn's curiosity about the like-mindedness of her lentil 
friends demonstrates a particular capacity and willingness to connect and 
communicate with others, particularly non-human others. If panpsychism obliges 
people to be open to the relationality of others, how might parents support and 
further the ontological, epistemological, and cultural development such openness in 
their children?   
As Mathews (2003) discusses, fairy tales are a valuable means of embodying 
panpsychism through culture: 
When the subjectivity of self is permeated by the subjectivity of the other, it is 
transformed, and this transformation will manifest outwardly in a change of material 
aspect. […] We have a word for the panpsychist ambience of the fairy tale: 
enchantment. […] A land or place is enchanted if it has been called up, its subjectivity 
rendered responsive to self by self’s invocation of it (Mathews, 2003, p.18).
It seems fitting then, that I analyse the panpsychic qualities and value of an 
‘enchanting fairy tale’ which has been much loved by Evelyn and myself.
Studio Ghibli movies are a particular breed of Japanese animé written and directed 
by Hayao Miyazaki. Evelyn’s all-time most watched movie was, and still is, 
Princess Mononoke (Miyazaki, 1997). Interestingly, a selection of his movies are of 
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interest to social researchers, and analysed in the academic literature due to their 
richly presented ‘environmental’, political, and cultural themes, including the use of 
strong female characters (Mayumi et al, 2005). 
Figure 7 - Characters of Princess Mononoke. Photo credit: Miyazaki, 1997 and Studio Ghibli.
Princess Mononoke (Miyazaki, 1997) has particularly strong and complex relational 
themes that combine elements of environmental destruction and industrialisation, 
cultural politics, economics, dualism and instrumentalism, panpsychism, animism, 
spirit and the super-natural, activism, fitting-in, and the interdependence of complex 
relational webs (Mayumi et al, 2005; Smith and Parsons, 2012). Princess Mononoke 
is set in Japan’s fictional distant past. It is the tale of Ashitaka, the young prince of a 
long-hidden tribe of people who live in the forest and ride red elk. 
As the story opens, an angry Boar God, turned hate-filled daemon, charges toward 
their settlement. Ashitaka leaps into action, flighting the beast from the back of his 
elk to save his community. As he kills the daemon, it touches his arm and so curses 
him with its hate and condemns him to die slowly and painfully. An iron bullet is 
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found inside the giant Boar, which is thought to be the cause of its hatred toward 
people. 
Ashitaka decides to travel the land to discover who shot the Boar and caused unrest, 
and to plead with the forest spirit to save his life from the curse. Along his journey to
find the source of the iron, he encounters Gods and spirits of the forest, violent 
people, politics of greed, and environmental destruction (and anger towards humans) 
caused by the mining operation of Iron Town. He also meets San (Princess 
Mononoke, or Spirit Princess), who is the adopted human daughter of the Wolf 
Gods. She hates humans and the destruction to her forest home caused by Iron Town.
Ashitaka is attracted to her and seeks her help to find the forest spirit. He must 
convince her that he is not like the other violent people, and that he cares about the 
forest and her. 
He also meets the dominating female leader of Iron Town, Lady Eboshi, who 
endeavours to kill the forest spirit to stop the forest animals and spirits attacking her 
mining operation. It was her bullet that set the Boar God charging into Ashitaka’s 
village. It is apparent that a war is building between the forest and the people of Iron 
Town, and Ashitaka tries to mediate the hate fuelled conflict and insists that people 
and the forest can live together. His argument fails to sway Lady Eboshi, who is also 
possessed with a hateful daemon. 
When war breaks out, San fights against the humans with the Gods, and Ashitaka 
remains neutral, trying to prevent the forest spirits and the people of Iron Town from 
being killed. The forest, its sprits, animals, and Gods suffer great losses in the war. 
Ashitaka fails to protect the forest spirit, who is beheaded, transforming into a large 
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walking demon, leaving indiscriminate death (represented by black goo) for people 
and the forest in its path as it searches for its stolen head. 
San and Ashitaka eventually rescue the head of the forest spirit from Lady Eboshi’s 
men, and return it. A great energy explodes from the reunited forest sprit, and our 
heroes wake to a quiet and empty landscape of death and destruction. Then, 
suddenly, it begins to rebirth, green plants growing out of every orifice, growing over
the town and the forest. The spirits and Gods are no longer walking beasts, but their 
spirit endures in the eternal rebirth of life. The movie closes with San deciding to live
in the forest, unable to reconcile with her humanity, and Ashitaka returns to Iron 
Town to help rebuild. Both characters, forever transformed, vow to see each other 
again.         
The themes of this movie depict a lived panpsychism, where not only is every part of
the world (particularly plants and animals) conscious and full of spirit (many of 
which are also physical), but Ashitaka, in an effort to repair the relationship between 
the forest and humans, champions the openness to relationality and reflexivity 
endeared by panpsychism. This makes it more than just conceptual, but relationally 
functional. He is neutral in his encounters with the forest beings and the humans, 
encouraging dialogue and engagement, while trying to make both sides aware of 
their ‘blind’ hate. Indeed, this blindness speaks of the perils of dualism, where a lack 
of communication and experience with one another (coupled with physical 
separation) allows for the justification of instrumentalism (such as the careless 
mining of the forest) and the justification of uninformed and destructive hate (such as
the hateful attacks towards the people launched from the forest beings).
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There are also many levels of moral hierarchy in this story. There is a functional 
level of moral hierarchy where life is valued from the human perspective based on 
intertwined meaning and functionality. For example, the lives of the central human 
characters and forest Gods are placed at the highest value, as they are the most 
significant players in the greater relationality. This is followed by the plants, animals,
town folk, and tree/animals sprits who play supporting roles to the central 
relationships. Lastly, the substrate on which the story unfolds is valued for its 
meaning to other relationships, such as its role as a medium or substrate for the 
rebirth of others, as a mineral to be consumed, or as a place of value to be fought 
over, but it is not clearly an active agent in its own right. 
There are also moral hierarchies of destruction, where both the forest creatures and 
the Iron Town humans view themselves as morally superior to the other, leading to 
the afore mentioned instrumentalism and conflict launched from both sides. Indeed, 
every being in the movie projects its own hierarchy of value, which layer and interact
with others. This story highlights that moral hierarchy, or valuing different 
relationships and roles with discretion, is relationally intrinsic and not necessarily 
dualistic. Rather discretion can focus action on significant participants, while 
dualistic moral hierarchies can be oppressive and destructive when they are in 
conjunction with other features, such as instrumentalism.    
Smith and Parsons (2012) argue that the movie is anthropocentric because it shows 
concern for human survival. I would disagree with this interpretation because the 
movie also shows concern for the forests survival, as well as how the survival of 
humans and the forest are intertwined. As described in Chapter 6, concern for ones 
self is as important to relationality as concern for the other. The movie is written for 
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people, by people, so human perspectives are very important to the meaning of the 
movie (particularly as we can only imagine the perspectives of the forest), but this 
does not make them anthropocentric, because the meanings derived from the human 
perspectives speak about caring for (or destroying) ecological others – they speak 
about relationality, not ‘–centrism’. Indeed, neither the forest nor the people are 
depicted as ‘right’ or superior from the perspective of the central character Ashitaka. 
Both are responsible for the dysfunction of their relationship, are powerful and 
capable in different ways, and suffer greatly as a result of their resistance to dialogue 
and hatred for one another. 
As in many of Miyazaki’s movies, female characters play strong roles which mediate
politics, connect with the spiritual, and balance or disrupt relationships (Smith and 
Parsons, 2012). Both Lady Eboshi and San play powerful and pivotal roles in the 
movie, representing opposing sides of the conflict, mediated by the masculine 
reasoning of Ashitaka. In Miyazaki’s movies, the strong role of women and the 
feminine, and the depiction of relationships unfolding along a continuum of various 
relational qualities, bears similar ontological and epistemological grounding to the 
various streams of ecofeminism. This movie also rejects some of the principles of 
deep ecology by depicting beings and forces on all sides of the conflict, human and 
forest alike, as responsible for the conflict and destruction in the movie, rather than 
showing people as the accountable perpetrators and the forest as a helpless victim 
(Smith and Parsons, 2012). 
Smith and Parsons (2012) argue that Princess Mononoke calls children to engage in 
environmental activism. I would similarly argue that these stories also call children 
and adults to reconsider the spiritual and mental qualities of matter and how 
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important such relational ontological growth is to personal and relational well-being. 
In the wake of such destructive relationships, this movie also offers the hopeful 
panpsychist message that because consciousness (represented by spirit in the movie) 
is eternal and everywhere, that no matter how destructive relationships become, there
is always hope in personal and interpersonal rebirth and growth. Failure can be both 
an end and a beginning, and conflict can create productive tension and catalyse a 
resolution.  The qualities of relationships, including those that may be described as 
dualistic, exist on a continuum and have tangled, and spatio-temporally, dynamic 
roles in the rise and fall of beings, but spirit and consciousness are an enduring and 
evolving constant. 
Rose’s (1992; 2005) contribution to an understanding of panpsychism is much more 
practical and rooted in experience, than that of Mathews and Plumwood. She derives 
her relational knowledge from the time she spent learning about people’s place in 
‘country’ with the Yarralin Aboriginals (Rose, 1992; 2005). As I will explore in the 
proceeding section, panpsychism, when experienced as a way of life, reveals a much 
greater depth to the connection between the theory of panpsychism and living 
panpsychism in space and time. 
8.6 Aboriginal Culture and Storytelling
8.6.1 Yarralin Panpsychism
It is one thing to accept panpsychism as a theory or belief on a superficial or 
intellectual level, and quite another when it is a lived and purposeful ‘philosophical 
ecology’ (a term used by Rose (2005) that describes our dynamic place in the world) 
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(Rose, 2005). For two years, Rose participated in the lives of the Yarralin people of 
the Victoria River Valley in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Yarralin belief 
system could be identified as panpsychist and animist (imagining or treating animals 
as similarly cultured people). As described by Rose (1992): 
Yarralin people assume, usually on the basis of specifiable evidence, that all species 
(some plants may be an exception) are made up of conscious and thinking individuals 
who speak, fight, plan, joke, perform rituals (men’s and women’s), according to their 
own Law (Rose, 1992, p. 46).
The form of panpsychism practised by the Yarralin, and its role in moral obligations 
to others, is contextually complicated. It is not simply a matter of conceptualising all 
matter as conscious and valuing it all equally. In this case, consciousness and 
connectivity (panpsychism) does not warrant moral obligation on its own, but 
relationality and the meaning and context of connections is key to forming moral 
responses. 
Rose (1992) describes the concept/practice/life of ‘Dreaming’ in Yarralin culture. 
She identifies the Yarralin Dreaming as a translated term which describes a range of 
entities and concepts which celebrate and guide life. It can refer to creative beings, 
their actions, the time period when these things occurred, and relationships among 
people and others. Dreaming also speaks about Law, which are the Yarralin’s open-
ended guidelines for how life should be lived. As Rose (1992) explains:
But what Law seems most fundamentally to be about is relationships. Dreamings 
determined sets of moral relationships-country to country, country to plant and animal 
species, people to country, people to species, people to people. Individuals of any 
species come and go, but the underlying relationships persist. Law is a serious life and
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death business for individuals and for the world; it tells how the world hangs together. 
To disregard the Law would be to disregard the source of life and thus to allow the 
cosmos to fall apart (Rose, 1992, p. 56).
The relationships which occur in Dreaming follow four general ‘meta-rules’ of Law. 
The first rule describes relational webs which are in balance, where every entity 
sustains it self in concert with caring for others. The second describes reciprocal 
communication as a moral obligation, and requires individuals to engage with, 
respond to and understand others. The third rule is to block, rather than dominate, 
conflicting relationships, so as to maintain balance. The fourth rule describes all 
entities as autonomous, which means that no entity is the superior of any other. This 
rule respects that different groups have different Laws, but leadership and 
dependence are still important within groups adhering to the same Laws (Rose, 
1992).  
8.6.2 Flying Fox Dreaming Stories
The flying fox is an integral part of the Yarralin people. Flying foxes feature in 
Dreaming stories and shape-shift among humans and flying foxes revealing their 
tangled intimacy with people (Rose, 1992; 2011; 2012): 
Most Dreamings finished by changing to become as they now are. No longer walking 
in human form, flying fox Dreamings, for example, ‘changed over’ into the flying 
foxes we now know. Most Dreaming beings are no longer with us in their original 
Dreaming form. Rather, Dreaming power exists in the sites where the Dreamings were
before, and all the living species of earth derive their life from these sites. […] The 
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disjunction involved in changing over can be drawn along a number of lines, but 
consciousness and responsibility have not been altered (Rose, 1992, p. 46). 
Flying foxes are also apart of matrilineal kin groups (Rose, 1992). These groups 
comprise people and flying foxes, where people’s inclusion in the group is because 
their mother was a flying fox person. The members of the group, both human and 
animal, and considered to share the same flesh from generation to generation, and as 
such are obliged to care for one another. 
According to one Yarralin story, flying foxes also ask the Rainbow Snake to come 
out of the river and bring on the rains when the land becomes very dry. The flying 
foxes move down from the highlands as the ground dries and follow the succession 
of flowering plants down to the river. When they get to the river, they swing in the 
trees over the river and tell the Rainbow Snake to make it rain (Rose, 2011). Flying 
foxes are considered to be like people, and/or to have once been people in their 
Dreaming. Rose (2011) tells an account of a story which imagines flying foxes as 
having human personalities:  
One of my teachers was Daly Pulkara, a man with a good fund of flying fox stories. 
We were watching the flyout one evening, and he pointed out something interesting. 
The crowd flew over, and then, after the mob was well on its way, a few turned back. 
A bit later, stragglers appeared, following the others but not quite catching up. ‘The 
old people always said those blokes forgot their axes’, Daly told me. I felt like a bit of 
a straggler myself as I tried to catch the drift of the story. Of course, they were shape-
shifters, and when they were men they would have carried axes. ‘They’re always like 
that’, Daly said, ‘one or two are back behind. That’s why the old people said they 
forgot their axes, they had to go back to camp and get them’. […] Within an animist 
worldview, flying foxes are persons, and like any group of human persons some are a 
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bit sloppy, forgetting their axes when they go out foraging, dragging along behind, 
always a bit out of step (Rose, 2011, no page number).
Not only do flying foxes signal the approach of the rainy season, they are also a 
keystone species and have co-evolved with flowering plants as pollen and seed 
dispersers (Rose, 2012). They are able to travel long distances and provide for a 
more diverse gene flow among flowering plants (Rose, 2012). Indeed, how people 
relate to the flying fox, even imaginatively through story, is important for their own 
survival both through the ecological knowledge provided by the flying fox as well as 
in its role in maintaining local flowering plants and the webs of connection which are
entangled with them. It is only through intimate and multi-generational experience 
with flying foxes and their webs that such knowledge has developed as a matter of 
course. Incorporating flying foxes into family groups ensures that they retain value, 
knowledge, and meaning to a group of people for future generations, and that they, 
their landscapes, and their kin will be cared for and deeply loved as blood relatives 
(Rose, 1992). 
It is interesting to consider that both objective science and intergenerational 
experience have come to the conclusion that the flying fox is important to people and
larger landscapes, yet have acted upon and interpreted these findings in very diverse 
ways – the latter in isolating/conserving ways, and the other in engaged/intimate 
ways. This speaks about the divergence of connectivity with non-humans among 
these groups and their differing life and death needs for relationality – science (or the
people behind it) being somewhat removed from the life and death of the flying fox 
value it as a theorised keystone species, whereas the Yarralin need to be engaged 
with the flying fox as a means of life and death in their country (Rose, 2005; 2008; 
Muir et al, 2010). 
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As Rose (2002) describes, ethics in Yarralin country takes the form of a situated 
dialogue with others that is characteristically open and reflexive, such as their 
meaningful dialogue with flying foxes. 
The first is that dialogue begins where one is, and thus is always situated; the second 
is that dialogue is open, and thus that the outcome is not known in advance. Openness 
produces reflexivity, so that one’s own ground becomes destabilized. In open dialogue
one holds one’s self available to be surprised, to be challenged, and to be changed 
(Rose, 2002, p. 175).  
This quote supports the criticism that panpsychism in and of itself does not warrant 
ethical inclusiveness for all. This is because it reveals that the value of such a belief 
system is not in mandating indiscriminate inclusiveness, but in creating ontological 
openness to relationality. If all matter is connective and comprised of a fluid 
conscious fabric, then all matter is a potential relational participant – suddenly we 
become ontologically sensitive to and aware of relationality. When one is open to 
relationality, our ‘ethic’ is then one of communication, responses, understanding, and
evaluation about the meaning and significance of the relationship to ourselves and 
others with whom we are connected. 
Indeed, not all encounters will be significant, as not all relational others are 
significant to our survival or well-being, and so a blind inclusive ethic or valuing all 
others (as described by Plumwood, 1993) because of universal consciousness, is not 
warranted (or practically possible). When the value of panpsychism is re-
conceptualised as a belief system, or a philosophical ecology (see Rose, 2005), rather
than used as evidence or reasoning to pursue an inclusive ethic, proving the 
phenomenon of panpsychism becomes unimportant (Muir et al, 2010; Rose, 2008). 
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It does not matter if the flying foxes in the previous story are real people coming 
back to get their axes, it is the meaning and knowledge (to self, to people) that 
emerges from such an open belief in the mind-like qualities of the flying fox, and all 
of its interconnections, that is significant for relational reciprocity within greater 
webs and landscapes of relation. Openness, dialogue, reflexivity, understanding and 
judgement that flow from panpsychism are critical for discerning who is most 
important and why (Rose, 2005; 2008). An inclusive ethic unintentionally ignores 
these features of relationality by mandating inclusion based on a common 
consciousness (rather than selectively evaluating the unique context and meaning of 
each encounter), and so defeats its own purpose to facilitate respectful engagement in
rich, diverse, and reciprocal relationships.           
8.7 The Importance of Epistemology
As I outlined above, we go through the process of producing accounts and theories of
how panpsychism might work based on the cultures, philosophies, experiential 
knowledge, and quantum physics which supports panpsychist claims of connectivity 
and consciousness. While inquiring minds strive to understand the ‘truth’ of 
concepts, it is the experience of panpsychism, rather than the evidence for it, which 
supports the value and function of panpsychist beliefs, such as those held by the 
Yarralin.  
In the Yarralin example, panpsychism is an embedded part of culture and thought – it
occurs as a matter of course through experience and intergenerational knowledge, 
and is evidenced through interpreted observations which support relationships that 
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work. From a western perspective, Yarralin panpsychism would appear to be rooted 
in belief and tradition. Yarralin belief in a widespread connective conscious 
developed from hundreds of generations of collective experience and communication
with webs of survival (Rose, 1992; 2005; 2008). Panpsychism embodied their 
experience of reality through a relationally purposeful growth and evolution. The 
panpsychist perspective is ‘proved/real/justified’ for them because it ‘works’ and 
‘balances’ life. Such a perspective and the culture and the relationships which flow 
from it support their survival in country – panpsychism is a real time-space 
experience of life (Dukor, 2011; Muir et al, 2001; Rose, 2008). 
For those of us who do not have a panpsychist lineage, and are somewhat 
disconnected and distracted from country (or the country that supports us is not the 
one we experience, such as through imported goods), there is no obvious or 
immediate catalyst or imperative to grow such a relational belief and to embody it 
with the local and distant countries which support our survival. Dukor (2011) makes 
a similar observation of Black African animism/panpsychism. He notes that both 
western/scientific and indigenous/lived forms of panpsychism are based on some 
form of rationality, but it is the indigenous (lived) panpsychism that is set apart as 
being both structural and functional as well as embedded in tradition. While 
western/scientific forms of panpsychism are viewed as a superficial rationalised 
theories, lived panpsychism is what he calls is a ‘structural functional panpsychic 
communicative structure’. 
Western ideas of panpsychism focus on proving its merit to science (such as in 
quantum mechanics) or on proving the intellectual rigour and the soundness of its 
logic (again, also rooted in a tradition of positivism). I come from a western, 
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scientific, materialist background, and many of my target audience members may 
also come from a similar ontological background. As such, proving the logical and 
objective merit of panpsychism forms an important means of validating the adoption 
of such an idea. Indeed, I instinctively treat panpsychism as a possible theory of 
existence, rather than as a matter-of-fact in my everyday life. 
How we approach panpsychism (its epistemology), as a given or belief entrenched in
experience and tradition, or as a questionable theory to be proved, makes a difference
to its relational usefulness. As Klemm and Klink (2008) describe below, 
panpsychism is of little use to scientific cultures, because science is all-knowing. 
There is no perceived need for concepts of relationality or a panpsychist perspective: 
The modern scientific view has no need for either universal mentalism or dualism in 
philosophy. Its explanations of phenomena (and all phenomena are, according to 
modern science, in principle physical phenomena) are entirely naturalistic. Consider 
Newtonian mechanics, through which the modern scientific view of the universe 
became compelling and dominant in the Western tradition, rendering the Cartesian 
line of thought an idiosyncratic branch of speculative philosophy that scientists can 
well ignore. In their initial reception, the principles of Newtonian mechanics seemed 
utterly universal and necessary. Their many successes raised the question: Do 
Newtonian principles exhaustively explain all of reality, including mental reality? If 
so, phenomenology and its domain—the first-person experience of conscious states—
lose their viability. Instead, the prospect looms of a deterministic, utterly material 
universe, completely knowable and predictable by science (Klemm and Klink, 2008, 
p. 309).
To science and science based cultures, panpsychism is, at best, an interesting theory 
of existence, one possibility among many, but not something which touches everyday
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life. The leap from panpsychism as theory to panpsychism as a functional ontology is
not a simple matter of accepting a theory, it goes much deeper, and it requires direct 
embeddment in life and death relationships that necessitate a panpsychist ontology 
among other things like co-created cultures, traditions, histories and lineages (Dukor,
2011). 
While I believe that all matter is composed of a connective consciousness and 
subjectivity, and that there is more to existence than we can observe or measure, I 
formed such a belief mostly through exposure to collaborating stories about 
extrasensory experiences and through reflexivity about my own experiences in this 
analysis. This belief is growing intellectually and theoretically, but it’s not quite an 
integral part of my reality yet – my survival does not depend upon it. Indeed, such a 
belief has made me feel more open to the potential relationships around me, but in 
practice, growth has really only occurred with those most close to me, such as with 
family, friends and my animals. The usefulness of panpsychism to those who do not 
have a panpsychist history/lineage, and who do not really have a personal need for 
such a belief, presents a tricky problem for those like Plumwood and Mathews who 
can see how valuable such an ontology (and its associated culture) would be to 
mainstream human society.  
Rose’s work demonstrates that to the Yarralin people, panpsychism’s relational value
is as an embedded, life and death, belief system which obliges its followers to 
relational openness, reflexivity, responsibility, and discretion with others. In the 
context of parenting, sharing stories, such as that of Princess Mononoke as above, 
may be one way to encourage or support the ontological ground work which may one
day support a deeply felt panpsychist embeddment in webs of relationality. 
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Storytelling is a significant means of relational knowledge transfer and expression in 
Yarralin country, as demonstrated by the stories of Flying Foxes (Rose, 1992; 2005; 
2011), and so perhaps a means of not only encouraging relational openness, but to 
help discern and reflect upon the significance of different relational encounters which
are felt in a particular place.  
8.8 Context and Locality in Panpsychist Storytelling 
As in Yarralin panpsychism, for storytelling to be a useful tool for imparting 
panpsychist knowledge, the story needs to be relevant to local experienced contexts, 
and local webs of relationality need to be continuous, rather than outsourced (Muir et
al, 2010; Rose, 2005; 2008). While the Princess Mononoke story certainly opened 
our minds to complex relationality applicable to 'environmental' crises, it is not 
relevant or useful to our personal lives because many of our sustaining relationships 
do not occur on our own land, but are outsourced to shops and other hidden, often 
distant, localities. 
For example, if we consider Evelyn’s relationship with the jar of lentils, we did not 
grow or harvest the lentils ourselves, we bought them at the store. Evelyn’s most 
significant experiences with the lentils were limited to buying, eating, and playing 
with them. The systems and tangled relationships which brought about their creation 
are somewhat fragmented and distant to us (‘lentil dreaming’ is not in our country, 
we are disconnected from it) (Plumwood, 2008). As Plumwood (2008) describes of 
these 'shadow places':
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In the context of the dominant global consciousness, ideals of dwelling compound this
by encouraging us to direct our honouring of place towards an ‘official' singular 
idealised place consciously identified with self, while disregarding the many 
unrecognised, shadow places that provide our material and ecological support, most of
which, in a global market, are likely to elude our knowledge and responsibility 
(Plumwood, 2008, no page number). 
It is assumed, based on our experience, that lentils will always be available for us to 
buy in the shops, regardless of our relationships within greater webs of relationality, 
and whether we embody their value or not (such as through storytelling and other 
channels of panpsychism). Indeed, if lentils were suddenly unavailable at the shops, 
we would just eat something else, with little or no change to our own well-being.
I can only imagine how Evelyn’s relationship with the lentils would have evolved if 
we grew them ourselves (in fact, we don’t grow any of our own food), if our webs 
and culture of relationality effected their creation, if their creation was not a constant 
given but always pending on relationality, and if they were perceived as a significant 
and valuable part of our own creation and nourishment. In this reality, “Mum, can 
lentils talk?” may have been answered with a meaningful and imaginative story 
about talking lentils, embedded with relational knowledge that may one day help her 
to sustain the creation of lentils. In this case, panpsychism also implores us to create 
relationships that we can touch and feel, which may imply locality (insomuch that we
are connective/embedded/aware participants). For such a belief to be useful, we need
to sustain our lives with felt resources which we can experience within greater webs, 
that are accessible for dialogue, and whose value imminently impends on our own 
lives and culture. 
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In the Yarralin culture, stories are embedded with knowledge that can be 
experienced, and such stories are not just for children, but are for all ages, and treated
with reverence as ‘real’ and valuable (Rose, 1992; 2005; 2011). In contrast, many 
children’s stories in Australian culture are treated superficially as entertainment or as
a tool for learning to read, talk, create and/or learn moral lessons. There are 
thousands of stories for children, usually delivered through books, television and 
music. Adults rarely consider these stories as important to their own lives, or express 
belief in or stress the importance of the subject matter. They are of fictional 
characters that children never or rarely encounter in lived experience. If they do 
encounter them in lived experience there is little meaningful connection to the story 
(because the story was likely forgotten and/or not relevant to lived experience). 
Mathews (2003) describes the background presence of fairy tales and panpsychism in
western culture: 
Fairy tales represent a surprisingly vital residue of archaic consciousness in the 
modern episteme. We are all brought up on fairy tales or the echoes thereof in other 
fiction. These stories have been relegated to the domestic sphere where they lead an 
underground but enduring life as children’s lore, handed from one generation to the 
next primarily by mothers and other female carers. The consciousness expressed in 
fairy tales is thus deeply familiar to us even while it is roundly contradicted and 
repudiated by every tenet, every founding principle, of modern life (Mathews, 2003, 
p.17).
Animism features frequently in western children’s stories, and sometimes that 
follows an underlying panpsychist belief, but the connection between lived 
experience and stories is limited. Stories often contain limited ecological or relational
knowledge, and they are rarely told, connected or reflected upon during lived 
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encounters. As such, in conjunction with situating the story locally in some way, 
stories like Princess Mononoke might be more likely to provide ontological guidance
if caregivers create a dialogue with children about the story and relate it to lived 
experiences in particular places of significance. 
Despite watching Princess Mononoke many times (sometimes every night for several
days) over the past year, Evelyn and I rarely had discussions about the relational 
themes in the movie, beyond just reflecting some obvious and interesting plot points. 
After watching the movie recently, I decided to ask Evelyn about the meanings she 
derived from it:
(Conversation from July 2016, Evelyn’s age: 3.5 years old)
Me: “Hey, Evelyn, what do you think about the movie Princess Mononoke?”
Evelyn: “Good”
Me: “Hummm, yeah, I think it’s a great movie too. Do you think that our trees on the
block [of land] have spirits too?”
Evelyn: “No, we don’t have a Forest Spirit. The trees are not alive.”
Me: “I think that the movie was trying to show us that life is all around, and that it 
always comes back, even when Daemons and Gods and humans fight and destroy 
it.”
Evelyn seemed uninterested and slightly suspicious of my conversation about the 
movie, and then changed the topic to a more interesting aspect of the movie.
209
Chapter 8
Evelyn, excitedly yells: “The pig was a daemon and had blood coming out of his 
mouth! Ashitaka killed him!”  
Clearly, more dialogue, local experience relating to the story (such as experiences 
relating to the movie in our own forest), and perhaps more maturity is needed to 
understand the significance of the movie, and of panpsychism in our own lives.    
8.9 Conclusion
Panpsychism acknowledges that experience and subjectivity are intrinsic to all 
matter, but I conclude that this does not warrant the universal adoption of an 
inclusive ethic, neither does it provide a practical means of living such an ethic. 
Panpsychism is valuable because it entails the recognition of a connective conscious 
and implores individuals to develop an ontological perspective which is open to the 
potential for relationality with any non-human other, and it acknowledges the 
connective fabric and meaning-making of the universe. Openness to relationality, 
while engaged in relational experience, gives way to reflexivity about those 
experiences. Such reflexivity includes discernment and judgement as to the meaning 
and significance of relationships to ones self. Different others have different places in
the moral hierarchy of the person, and so different relationships receive different 
forms and quantities of time/space/value/cultural resources and respect. Values and 
their hierarchies do not create dualism, they are intrinsic to relationships in an 
infinitely complex world, reciprocal or not.   
From a practical standpoint, moral hierarchies are an important part of focusing on 
those kin which are most significant to our web of survival. Indeed, the Yarralin 
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seemed to form more direct intimate and communicative relationships with animals 
that were observed or imagined as human-like (like the flying fox), while other less 
human-like matter, like plants and landscape features, were valued because of their 
meaning as substrates in larger webs of relation (such as a Dreaming site which holds
complex ecological and cultural knowledge) or because of their direct utility or 
consumption (such as food) (Rose, 1992; 2008; 2011). Respect did not necessarily 
take the form of valuing the subjectivity of others in their own right (as Plumwood 
1993 suggests it should be), but rather others were interpreted and understood 
through highly experiential, yet very human perspectives and meanings. As I learned 
from the Yarralin stories of flying foxes, respect for significant interdependent kin 
didn’t necessarily require an accurate understanding of their subjectivity, rather it 
constituted the formation of an understanding that was relationally purposeful and 
based on deep experiences. This may mean that (Plumwood’s) rules, such as 
‘respecting difference’ and ‘intentionality’, need not be set in stone for panpsychism 
to be ‘fit for purpose’.      
As in the Yarralin and Princess Mononoke examples, storytelling can facilitate an 
understanding of the greater webs of interdependence in a particular locality, 
including the development of internal ethical responses to relational values. These 
examples of storytelling endeared panpsychist themes through the imaginative 
animation of the other-than-human world. Storytelling revealed that panpsychism 
may be more useful to the praxis of environmental scholarship as an underlying 
assumption about life (or a functional and experienced belief about the world), rather
than as a ‘proved’ theory which describes the physics of consciousness and mandates
an inclusive ethic. 
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Moreover, for storytelling to have significant meanings for children beyond the 
screen, parents and carers need to talk about the relational themes of stories in 
conjunction with local experiences of interconnection. Storytellers prime the 
ontological and epistemological attitudes of their audience, but it takes other people 
to ‘pull out’, unpack, and reflect upon its significant themes, and make the meaning 
of stories relevant in lived practice and experienced relationships. Furthermore, if the
webs of relationality described in stories are not situated within the context of local 
relationships or within reach of dialogue (or not interpreted to have local meanings), 
then they may fail to have much ontological or epistemological impact.  
In closing, I think we must accept that there is no flawless ethic or way of relating 
with others – panpsychism does not promise relational perfection, it merely beats a 
path of relational possibility. Our relationships with different kin are going to be 
different from each other. Some we will understand better than others, some we will 
respect better than others, and ultimately some kin will get squashed while others 
won’t. Relationality entails a range of experiences which exist along a continuum, 
and flow through time and space, continually changing and avoiding permanent 
definition. Ecofeminists or ecophilosophers don't need to describe or achieve some 
grand perfection of relationality with the world that is logically solid and rigorous. 
The aims of such scholars may really only need to entail growing a relational 
awareness of individuals to sustain a dialogue with significant kin and country. This 
can take many forms. Concepts of relationality can only ever be ‘good enough’, and 
what constitutes ‘good enough’ is always going to be contextually contingent and a 
matter of perspective. 
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In the next chapter, the synthesis and conclusion, I will explore the importance of 
open and intimate experience with matter and interdependent others. Through 
relational experience and engagement, our ethical response may be formed as a 
matter of course within the growth of relational encounters, rather than as a matter 
determined by indiscriminately imposed concepts, such as an inclusive ethic. That 
dialogue can be hierarchical and respectful, but the distinction is context-dependent 
and thus somewhat irrelevant. Rather, it is the complex relational discernment and 
experimentation which comes with engagement that situates our place amongst 
others.
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Chapter 9 Synthesis and Conclusion
In this chapter, I will consider my analysis as a whole, and pull out and clarify the 
most significant findings of this work. I will frame them within the bigger picture of 
relationality as well as emphasise why certain findings contribute to addressing the 
aims of this thesis – to strengthen and understand the dialogue between parenting and
relational philosophies, especially in regards to relational praxis.  
9.1 An Evolved Understanding of Relationality 
9.1.1 Integration of Key Findings
As I have described throughout this thesis, theories of relationality challenge the 
instrumental and one-sided approaches toward others, and adopt an ontological and 
epistemological repositioning focused on the connective, interactive, subjective, 
contextual, and responsive aspects of self and other. These ideas of relationality 
reflect how we would like to live, but they cannot guarantee what is or can be lived. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that a perfect praxis will come from a perfected theory. 
Throughout this thesis, dualistic ideologies and practices have been assumed or 
framed as antagonists to the type of relationality proposed by such scholarship. As 
discussed previously, Plumwood (1993) is concerned with dismantling dualisms in a 
way which seamlessly reconnects the fragmented participants and their diverse 
qualities (Booth, 2013; Mathews, 2017; Plumwood, 1993). She argues that moving 
from one extreme, like an oppressive patriarchy, to another, such as an ecofemist 
matriarchy, does not resolve the dysfunctional or oppressive qualities of such 
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relationships. Moving between extremes (in both theory and practice), or simply 
rejecting and redefining the parts of relationships, neglects a consideration of the 
infinite diversity of entities, their connections, and their experiences as they are, 
embedded within unique contexts and subjective landscapes (Booth, 2013; Mathews,
2017; Plumwood, 1993).         
As I have come to understand, relationships are blurred and smeared on a continuum,
and the complexity of spatial and temporal relations often defy simple definition or 
hard boundaries. It is easy to slip into thinking about dualism, relationality, and 
similar concepts as simple things to be used, or as occurrences which happen within 
defined boundaries. Many of my parenting experiences, that I have included here, 
reveal that reciprocal intentions do not always equate to reciprocal practices, and that
reciprocal practices do not always facilitate reciprocal relationships. 
In Chapter 5, I outlined the five qualities of dualistic practice as described by 
Plumwood (1993), and illustrated how these qualities were evident in the culturally 
shaped parenting practice of sleep training infants and toddlers. The practice of sleep 
training infants revealed that parenting practice also harbours threads of oppressive 
dualistic logic, and represents one of the many different ways in which the next 
generation of people may embody ideologies of mastery, abstract reasoning, 
rationalism, and dualistic oppression. It is from this initial awaking that I begin to 
question the underlying fabric of our relational reality, to seek clarity about what can 
make relationships oppressively dualistic, and to consider ways in which to heal 
them and forge new reciprocal relationships.
This particular chapter was written early in my PhD process, and written from the 
simple perspective that dualisms of oppression are ‘bad’ for everything and everyone
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and should be rejected. Whereas their alternatives or extreme opposites, such as 
purely reciprocal relationships, are ‘good’ and welcomed. Such an assumption is 
perhaps a reflection of my ignorance or lack of awareness of the profound 
complexity of worldly relationships. I viewed the world through a polarised and 
rational lens as a set of ideals and pure definable phenomena to be either rejected or 
adopted. 
For instance, I argued that sleep training and its underlying dualistic logic were 
oppressive and therefore unwanted in an ideal relational world, and proposed that 
practices such as bed-sharing were a more respectful and mutual solution to the 
‘problem of infant sleep’. The ease with which dualisms and their opponents could 
be defined - in terms of good and bad - started to unravel when I questioned 
paradoxical situations where oppressive treatments may seem to be the most 
relationally viable option in certain contexts. For instance, in situations where parents
are suffering extreme sleep deprivation, sleep training may be viewed as the only 
practical means of preventing even more extreme physical or relational damage to 
both parent and child. 
While I still maintain that the cultural phenomenon of routine sleep training is 
steeped in a complex history of dualistic logic and mastery, I have become open to 
the possibility that oppression may not always be avoidable in certain relational 
contexts. This analysis highlighted that there may be no perfect world devoid of 
dualism, and that my understanding of relationships need not exclude one perceived 
‘type’ (like dualism) for another. It may even be possible that the tension of 
oppressive relationships can act as a catalyst for the formation of more reciprocal 
ones (as is also theorised about the evolution of mutualistic gut bacteria), and that 
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such relationships are spatio-temporally complex and dynamic, rather than easily and
statically definable. 
After identifying dualistic logic in sleep training practice, I began to wonder when 
control over an other – an other who requires guidance and care - was not 
oppressively dualistic. In Chapter 6, I analysed concepts of self and other, 
leadership, and solidarity to create a greater understanding of how to care for 
interdependent others without falling to the extreme ends of permissiveness or 
authoritarianism. I concluded, in line with Plumwood (1991; 1993; 2002), that the 
differences between self and other are significant to their relational potential, and 
therefore valuable in their own right. Self should not need to be merged with other to 
be able to form reciprocal relationships. Self, as a centre of subjectivity, is a critical 
player in connective relationships. Equally, self-interested barriers help to maintain 
the connective and reciprocating nature of relationships by preventing one part from 
damaging the other – knowingly or not - and by reinforcing the core attachment of 
the relational participants. Expressing and enforcing relational limits is but one of 
many means of creating relational dialogue. 
I also explored leadership and solidarity as examples of caregiver power that are 
usually not oppressive. Plumwood (1991; 2002) and Scholz (2008; 2013) argue that 
participants of unequal power can unite over common causes and in solidarity. As 
such, a stronger leader may make decisions which are not democratic, but that 
support the common cause. Valuing one’s own existence (and connection to others) 
can be seen as a common cause, and so actions to preserve that existence (such as to 
restrain Evelyn against her will when around car traffic), were not oppressive, but 
supportive of a shared cause and of the relationship as a whole. Indeed, as Plumwood
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(1991; 1993; 2002) argues, standing with another in solidarity need not negate the 
differences of individual selves nor entail fear and avoidance of the suffering caused 
by attachment to significant others. Standing in solidarity with another does not 
imply that self or others conform to relational ideals, because conflict, discontent, 
and tension can lead to greater relational understandings and practices, especially 
when reflexively engaged. In these moments, the lines between instrumentalism and 
leadership, and between solidarity and oppression, can blur and shift. 
In Chapter 7, I delved more deeply into the fabric of relational encounter to consider 
the ethical frameworks that guide relationality. I broadly considered closed-ended 
moral codes and open-ended ethics, linking closed-ended morality, such as 
decontextualized and objective rules for living and interacting, to dualistic logic and 
rationalism, and open-ended ethics to the dialogical and metaphysical philosophies of
Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose. I discussed Boyce (2014) and Mathew’s (2003) 
theories about how closed-ended moral codes were evident in the Christian story of 
creation, which has deeply influenced western cultures of domination. Judgement, 
such as forms of punishment and shaming or rewarding and praising, were the 
primary means of upholding these moral codes and of maintaining a relatively ‘safe’ 
and stable social order (Mathews, 2003). 
Initially, I assumed that all judgement was oppressively dualistic – to take the 
perspective and will of one being or group and apply it universally to rate, rank and 
regulate others. While actively and outwardly judging others may turn into 
oppression and deny the subjectivity and value of others, internal forms of judgement
can also be an important part of more reciprocal forms of relationality. Reflecting 
upon the parenting situations when I hurt Evelyn, I judged my actions against my 
218
Chapter 9
internal ethic of care for Evelyn, which mustered feelings of guilt. Such powerful 
guilt motivated me to find ways to prevent such hurtful actions in the future.
I concluded that open-ended ethics develop through experience, reflexivity, including
self-judgement or guilt, and empathetic guidance from others. While open-ended 
ethics are more socially risky than rule-based morals, they allow individuals to more 
fluidly relate to others in light of multiple subjectivities and contexts (Mathews, 
2003). Based on these understandings, questioning the assumptions and norms of self
and other (Why do I think X? Why do others think X? Why do I value X? and so on) 
is an important means of unveiling hidden ethical or moral frameworks and their 
embedded power structures. 
In this chapter, I proposed that setting ‘empathetic limits’ may be one way in which 
parents could move beyond outwardly judgemental 'reward and punishment' methods
of communicating and enforcing relational boundaries. My experience of learning 
how to set empathetic limits with Evelyn revealed the importance of moving beyond 
merely following logical instructions to achieve a perfected ‘success’, but to embrace
and navigate the difficult and confrontational aspects of relational life. 
In the story that I analysed, I wanted to stop Evelyn drawing on the floor, while also 
validating her perspective and emotional reactions to the limit. I found it difficult at 
times to understand her experience and what she was feeling, while trying to 
suppress my own anxieties about if I was ‘doing it right’. Indeed, I assumed that my 
practice of setting empathetic limits would make such relational work easier, in that 
my validation of her experience would help her to accept the limit, calm down faster,
and move on. I later reflected that the relational value of such empathetic limit 
setting was in maintaining connection through struggle. Maintaining connection was 
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supported by upholding dialogical and thoughtful boundaries which ensured the 
mental and physical safety of self and others. By welcoming and accepting her 
feelings, the encounter was not personally adversarial or oppressive, but an event of 
coming to understand one another and our unique boundaries and connections. I 
understood that developing and embodying the nuances of such practices took time - 
time to reflexively understand relationships in the present and to move past the 
training and assumptions created by past experiences.   
In Chapter 8, my analysis of panpsychism helped me to understand whom we value 
as kin and worthy of ethical consideration. Mathews (2003) describes panpsychism 
as a fundamental physic, mind-like, or consciousness quality of the universe and its 
matter. Plumwood (1991; 1993; 2002) indicated that if all matter is conscious, then 
an inclusive ethic is warranted. In line with Andrews (1998), I argue that 
panpsychism does not mandate an inclusive ethic, nor does it provide a means of 
living such an ethic. Individuals must judge what relationships are important to their 
own interests, and so allocate time and energy to understanding those core 
relationships. Therefore, value and moral hierarchies (often considered a feature of 
oppressive dualisms) are not necessarily dualistic, but are essential for discerning 
what and who is most important in a diverse and complex world. 
As I reflect, I do not and cannot apply the same ethical position to my daughter as I 
do to my lentils – I cannot be inclusive of all conscious entities. My connection to 
and relationship with my daughter is many times more valuable to me and my well-
being than is my relationship to the lentils. Furthermore, it is not physically possible 
to give every being in my world, if it is even possible to know all these beings, 
enough time and attention to form a unique understanding and ethical approach to 
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each one. I am not able to understand the subjectivity or consciousness of the lentils 
because they are so very different from me, whereas my daughter is very much like 
me - we communicate, sense, and understand in comparatively similar ways. 
Therefore, the depth of our relationship is greater and more significant to the both of 
us, and thus the relational frameworks that I have evolved to relate to my daughter 
are privileged. I need to judge and rank the importance and value of different kin so 
that I can allocate my time for engagement to those most critical in my own well-
being. Judgement and the creation of moral hierarchies, as in internal reasoning, 
helps individuals to determine which kin to keep close, and which kin to let be 
(Mathews, 2003). 
Plumwood also states that the subjectivities of others should be valued in their own 
right, but as Rose demonstrates with Aboriginal examples (Rose, 2002; 2005; 2011), 
respect for significant others need not require an understanding of their subjectivity, 
as this may not even be possible. Rather, respect entails responsiveness and 
experience with others which is purposeful and situationally located in landscapes, 
amongst other things, and distributed through time and space.
Therefore, the value of panpsychism is not to justify a call for an inclusive ethic or 
universal understandings of respect, but to open our eyes to relational possibilities. If 
the world is composed of infinitely complex manifestations of consciousness, even if
we only believe that it is that way regardless of ‘hard’ proof, such thinking opens our
ontological and epistemological approach towards others. It requires us to be 
ontologically and epistemologically open, to understand context, to be active and 
engaged in relationships, and to acknowledge that there are many others (seen and 
unseen) who are also active in relationships that touch us. 
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Through my analysis, I came to the conclusion that panpsychism does not happen 
merely by believing in a form of universal consciousness. It requires that one is 
aware, mindful, embedded, and engaged with those whom supports one and those 
whom one, in-turn, supports. As such, the bridge between relational theory and 
practice is engagement. Not just as a visitation with others, but as a deep engagement
where we can feel - emotionally, spiritually, and physically - our interdependence 
with certain others. Such engagement also requires us to be reflexive, such as to 
question ourselves and others, so as to continually grow our relational 
understandings through changing contexts, and to help us move beyond damaging 
and dysfunctional ways of being. As Mathews (2003) explains, the kind of 
engagement which fosters a dialogical relationality, much like panpsychism, is felt as
much as, if not more, than  ‘known’ or communicated:  
We are not interested in explaining why they are as they are, but rather in engaging 
with them as they are. We seek to make contact with the self that they know, the self 
as they experience it – the subjective aspect of their being – rather than with aspects of
the self that are outside their experience, such as synapses and neural pathways and 
unconscious behaviour patterns. When such contact with the self as they experience it 
– as subject – is made, and they communicate to us something of the meanings they 
have for them-selves, we do in fact share a deep sense of mutual knowing, but this is a
felt form of knowing, only secondarily translatable into information (Mathews, 2003, 
p.78).     
My parenting experiences, and subsequent analysis, revealed to me that relational 
understandings, such as of dualisms, are much more complicated and challenging in 
practice. As such, it is deep reflexive engagement that can bridge the gap between 
ideals of relationality and dynamic, dialogical, and evolving relational practices. If 
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panpsychism calls us to be open to relational opportunities with all matter, then the 
depth of ones engagement with matter is critical for uncovering new relational 
opportunities and of recognising extant relationships which, may be hidden or taken-
for-granted, but still support our lives.
9.1.2 Reflexive Engagement
The main aim for a praxis of environmental theories need not simply be to apply and 
achieve them, but rather to interpret and try them. Adopting such an approach can 
reveal new questions, insights, and assumptions about the world, thereby leading to 
more novel and dynamic theories and practices including, in this instance, those of 
relationality. Heidegger (1927/1962) theorised that equipment is more than static and
isolated objects, but the complex totality of human intention and agency, the 
equipment's connections with other systems, beings, and tools, and its technological 
and material qualities. In order to understand equipment and its place in the world, 
Heidegger considered equipment as an experience, and thus to understand the 
experience of equipment, one had to be reflexive about their engagement with 
equipment (Heidegger, 1927/1962; see also Harnesk and Thapa, 2016 ).       
Reflexivity is a fundamental component of engagement because it critically 
examines self-awareness and moderates the changes that take place during 
engagement. The process of engagement creates a constant feedback loop among 
those beings and materials involved in it, and this continuous, reflexive process 
guides the direction and meaning of the experience. Of course, the depth and shape 
of the reflexivity can vary greatly between individuals and in different contexts, and 
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thus the power of reflexivity to create new languages for connecting with others is as 
diverse as the individuals themselves. 
Reflexivity takes place within individual selves, and so phenomena and concepts of 
the self are also crucial to relational engagement. When we become aware of the 
particular qualities of our own subjectivity, our self, as both permeable with all other 
selves, yet also a distinct centre, then we can appreciate others as they are and the 
meanings they may place on their own encounters (Mathews, 2003). In other words, 
to engage fully within a world of relationality, we must not neglect the role of the 
self, especially the reflexive self, in motivating and mediating engagement with 
others. The active dialogue of self and other drives internal developments, and 
internal developments then cycle back to moderate the interactions of self and others.
In my previous analyses, relational ethics have been described in terms of respect for 
otherness (Mathews, 2005; 2008; Plumwood, 1991; 1993), and ‘letting be’, such as 
when one accepts processes of relationality rather than abstractedly managing them 
(Mathews, 2005; Rose, 1992). Likewise, it involves discerning ones position in 
relation to others through a responsive dialogue (Rose, 2002; 2005; Plumwood, 
1993), and a responsibility to openly consider the possibility of relationships with all 
others (Rose, 1992; 2002; Mathews, 2005; Plumwood, 1993). Reflexive engagement 
may be a significant part of fostering these kinds of internalised open-ended ethical 
positions in individuals. 
Mathews (2008) proposes that to facilitate an ethic which entails sensitivity for 
others, the individuals involved need to engage synergistically:
Synergy was defined earlier as any form of intentional interactivity between two or 
more parties who engage with each other in such a way that something new and larger 
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than either of them, but true to the inner principle of each, is created. Synergy then 
provides new and larger opportunities for the expression of the inner principle of both 
parties (Mathews, 2008, p.50).
Synergy encompasses active engagement between relational participants, which is 
transformative and creative, yet also speaks to the inner qualities and self-interests of
the individuals. The development of a relational ethic through such synergistic 
engagement may not always be pleasant, but it will be sensitive to and reflective of 
the dynamic between self and other in the context of the moment (Mathews, 2003). 
As Rose (2002) describes, a dialogical ethic is a responsibility to be open and 
responsive with others. As such, the ethic is not to uphold particular moral rules, but 
to be engaged in the moment and context of the relationship. 
I suggest that play is one such form of synergistic engagement that can be manifest in
parenting practice. Parents may have a great deal of sway in the way children play in 
the world, such as by creating or allowing opportunities for play, creating or 
moderating the landscapes of play, and through supporting different ontologies and 
epistemologies through and about play. 
Shields (2015) implores us to move beyond the materialistic views of play of late 
modernity, where this activity is understood as physical events of cultural and social 
origin. Instead, play should be considered as a more fundamental force of the 
universe, shaping the subjective ontological position of the individual.  In her 
argument, Shields (2015) frames play as a force which opens up new worlds of 
being, and new means of expressing those experiences, such as with new languages. 
Playfulness is not just a personal quality or behaviour, but rather can be a position 
225
Chapter 9
toward the world that challenges and rebels against the status quo.  She concludes 
that play is consciousness: 
Consciousness, in this view, is play at it its most basic level—we have no real control 
over it, it is fluid, shifting, multilayered, mysterious, pleasurable, whirling, 
overwhelming. It is not real in the sense that it is one order removed from the material 
world and thus from interaction. Every sensory input is first filtered through, or 
produced by, the brain at the cellular level and then reproduced in the form of 
conscious thought (Shields, 2015, p.306).
While Shield’s take on consciousness is largely focused on the physical happenings 
within the brain, this connection between consciousness and play draws in my 
previous analysis of panpsychism – of a unity of mind and matter. Play can then be 
viewed as a very specific and active way of experiencing a world of fundamental 
consciousness – or rather, panpsychism may describe a world of playing matter. It is 
the action of openly engaging in play that builds understandings of others and opens 
up opportunities for relationships among human and non-human selves and others. 
Similarly, postmodern and other theoretical discourses, such as those pertaining to 
environmental ethics in this thesis, also 'play', in the sense that texts, meanings, and 
ideas connect and engage with one another to create something greater than 
themselves. Play, and its many forms, theories, understandings, and applications 
warrants further exploration and research.   
9.1.3 Love and Anxiety
As I come to the end of this thesis I ponder a very basic, yet fundamental question: 
why would environmental scholars or parents care about relationality with others, or 
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even be motivated to engage and grow relationally? Why did I want to parent 
respectfully, and why do I care enough to want to write a PhD thesis about it? When 
I reflect upon my motivations for exploring relationality, I feel underpinning love 
accompanied by anxiety. I love Evelyn and so want to treat her with respect, and 
likewise I feel sentimental attachment to and interest in the non-human world. A 
motivation to engage with these beings originates from my love of them, as well as 
my concern for them. It would be logical to assume that many environmental 
scholars are also motivated to create and communicate their work by an underlying 
love and concern for non-human worlds.
Love is an integral part of our bond with others which provokes us to protect and 
connect with them, as we come to understand the ways in which their lives are 
integral to our own. Such love for another can also come with the burden of anxiety. 
We worry about their well-being, our connection to them, and therefore worry about 
our collective well-being. As previously discussed, Immergut and Kaufman (2014) 
argue that feeling anxiety about another is symptomatic of a dualistic mentality, as 
self cannot be defined without the duality of the other. They go on to propose the 
concept of ‘no-self’, criticised by Plumwood (1993) as yet another extreme reaction 
to dualism which neglects the diversity and subjectivity of entities and their 
experiences. I also argue that the anxious-self need not be dualistic, and that anxiety 
can motivate connection, care, and responsibility for others, as it can do in parenting.
Love and anxiety have their place in both environmental and parenting discourses 
alike. It is no surprise that Plumwood, Mathews, and Rose have all described the 
fundamental place of love in their work and indeed in their own lives. As Plumwood 
(1991) describes the role of love and care for others in webs of relationality:
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With nature, as with the human sphere, the capacity to care, to experience sympathy, 
understanding, and sensitivity to the situation and fate of particular others, and to take 
responsibility for others is an index of our moral being. Special relationship with, care 
for, or empathy with particular aspects of nature as experiences rather than with nature
as abstraction are essential to provide a depth and type of concern that is not otherwise
possible. Care and responsibility for particular animals, trees, and rivers that are 
known well, loved, and appropriately connected to the self are an important basis for 
acquiring a wider, more generalized concern (Plumwood, 1991, p. 7).
Mathews (2003) describes love as a process of coming to know one’s self through 
the struggles and dialogues that arises from enmeshment within the life of another. 
When we know ourselves, as a result of knowing another, engagement may endure 
through their awareness of connection and the thrill of possibility that comes with 
openness. Indeed, as she alludes, such attachment cannot be guaranteed, and thus 
there always lingers an anxiety of loss of the other:
What happens when we fall in love? We become permeable to another subjectivity. 
Our own subjectivity is cracked open by contact with an other, or even by the prospect
of such contact. […] It is arguably only when we fall in love that we are inducted into 
the essence of the life experience, if this essence is understood as a function of 
participation in an infinitely responsive, infinitely animate world. […] When our 
world is beloved, which is to say, when we are erotically engaged with world via its 
local modality of land or place, then the state of being-in-love is relatively enduring, 
for world necessarily retains its unknowability, its inexhaustibility, its mystery. Once 
opened to its subjectivity, we remain open – permeable, transmutable, alive to the call 
of life. On the other hand, while world as our beloved may never be encompassed 
[original emphasis], it can be lost (Mathews, 2003, p. 19). 
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Rose (2002) describes love as an integral part of connection with others, and of being
situated in the world. Love is something that is strengthened by engagement, and 
such love is extended to non-humans and landscapes as a matter of course and 
permeation in a place:
The country "gets under the skin" or "gets into the blood"; people become "married to"
their country. This is the language of kinship: of flesh and blood, love and marriage. It
is a language of emplacement: of keeping your body in the place, and putting your 
labour into the place, of learning to know the place, and of being available to the 
place. It is, thus, a language of permeability: the dust gets up your nose and into the 
crevices of your skin, it mingles with your sweat and personalises your hat band even 
as your own fluids wash into the ground (Rose, 2002, p. 313).
The felt experience of love feeds into our judgements of whom we value and why. 
To love someone can be both a manifestation of physiological states of the body 
(such as the hormones that flow through a mother’s body and drive her to bond with 
her baby) and of long and meaningful engagement (love can deepen and mature as 
we spend time with others). In this way, love and anxiety are cyclic and flowing. We 
engage with others because we love them, and because we love them we are 
motivated to keep engaging with them. Equally, we worry about those we love 
because their well-being touches us, and yet as love evolves through time, we 
sometimes have to let go of our worry and acknowledge that others are also agents in
the world, and have their own struggles to face for which we are not responsible.  We
can grow love when we intimately engage with others, and we are motivated to 
continue engaging and improve our relationships because we are able to love and 
care.  
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Parenting is an obvious praxis of feeling love and anxiety for another – sometimes 
parenting is overwhelming in this aspect. Love is expressed and received in infinitely
complex ways, from helping our children with their everyday care, to physical 
closeness and emotional support. Indeed, sometimes the intense feeling of love 
between parent and child can be felt before birth. 
It is imperative, then, to consider the conditionality of love. In authoritarian and 
behaviourist parenting traditions discussed throughout this thesis, love is used as a 
conditional currency – as praise or punishment to manipulate children’s external 
behaviour. Kohn (2005) describes the currency of love in parenting: 
In our society, we are taught that good things must always be earned, never given 
away. […] Ultimately, conditional parenting reflects a tendency to see almost every 
human interaction, even among family members, as a kind of economic transaction. 
The laws of the marketplace – supply and demand, tit for tat – have assumed the status
of universal and absolute principles, as though everything in our lives, including what 
we do with our children, is analogous to buying a car or renting an apartment. […] 
Even many writers and therapists who don’t address the issue explicitly nevertheless 
seem to rely on some sort of economic model. If we read between the lines, their 
advice appears to be based on the belief that when children don’t act the way we want,
the things they like ought to be withheld from them. After all, people shouldn’t get 
something for nothing. Not even happiness. Or love (Kohn, 2005, p. 23).
To love another without conditions is important in underpinning dialogical forms of 
parenting, because the very basis of a dialogical ethic is the acceptance of others, as 
they are, as unique centres of subjectivity. From this position, we engage with others,
not to change them to conform to our version of the world, but to grow with them in 
an infinitely complex and diverse universe. 
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Acceptance and knowledge of self is critical to knowing one’s self as a situated and 
relational being. To reflect upon one’s self, one’s perceptions, one’s actions, and 
one’s boundaries (to protect self), is to question and understand where self fits with 
other, and to know why other is important to self (or not) and so strengthen relational
connections. As discussed, Plumwood (1993) argues for the importance of self (in 
theory and practice) and of acknowledging the infinitely diverse versions of self 
which perpetuate the universe. However, when love is conditional on pleasing the 
other, then a fragile ‘false-self’ develops. As Kohn (2005) describes:  
That, in turn, may lead a given adolescent to construct a “false-self” – in other words, 
to pretend to be the kind of person whom his or her parents will love. This desperate 
strategy to gain acceptance is often associated with depression, a sense of 
hopelessness, and a tendency to lose touch with one’s true self. At some point, such 
teenagers may not even know who they really are because they’ve had to work so hard
to become something they’re not (Kohn, 2005, p.23).
If love is conditional, and we lose sight of a genuine sense of self and of other selves,
then our connections to others may also be flimsy and uncertain, because ‘common 
ground’ may also be non-genuine. The conditionality of love appears to be a very 
complex dynamic, and so it may be valuable to consider its significance through 
further experiential study within the context of relational environmental scholarship. 
9.2 Conclusion
To directly address my research question, this thesis contributes to relational 
environmental scholarship in several ways. It demonstrates that the relational 
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philosophies and ethics of Mathews, Plumwood, and Rose can be applied to (my) 
parenting practice. Exploring the dynamics of such intimate and personal 
relationships among and between individual people may help people to understand 
our relationships with more-than-human others. This research argues that the 
cultures, values, and ethical frameworks that are deemed influential for relationships 
categorised as environmental, are not just isolated between people and non-humans –
after all, ‘environment’ is just a conceptual boundary between people and non-
people. The ways in which we love and care for our children, and love and care for 
all others, including non-humans, are continuous and connected. All relationships are
messily tangled and colour each other in vastly complex and incomprehensible ways.
As I have suggested, the formative relationships we have in childhood likely provide 
profound relational scaffolds that underpin other relationships, human or non-human,
which touch our lives. Childhood is the time in our lives when we are vulnerable to 
others, yet also open to being enmeshed within the world. Therefore, parenting 
relationships are very relevant to relational environmental scholarship, as well as 
many other ontologically focused causes. Parenting reveals a potential praxis for 
relational theory, but also suggests an arena where relational theories may be 
experienced, reflected upon, and evolved.   
Much like this thesis, research that examines the experience of interpreting relational 
environmental scholarship and applying it to life may help to further bridge the gap 
between theory and praxis. Such relational work may provide a certain questioning 
path for growth, rather than philosophical end-state ideals. While I privilege the 
philosophies of Rose, Mathews, and Plumwood, their ideas do not constitute any 
final goal, but are inspirational fodder for questioning my own relational world. This 
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process has impressed upon me the need to remain open to relational possibility, to 
question rules for living and assumptions about our place amongst others, to accept 
that no process, relationship, being, or concept will be perfect or ideal in practice, 
and to consider relational encounters individually and dialogically. Environmental 
philosophy and ethics can inform practical relationships, such as parenting practice, 
and make some long-term strides in addressing the human-driven destruction of 
ourselves and others. Parenting practice, informed by ideas of relationality, may 
foster the abilities of future generations to question and reflect upon their 
relationships of care, and thus evolve and refine their ethics and practices of relating 
to others and pass such knowledge on. 
  
Their voices were heard! They rang out clear and clean. And the elephant smiled.
“Do you see what I mean?... They’ve proved they ARE persons, no matter how
small. And their whole world was saved by the Smallest of All!”
(Seuss, 1954, p. 58)
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Figure 8 - Evelyn, now (2017) 4 years old, with her
goats. Photo credit: Kaseen Cook
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